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 Palestinian Women’s Movements and Their Relations With the Palestinian Nationalist 
Movement: A History of Partnership and A Future of Challenging Cooperation 
Ihab Aldaqqaq 
This study investigates the relationship between Palestinian Women’s Movement(s) (PWMs) 
and the Palestinian Nationalist Movement (PNM). A closer look at the descriptive research 
about (PWMs) indicates that both movements have generally been perceived as one entity by 
some Palestinian activists as well as scholars who have explored Palestinian nationalism.  
Here, we address questions about the nature of women’s activism in Palestine and seek to 
assess to what extent this organizing and mobilization form a social movement, particularly 
questions that focus on important factors such as faction dynamics, funding dynamics, 
perceptions and relationships issues, leadership features and religion dynamics.  
Taking into consideration the specificity of women’s movements in a nation that has 
survived military occupation for over five decades under military occupation, this research 
draws on a number of theories, including resource mobilization and resource dependence as 
well as political opportunity theories. The research is rooted in extensive interviews with 
former and current women activists, in addition to chief executive officers (CEOs) of 
Palestinian women’s movement organizations located in the West Bank, Palestine. 
Moreover, the researcher utilizes thematic analysis. This study is among very few that seek to 
shed light on women’s activism in Palestine “West Bank and East Jerusalem” through the 
eyes of a Palestinian-born man who was raised therein and is an integral part of the cultural 
and academic fabric of that land.  
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I. a.  Study Motivation 
Growing up, I was enrolled in a co-ed pre-school for two years. These two years were 
very crucial to my psychological formation and social development as I was surrounded by both 
girls and boys. At that early age, I doubt that I, or the other boys and girls for that matter, were 
aware of the differences between the two sexes and or that these differences had any significance 
to us. We simply felt we were part of each other’s surroundings.  
However, when I moved to elementary school, I was introduced to a new reality. It was a 
male-only school; girls attended separate schools. The further I progressed in my education, the 
more I became aware of this reality. I also noticed that apart from the Israeli occupation, which 
had taken over every aspect of our lives, inequality was a constant aspect of everyday interaction 
between men and women. Despite the simplistic indoctrination that we received at school that 
men and women were equal in rights and responsibilities, I grew up in a society where males 
were privileged and females were unprivileged.  
When I reached the crossroads at which I had to decide on a discipline for my 
undergraduate studies, and even though the social sciences major was not my first choice, I think 
I was destined to spend my academic life in pursuit of this field. The further I advanced in the 
study of social sciences, the more apparent it became to me that the social and cultural gap 
between males and females was bigger and more complicated than I ever thought it would be.   
In 1987, and when I was ten years of age, the first Intifada (or uprising) erupted. At such 
a young age, it was quite difficult for me to comprehend the concept of occupation. However, 
some of my most vivid memories of that time are of Palestinian women standing side by side 
with men, fighting Israeli soldiers and protesting against occupation. The sight of women taking 
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such an active role in resisting occupation made me create a rather general picture that women 
took the same active part as men in decision making and in deciding the fate of Palestine.  
Moreover, when I was 18, I was privileged to participate in the first legislative and presidential 
elections in Palestine.  This provided a golden opportunity for me to reinforce my conviction of 
the equality of women and men in the political scene as there were many women candidates for 
both the presidency and the Legislative Council. Unfortunately, the results of the elections were 
a big disappointment: it was quite evident that women were marginalized, treated as second-class 
citizens, and stripped off their right to equal representation in decision making. Only a very small 
number of women were elected, which in fact did not reflect the demographic realities in any 
way, or the vital role they play in society.  
The more I expanded my readings sociology, political science, and cultural studies in the 
Arab region, the more evident it became that the qualitative scholarly work dedicated to linking 
Palestinian women to the broader nationalist and regional contexts within the current political 
atmosphere was quite scarce. Even the few studies that I was able to locate were quantitative 
rather than qualitative. These studies were significant because they provided some crucial 
statistics about Palestine. However, they lacked substantial content and context. They did not 
reflect the struggle, hardships and accomplishments of Palestinian women. I hope that this 
doctoral thesis would contribute to filling the gap in qualitative studies about Palestinian women.  
I further hope that this thesis would ultimately dig up stories of Palestinian women, especially 
those who worked silently and were unheard of. My intention is to shed light on their stories and 
bring them back to life.  
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This is a brief story of women who dedicated their lives to serve a purpose; this is the 
story of Angela, Hind, Zlikha, Aliya, Widad, Khadija, Hilda. This is the story of women who 
saw education as the future of the Palestinian youth and Palestinian women, and the future of a 
rising nation. These women are only a few of the many pioneering women who served as school 
principals in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.  
These were the women that guided and mentored the first generation of the leaders of the 
women’s movement.  In most probability, these women were not perceived at that time as 
activists in the modern sense, neither by their students nor by history. However, they formed the 
nucleus of women’s activism that paved the way for the emergence of educated Palestinian 
women’s movements at a later stage. 
This is a humble tribute to commemorate these unique figures in the history of modern 
Palestine. It is never too late to acknowledge the hardships they went through, appreciate their 
lifelong devotion and commitment and express our gratitude to them for their landmark historical 
accomplishments.  Perhaps, they were unable, back then, to harvest the fruits of their hard work. 
It would be impossible for us to study the history of women’s activism in Palestine without 
visiting and remembering these figures and names.   
In the 1980s, I was still a very young child, but I can still remember, and will always 
remember, the name Angela. Angela was the principal of Schmidt’s Girls College in Jerusalem. 
She was the English teacher when my late Mom attended that school in the 1940s and 1950s. She 
was also the school principal when my sisters attended the school in the 1960s and 1970s. I still 
recall the stories about how strict Angela was both as a teacher and principal. While such 
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characteristics might not be atypical of most principals and teachers; however, within the 
Palestinian context, Angela’s rigor would gain more importance.  
Now when I look back at Angela, I perceive her through a different perspective and can 
appreciate her aspirations from a totally new vintage point. I can certainly say that as a woman 
she understood how pivotal it was to invest in young women’s education for the future of 
Palestine in general and the advancement of Palestinian women in particular.    
Angela never got married and did not have children of her own.  Nonetheless, the 
generations of young women who graduated under her leadership attest to her role as a 
pioneering woman activist, who burned like a candle to illuminate the path of others towards a 












I. b.  Study Aims and Rationale 
“… I think that the nationalist movement and the women’s movement(s) in Palestine are 
in harmony, working towards one unified goal, which is ending occupation. …I think that we 
have what we can consider a social movement or a women’s social movement…”1. “… I believe 
that although the women’s movement(s) in Palestine started as part of the nationalist movement, 
each one of them has chosen a separate path since the early nineties. I cannot say it is a divorce, 
but I can say it is a separation. Nonetheless, the occupation is still a unifying denominator for 
both of them. … I cannot say that we have a women’s movement(s) in the true meaning, I would 
rather think of it as some sort of activism, since we do not possess the needed holistic approach. 
For example, we cannot maintain ourselves as a movement…”2      
This study will investigate the relationship between the Palestinian women’s 
movement(s) and the Palestinian nationalist movement as perceived and reported by women 
activists, current and former Chief Executive Officers s (CEOs) of Palestinian Women’s 
Movement(s) (henceforth, PWMs). A close look at the history of PWMs reveals that the PWMs 
and the Palestinian Nationalist Movement (PNM) were thought by some Palestinian activists as 
well as scholars who explored Palestinian nationalism to be one entity. Some scholars perceive 
nationalism as an ideology or set of ideologies that stem from the premise that the individual’s 
loyalty and devotion to the nation state surpass other individual or group interests (Massad, 
1995; Anderson, 1991). As such, the Palestinian Nationalist Movement, including PWMs, 
                                                            




perceived independence as a nation state as the inspiration for their activism against colonialism 
(Hasso, 1998; Nasser, Barghouti & Mousa, 2010). 
Like other nationalisms around the world, Palestinian nationalism is deeply affected in its 
philosophy by enlightenment and post- enlightenment thoughts, especially those that emerged in 
Europe in the 18th and early 19th centuries (Massad, 1995; Alter, 1996; Anderson, 1991). In the 
European political arena, nationalism was most often expressed through gender narratives. 
Kumari (1986) claims that the gender objectives of the nationalist reformers across Asia as 
members of former colonies of European empires were “to establish in their countries a system 
of stable, monogamous nuclear families with educated and employed women such as was 
associated with capitalist development and bourgeois ideology, and yet to ensure that women 
would retain a position of traditional subordination within the family” (p.1) 
This discourse was later adopted by nations seeking independence and the establishment 
of a nation state in the former European colonies, including Palestine. However, it is important to 
bear in mind that Palestine, like other Arab, African, and Asian countries that were former 
colonies of Europe, did not go through the same circumstances that resulted in the development 
of the modern nation states in Europe and the West. For example, although there was feudalism 
in the former Ottoman Empire, there were no religious reform movements such as the movement 
led by Martin Luther in 16th century Germany, nor was there a renaissance like the one which 
emerged in Italy in the 14th century, or political revolutions like those that happened in France 
and America in the 18th century, or even an industrial revolution like the one that happened in 
Britain in the 19th century (Anderson, 1991). 
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However, after most of the developing countries achieved their independence, they had 
little choice but to adopt the Western model of the modern nation state, especially the models of 
their former colonizer. The new gender-based discourses are modern innovations disguised in 
traditional forms to satisfy nationalism’s claim of honoring, salvaging, and deepening a national 
culture for which it stands (Massad, 1995; Kumari, 1986).  
Palestinian nationalism solidified only in the wake of the defeat of the 1967 war between 
Israel and the neighboring Arab countries, and the collapse of Nasser’s Pan Arabism3 Project in 
the Middle East and North Africa. In the late 19th century and early 20th century, the Palestinian 
national identity was expressed as an Ottoman identity, which later changed to a nationalist Arab 
identity in the aftermath of World War I when Palestine, a former Ottoman territory, fell under 
the British Mandate in 1917 (Regean, 2008; PASSIA.org, 2013).With the establishment of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization4 (PLO)5 in 1964, the concept of Palestinian identity emerged 
                                                            
3 Pan-Arabism is a form of Arab nationalism which matured in the early decades of the 20th century. The idea of 
Pan-Arabism was centered on unifying Arab nations as one nation under federal union. It is worth mentioning that 
Pan-Arabism, which was first conceived by Hussein ibn Ali, Sharif of Mecca around World War, became very 
prominent as an ideology during the rule of late Egyptian president Jamal Abdul-Nasser between 1952 and 1970,. 
The idea of Pan-Arabism was further developed as an ideology by Arab nationalist and Ba’thists in Syria and Iraq 
(Sirriyeh, 2000; Khalidi, 1991; Ajami, 1974).                
4 Also known as Palestinian Liberation Organization. 
5 The PLO was founded by a decision of the Arab League in May 1964 in Jerusalem. It was backed by Egyptian 
president Nasser, and was chaired by Ahmed Shuqeiri.  However, in the aftermath of the Arab defeat in the 1967 
War with Israel, FATEH Palestinian Faction, led by Yasser Arafat, took over the leadership of the PLO in 1969. 
Since then, the PLO became an umbrella organization for the various Palestinian factions, including the Popular 
Front for the Libration of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the 
Palestinian Communist Party (later the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP)). The PLO acquired a more central role in 
mobilizing Palestinians as well as international support. It is considered the sole representative of Palestinians in the 
Palestinian territories and the Diaspora. Israel only recognized the PLO in 1993 as part of the Oslo Accords, which 
resulted in the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Until today, the PLO remains the political 
foster entity for the PNA (Passia.org, 2013; Palestinepnc.org, 2013). 
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as an alternative discourse for Palestinian patriots who were seeking the independence of 
Palestine, demoting Arab identity discourse to a secondary priority.   
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I. c.  Statement of Problem  
Though the Palestinian women's movement (PWMs) organizations in Palestine emerged 
as an integral part of the Palestinian nationalist movement (PNM), currently, the nationalist 
movement constitutes a competitive force against PWMs. The competition between PWMs and 
PNM took various forms and operated at different levels, including, though not limited to, 
framing rights, the capacity for mobilization –mobilizing grass roots and mobilizing the public 
sphere- and resource mobilization. In some instances, the Palestinian nationalist movement 
hindered the planning, activities, visibility, and political discourse of women's movement 
organizations in Palestine. 
To understand the development and meaning of the Palestinian women's movement(s), 
one must first grasp the Palestinian national movement as a whole, since the former grew out of 
the latter.  Abu Awdeh and Kuttab (2004) indicate that it is difficult to separate the social 
liberation of women in Palestine from their role in the struggle against the colonization of 
Palestine. The authors explain that the women's movement(s) gained momentum because of 
women's participation in the national struggle for liberation. Moreover, the early beginnings of 
the Palestinian women's movement(s) were parallel to the foundation and development of other 
women’s movements in the region, particularly, the Arab women's movements that were actively 
involved in the struggle against colonial mandates in the Arab states in the Middle East and 






I. d. Introduction  
I will start my introduction with a quote from the Declaration of Independence6 of the 
State of Palestine, which was proclaimed by Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, before the 
Palestinian National Council (PNC), which convened in Algiers on November 15, 1988
7. Arafat 
confirmed the right of Palestinians to build their nation state, and fulfill their dreams of freedom 
and sovereignty. Moreover, he set the foundation for the future democratic Palestinian state. The 
quotation below from the Declaration of Independence addresses many issues and concerns such 
as the equity and equality between females and males in the future State of Palestinian. 
The State of Palestine is for all the Palestinians wherever they are. It is the state within which all 
Palestinians shall develop their national and cultural identity. They shall enjoy full equality in 
rights. Their religious and political beliefs and their human dignity shall be protected by a 
parliamentary democratic system based on freedom of opinion and freedom to form parties. It is a 
state within which the rights of minorities are protected and the respect of minorities to the 
decisions of the majority is mutual. It is a state that promotes social justice, equality and non-
discrimination in public rights on the basis of: race, religion, color, or between women8 and men, 
under a constitution which ensures the rule of law and an independent judiciary. It is a state that 
stands on the basis of preserving the full legacy of Palestine spiritual and civilizational heritage of 
tolerance and coexistence between religions over the centuries.” (Algiers, November 15th 1988). 
Equity and equality between males and females, elimination of all forms of 
discrimination between the two sexes, constitutional state, rule of law, a place where every 
Palestinian’s dream can come true, among other rights. These were the terms underlined by the 
Declaration of Independence 25 years ago. An overview of these terms confirms that the long-
awaited state of Palestine shall be a democracy in which all Palestinians shall enjoy equity and 
                                                            
6 See Appendix (M) for the full English version of the Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine. Source: 
Lukacs, Y. (1992). The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict – a documentary record 1967-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.(http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal3.htm) Retrieved 12 May 2013. 
7 See Appendix (L) for the full Arabic version of the Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine. 
8 It is important to point out the fact that Chairman Arafat reversed the original order of the words women and men 
in his address before the Palestinian National Council.  
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equality in their rights and duties. It is a state that will reward them and compensate them for the 
years of oppression, negligence, and sufferings. It is a state that will come as remuneration to the 
Palestinians for their resistance and their belief in a better future.    
These were the exact terms that set the foundation for women’s activism in Palestine. 
PWMs have always worked towards that end. However, 25 years later, how can the relationship 
between PWMs and PNM be understood? It would be quite legitimate to ask whether these 
objectives set forth in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence have been achieved. The 
Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine highlighted the indispensable role of 
women in the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
 “… Palestinian women of courage, guards of our survival and our lives, and our eternal 
flame guard…”9  These were the words that motivated the women’s activism in Palestine and 
that inspired the Palestinian youth to believe in a better future.  
                                                            
9 Therefore, on this day unlike all others, November 15, 1988, as we stand at the threshold of a new dawn, in all 
honor and modesty we humbly bow to the sacred spirits of our fallen ones, Palestinian and Arab, by the purity of 
whose sacrifice for the homeland our sky has been illuminated and our Land given life. Our hearts are lifted up and 
irradiated by the light emanating from the much blessed intifada, from those who have endured and have fought the 
fight of the camps, of dispersion, of exile, from those who have borne the standard for freedom, our children, aged 
(elderly), youth, prisoners, detainees and wounded, all those whose ties to our sacred soil are confirmed in camps, 
villages and towns. We render special tribute to that brave Palestinian Woman, guardian of sustenance and Life, 
keeper of our people’s perennial flame. To the souls of our sainted martyrs, to the all our Palestinian Arab people, to 
all free and honorable peoples everywhere, we pledge that our struggle shall continue until the occupation ends, and 
the foundation of our sovereignty and independence fortified accordingly. Therefore, we call upon our great people 
to rally to the banner of Palestine, to cherish and defend it, so that it may forever be the symbol of our freedom and 
dignity in that homeland, which is a homeland for the free, now and always  
Source: Lukacs, Y. (1992). The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict – a documentary record 1967-1990. Cambridge: 




Nevertheless, if we arguably agree that none of the goals set by the PLO have been 
fulfilled yet, then the dynamics of the relationship between PWMs and PNM should be revisited 
and examined closely and critically. 
My study aims at exploring the dynamics of the relationship between PWMs and PNM. 
Moreover, it intends to identify the milestones which delineate this relationship which started 
over 50 years ago. In addition, my study aspires to ascertain the circumstances within which 
PWMs developed, with special attention to the social, cultural, and economic factors in addition 
to the nationalist factor. Furthermore, my study aims at understanding predicting the future of the 
relationship between PWMs and PNM, especially, in an environment characterized by an 
increased competition on resources. It is also important to determine what the available resources 
for the PWMs are, and what their capacity to mobilize them is. It would therefore be equally 
important to understand establish the effect of resource dynamics on the PWMs’ capacity to 
mobilize the grassroots 
Finally, it is important to examine the contemporary PWMs and explore whether their 
aspiration, mission, and philosophy have changed, and if so, try to determine the implications for 
the future of the PWMs and the future for their relationship with PNM. Moreover, it is also 
important to establish the obstacles that stand in the way of achieving these goals. Worldwide, 
throughout history women have been fighting for their rights for freedom, equality and 
individuality.  
Palestinian women’s struggle has been the focus of many quantitative studies. Vital as 
they are, such studies did not reflect the struggle, hardships or accomplishments of Palestinian 
women. In view of the dearth of qualitative studies of women’s movements and women’s 
14 
 
activism in Palestine, the present doctoral thesis aims to fill this evident gap, albeit partially, by 
proposing a qualitative study which would uncover the stories of many Palestinian women, most 
of whom worked diligently yet silently and who remained anonymous through most of their 
lifetime, and bring them back to life.  
I end my introduction with quotations from some Arab intellectuals who were well 
known for their support of women’s rights. The first extract comes from Abu al-Qassem Al-
Shabbi10, the famous Tunisian poet11: 
“If, one day, a people desires to live, then fate will answer their call,  
And their night will then begin to fade, and their chains break and fall.” 
The Palestinian women shall see light at the end of the tunnel; nonetheless, they have to break 
the barrier of occupation, and the barrier of patriarchy. The second12 excerpt is attributed to 
Sheik Mohamed Ghazali13: “It is not unusual in the history of any renaissance, that intellectual 
awakening always precedes political and social activism.” In other words, it is hard to achieve 




one-day/ retrieved December 12 2013  
11 Arabic:   
 فال ُبد أن يستجيب القدر                               إذا الشعب يوماً أراد الحياة
 وال بد للقيد أن ينكسر                                       والُبد لليل أن ينجلي
12 Arabic: ( يمن المألوف في تاريخ النھضات أن اليقظة العقلية تسبق دائماً النشاط السياسي واالجتماع ) 
13 Sheikh Mohamed al-Ghazali (1917-1996), contemporary Egyptian scholar. He was very famous for his reformist 
writings and thought. He held the post of Chairman of the Academic Council of the International Institute of Islamic 
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II. Palestine: History & Location14. 
This chapter offers (the reader) an overview of the history and geographical location of 
Palestine in order to support a better understanding of the events that helped shape the identity of 
women’s activism. In addition, this part of my dissertation will attempt to expand the reader’s 
comprehension of how Palestinian women’s nationalist identity evolved, especially through their 
involvement in the struggle against colonialism and occupation. I will focus on the geopolitical 
history of modern Palestine from the late 19th century to the early 21st century.  
Historic Palestine is a Mediterranean country that lies on the western edge of the Asian 
Continent. It is located in a region that came to be known in the late 19th century as the Middle 
East and North Africa, (MENA). Historic Palestine, which includes modern-day Israel, the West 
Bank (WB), Gaza Strip (GS), and East Jerusalem (EJ), is bound by Lebanon and Syria to the 
north, Jordan to the east, Mediterranean Sea to the west, and the Gulf of Aqaba and the Egyptian 
Sinai Peninsula to the south (PASSIA, 2011; worldatlas.com, 2013; googlemaps.com, 2013; 
ARIJ.org, 2013).  
Palestine came to be the center of attention after the first Zionist Congress, which was 
held in Basel, Switzerland, August 29-31, 1897. The Congress convened to discuss the ideas of 
Theodor Herzl, the author of “The Jewish State”- a book published in German in February 1896. 
Herzl’s ideas inspired the attendees and the modern movement of Zionism. Soon thereafter, the 
Congress’ outcomes were summarized in a doctrine that laid out the aims of Zionism, most 
importantly, to found a “home for the Jewish people in Palestine secured by public law” and set 
                                                            




up the World Zionist Organization to work for that end (bbc.co.uk, 2013; PASSIA.org, 2013; 
YAF.ps, 2013).  
The doctrine was later transformed into the Balfour Declaration15 of 1917, in which the 
Government of Great Britain promised to support the establishment of a Jewish nation state in 
Palestine. The Balfour Declaration was actually a correspondence16 between the British Foreign 
Secretary, Arthur James Balfour and the Baron de Rothschild of Paris, in which the former 
pledged British support for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. As a result 
of the Balfour Declaration, the immigration of Jews to Palestine, especially European Jews, 
gained momentum and reached its peak under the British Mandate over Palestine, which lasted 
from 1917 to 1947 (Knesset.gov.il, 2013; Yaf.ps, 2013; MFA.gov.il, 2013).   
Following World War I, the Ottoman Empire17 lost control over all its territories in the 
Middle East and North Africa to the two major European colonial powers: France and Great 
Britain18. Palestine, or what was then known as southern Syria, fell under the British Mandate 
from 1917 and 1947 (ARIJ, 2012). The British Mandate over Palestine was a form of 
                                                            
15 The declaration stated: “His Majesty’s Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national 
home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being 
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country” 
(Knesset.gov.il, 2013; YAF.ps, 2013). 
16 A snapshot copy of the correspondence can be found in Appendix (F). 
17 “Ottoman Empire: “The Ottoman state … emerged, c. 1300, in western Asia Minor, not far from the modern city 
of Istanbul. In a steady process of territorial accretion, this state … expanded both West and East, defeating 
Byzantine, Serb, and Bulgarian kingdoms as well as Turkish nomadic principalities in Anatolia (Asia Minor) and the 
Mamluk Sultanate based in Egypt. By the seventeenth Century it held vast lands in West Asia, North Africa, and 
Southeast Europe.” (Quataert, 2005: p.1). 
18 Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 9, 1916: “Sykes-Picot agreement Secret agreement (named after the British 
orientalist Sir Mark Sykes and the former French CG in Beirut Charles Georges Picot) signed by Britain and France 
in May 1916, dividing the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire among them, assigning Lebanon and Syria to 
France and Jordan and Iraq to Britain; Palestine was to be internationalized.” (PASSIA, 2012). 
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administrative control given officially to Great Britain by the League of Nations19 on July 24th, 
1922, based on the decisions of the 1920 San Remo Conference20, which awarded the Mandate 
of the former Ottoman Empire territories of Syria and Lebanon to France and those of Palestine, 
Transjordan (modern-day Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan) and modern-day Iraq to Great Britain. 
The Mandate of Great Britain over Palestine lasted officially from 1920 to1948. During this 
period Britain facilitated the Jewish immigration into Palestine, in fulfillment of the Balfour 
Declaration 21of 1917, which promised the foundation of a nation state for the Jews in Palestine. 
In 1947, Great Britain decided to terminate the Mandate and submitted the Palestine Question to 
the United Nations (UN), following clashes between native Palestinian Arabs and Jewish 
immigrants in Palestine. The Mandate officially ended on May 15, 1948, and the State of Israel 
was declared on the same day (PASSIA, 2011; ARIJ, 2012; UN.org, 2012).  
In 1947, the British Mandate authorities —after clashes between the Palestinian Arab 
Natives and the Jewish immigrants escalated-- transferred the Arab-Jewish conflict to the UN 
General Assembly to find a solution after the termination of the Mandate in 1948. This conflict 
was known as the Palestine Question. The UN commissioned an Ad Hoc Committee to evaluate 
the situation in Palestine and submit its recommendations in order to prepare the UN for the 
                                                            
19 League of Nations: The League was established at the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference to promote international 
co-operation and to achieve international peace and security. Member states pledged to resolve disputes peacefully, 
maintain open diplomacy, and mutually guarantee each other’s' territorial and political independence where: "Any 
war or threat of war is declared a matter of concern to the whole League" (The Versailles Treaty 1919). The League 
was a partial fulfillment of then-US President Woodrow Wilson's famous appeal for collective security through "a 
general association of nations" (Wilson 1918/1966).” (Jones, 2005: p.1). 
20 San Remo Conference of April 1920 “San Remo Conference took place in April 1920, confirmed the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement awarding the administration of the former Turkish territories of Syria and Lebanon to France and of 
Palestine, Transjordan and Mesopotamia (Iraq) to Britain.”(PASSIA, 2012). 
21 Balfour Declaration, November 2, 1917: a letter sent on 2 Nov. 1917 by British Foreign Secretary Arthur James 
Balfour to Baron de Rothschild pledging British support for the establishment of a Jewish ‘national home’ in 
Palestine.” (PASSIA, 2012). 
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consideration of the question of the future government of Palestine. After consulting with the 
mandatory powers, the Committee sent its recommendations to the General Assembly, which 
focused on the necessity of dividing Palestine into two states: an Arab State and a Jewish State, 
thereby keeping Jerusalem under direct UN administration. In its 128th meeting in 1947, the 
United Nation General Assembly (UNGA) voted on the Partition of Palestine (UNGA resolution 
181/ November 21st 1947)22,23. The Arab member states at the UN and the Arab League24 
rejected the UN partition resolution of Palestine (UN.org, 2012).   
Following the declaration of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948, the first Arab-Israeli 
war erupted. This war was known to the Arabs as “Al-Nakba” or “the catastrophe”. At the end of 
this war, historic Palestine was divided into three major entities: the state of Israel, which 
claimed 78% of historic Palestine, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, which constituted 
almost 21%, remained under Jordanian control until the Six Days War of June 1967. The third 
entity was the Gaza Strip, which constituted only 1% of historic Palestine, remained under the 
                                                            
22 United Nation General Assembly Resolution 181, November 21st 1947 which stated that:  “… 3. Independent 
Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in part III of this 
plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory 
Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the 
Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in parts II and III below…” (UN.org, 2013). 
23 On November 29, 2012, 65 years after the original UN Partition Plan of Palestine, the  UNGA voted 
overwhelmingly to accord Palestine ‘ Non-Member Observer State’] status in United Nations. The vote was (138) in 
favor, (9) against, and (41) abstentions (UN.org, 2013). 
24 The Arab League, also known as League for Arab States, was conceived on March 22,1945 and consisted then of 
only seven member states: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria; Yemen joined in 1946. However, 
today the League consists of 22 member states, among which is Palestine. The idea of finding an organization or an 
entity that looks after the Arab interests solidified in the wake of World War II especially after many Arab countries 
had gained their independence from the mandatory powers (Great Britain and France). In addition, the idea of Arab 
nationalism and the nation states excelled due to the exposure to the West through colonization. Moreover, the 
commercial and cultural exchange between these countries set the climate for the foundation of an organizational 




Egyptian administration until it was occupied by Israel in the Six Days War (PASSIA, 2011, 
Sirryih, 2000). 
The West Bank is a territory located west of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea, and it 
was captured during the war of 1948 by Jordan and annexed to the Hashemite Kingdom 
(formerly Transjordan) in 1950. According to the UN resolutions25, this territory has been 
illegally occupied by Israel since the 1967 war (UN.org, 2013). It is currently inhabited by over 
2.3 million Palestinians and approximately 200,000 Israeli settlers, excluding East Jerusalem. 
Despite the peace agreement and the Oslo Accords with the Palestinian Authority (PA), Israel 
still retains control of over 60% of the West Bank territory (ARIJ.org, 2013). 
The Gaza Strip is a coastal region of the Mediterranean Sea, adjoining Egypt and Israel, 
covering an area of approximately 226 square miles (SM) and is home to some 1.5 million 
Palestinians, mostly refugees. It ranks among the most highly dense populated areas in the world. 
The Gaza Strip was passed to Egyptian control in 1949 and was occupied by Israel during the 
Six Days War of 1967. Although Israel unilaterally evacuated all Israeli settlers from the Gaza 
Strip in 2005, it still retains control of all land, air, and sea access of the Strip (PASSIA, 2011; 
MFA.gov.il, 2013; Arnold, 1998). 
East Jerusalem remained under the Jordanian control from the year 1948 until it was 
occupied following the Six Day War of 1967. On July 30, 1980 and in a unilateral act, Israel 
illegally annexed East Jerusalem and declared it “the unified capital of Israel”. The annexation of 
Jerusalem was, and still is, not recognized by international law. It is worth mentioning that all 
                                                            




embassies and diplomatic delegates to Israel are based in Tel-Aviv and not in Jerusalem 
(PASSIA, 2011, UN.org, 2012, Knesset.gov.il, 2013; MFA.gov.il, 2013).  
The Nakba, or the Palestinian catastrophe, resulted in the forced migration and 
displacement of almost (800,000) Palestinians who became refugees within what remained of 
historic Palestine (the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem), neighboring, neighboring 
Arab countries (Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon), and the Diaspora. According to the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)26 a total of 
506,200 Palestinians 27 were forced to migrate to Jordan; 127,600 to Lebanon; 82,194 to Syria, 
and finally 198,227 Palestinians to the Gaza Strip. These refugees later constituted the nucleus of 
Palestinian resistance and the Palestinian factions and later the PLO. Today these numbers have 
swelled to almost five (5) million refugees (UNRWA.org, 2013; PCBS.gov.ps, 2013). 
The years between 1948 and the wake of the 1967 Six Day War witnessed a solidification 
of the Arab identity of Palestinians. This development was due to the growing Nasserism28 
                                                            
26 UNRWA, is a UN Agency that was founded by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) on 
December 8th, 1949 following the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, until present UNRWA still offer relief and works 
programs for Palestine refugees. The Agency began operations on 1 May 1950. In the absence of a solution to the 
Palestine refugee problem, the UN General Assembly has repeatedly renewed UNRWA's mandate, most recently 
extending it until 30 June 2014. UNRWA provides assistance, protection and advocacy for some 5 million registered 
Palestine refugees in the Middle East in the fields of education, health care, relief, camp infrastructure and 
improvement, community support, microfinance and emergency response, including in times of armed conflict, in 
its five fields of operation: Jordan, Lebanon, Gaza Strip, the Syrian Arab Republic and the West Bank, including 
East Jerusalem. The Agency currently operates or sponsors over 900 installations with nearly 30,000 staff across the 
five fields. Since UNRWA's services are usually provided within the public sector, the Agency works in conjunction 
with governmental authorities in the area, who also provide some services to Palestine refugees.  
 
27 This number includes refugees who were forcefully displaced in the West Bank camps including East Jerusalem, 
after the war of 1967. Statistics of Palestinian refugees in UNRWA camps in the West Bank are reported separately 
(UNRWA.org, 2013; PASSIA.org, 2013). 
28  Nasserism is a term used to define the nationalist social ideology inspired by the thinking of late Egyptian 
president Jamal Abdul Nasser. Nasser’s ideology was embedded in a leftist, nationalist, socialist anti-imperialist 
background. He mobilized the Egyptian public as well as the Arab masses to endorse Pan-Arabism. He advocated 
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ideology in the region as a whole, stemming from Nasser’s Pan-Arab project. Nasser, or Jamal 
Abdul Nasser, who succeeded Colonel Mohammed Nagib in 1954, and became second president 
was the president of Egypt from 1954 until his death in September 1970.  
Palestinian nationalism was recognized publicly by all Arab states; however, Palestinian 
nationalism and Palestinian nationalist activism were intentionally contained by the regimes that 
ruled what remained of historic Palestine, namely Jordan and Egypt (Yaf.ps, 2013; Khalidi, 
1991). Nonetheless, the containment of the Palestinian independence movement did not last long 
and was changed by the establishment of the PLO in 1964, and the recognition of the Arab states 
of the rights of Palestinians to self-determination and to armed resistance against Israel. 
Consequently, the Palestinian factions’ militias, or Fedayeen Organizations”29 and Palestinian 
factions, were born. And it is quite worth to note that each faction founded a women’s 
organization affiliated with it (DFLP-palestine.net, 2013; PFLP.ps, 2013; PASSIA.org, 2013; 
FATAH.ps, 2013; Aljazeera.net, 2013; PPP.ps, 2013; washingtoninstitute.org, 2013). 
The Palestinian militia and factions became more organized and active in the mid-1960s. 
In their early beginnings, these militias were called the Fedayeen Organizations.  FATAH was 
founded in 1965 by Yasser Arafat; the PFLP was founded by George Habash in 1967; the DFLP 
seceded from the PFLP in 1969 and became a separate faction under the leadership of Nayef 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
the idea of one Arab nation, which was also the slogan of Arab nationalism and Ba’th parties in both Syria and Iraq. 
It is worth to note that the expression Nasserisim emerged after the passing of President Nasser in 1970. A political 
party that holds the name the Nasserist Party was established in 1974 by … (?) who summarized the thinking of late 
president Nasser and incorporated them in the new party’s charter.  Nasserism continues to have a significant 
resonance throughout the Arab World until present day  (Sirriyeh, 2000; Khalidi, 1991; Ajami, 1974)    
29 Feda’yeen, plural, are guerilla fighters who are willing to sacrifice their life executing military operation against 
enemy targets. The idea of Feda’yeen was inspired by the concept of Japanese Kamikaze. (The Encyclopedia of 
Arab Politics, 1989).   
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Hawatemeh. The Palestinian Communist Party was founded by Bashir Barguthi in 198230 and in 
1991 the Palestinian People’s Party. FIDA31 was formed in 1990 by Yasser Abed Rabo as a 
result of a split in the DFLP. Despite the fact that most of these factions were inspired by 
different ideologies: Marxist, socialist, Leninist, communist, or secular; yet they all had one 
common denominator; the liberation of Palestine through armed struggle. Nonetheless, these 
factions came together under the umbrella of the PLO. The Oslo Accords were the turning point 
that tore them apart. (DFLP-Palestine.net, 2013; PFLP.org, 2013; PPP.org, 2013; Washington 
institute.org, 2013). 
The Six Day War erupted on June 5, 1967 and ended on June 10, 1967 by a UN decree to 
cease-fire. The war erupted between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries: Egypt, Jordan 
and Syria. The Arab armies were defeated. The outcomes of the war were catastrophic for the 
Arabs especially the fall of Jerusalem. As a result of the war, Israel captured Sinai, the Gaza 
Strip from Egypt, and the Golan Heights from Syria. Most importantly, Israel captured the 
remaining of historic Palestine the West Bank including East Jerusalem from Jordan. It is 
important to note that the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 considered the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank including East Jerusalem, occupied territories and called on Israel to 
withdraw its troops from them. Moreover, the Arab population in the newly captured territories 
by Israel were granted the status of a nation under occupation and thus were under the protection 
of the Fourth Protocol of the Geneva Convention (UN.org.a, 2013; UN.org.b, 2013).        
                                                            
30 It is a continuation of the original communist party that was founded in historic Palestine in 1922.  
31 FIDA is the only Palestinian faction of the PLO that has a woman as its Secretary General, former Minister of 
Women’s Affairs Dr. Zahira Kamal (FIDA.ps, 2013). 
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The period from 1968 to 1990 witnessed a peak in the military action of the various PLO 
factions. The Cold War between the West led by the U.S.A and the former Soviet Union 
provided a good climate and a cover for the military operations of the PLO factions. The leftist 
parties, especially the PFLP, the DFLP, and the PPP received financial and logistic support from 
the former Soviet Union, and thus ushered a new chapter in the Arab-Israeli conflict (DFLP-
palestine.net, 2012; PFLP.org, 2013). 
It was in the 1970s that women participation gained special momentum. According to the 
PLO charter, the mission of liberating Palestine is entrusted to both males and females. The PLO 
realized this concept by establishing the General Union of Palestinian Women in 1965, clearly 
emphasizing the role of Palestinian women in the struggle (GUPW.net, 2012). However, the 
Palestinian military mobilization went into ebb and flow especially after of the expulsion of the 
PLO and its factions from Jordan, the movement of the PLO leadership to Lebanon, and the 
eruption of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975 (Aljazeera.net, 2004). 
The PLO leadership and its militia were expelled from Jordan in the aftermath of the 
events of Black September. Some scholars consider the events that took place in 1970 in 
Amman, the Jordanian capital, the first spark of the Palestinian civil war. 32 (Aljazeera.net, 2004; 
PASSIA.org, 2010; Palestinian Encyclopedia, 1989). After its exile from Jordan, the PLO 
leadership went to Lebanon. Under pressure from President Nasser on the Lebanese government, 
the Lebanese president Charles Helou granted permission to the Palestinian militia to launch 
military action against Israel from Lebanon’s southern borders. The presence of the PLO as a 
                                                            
32 It is worth noting that Jordan hosts the largest number of Palestinian refugees. Palestinians in Jordan enjoy full 
citizenship and the right to vote (www.UNRWA.org, 2012; www.moi.gov.jo, 2012f). 
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militant organization in Lebanon received a different reaction from the Lebanese public. 
However, when the Lebanese Civil War erupted in 1975, the PLO and its factions, namely 
FATAH, were major players in the war, and had formed different coalitions with conflicting 
parties (Aljazeera.net, 2004). 
From 1975 to 1981 there was a clear increase in the Palestinian military operations. 
However, these military operations started to retreat in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of 
south Lebanon in 1982 and the siege of the capital Beirut. It was after negotiation and pressure 
from Arab governments that the PLO militias were forced out of Lebanon. The PLO leadership 
left to Tunisia which offered to host the PLO on one condition, which was to refrain from 
interfering in the Tunisian internal politics and respect the sovereignty of the Tunisian Republic 
(Aljazeera.net, 2004; Journal of Palestine Studies 1981). 
The early to mid-1980s witnessed a decrease in the militia acts of the PLO factions and a 
boom in the grassroots framing especially in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. 
It was this period that the grassroots mobilization and political framing reached its peak. It was 
the same period when women’s frames or the women’s organizations started to appear on the 
Palestinian scene. For instance, the Union of Palestinian Working Women Committees 
(UPWWC) was established in 1980 as a women frame for the DFLP. The Association of Women 
Committees for Social Work (AWCSW) was established by FATAH in 1981. The Palestinian 
Working Women Society for Development (PWWSD) was established by the PPP as the Union 
of Palestinian Working Women 1981. The Union of Palestinian Women Committees was 
established by the PFLP in 1980 (GUPW.ps, 2013, DFLP-palestine.net, 2013; PFLP.ps, 2013, 
palpeople.org, 2013; UPWC.org.ps, 2013; AWCSW.org, 2013; PWWSD.org, 2013).  
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The early 1980s witnessed a rise in the role and representation of women in the PNM 
factions within the Palestinian territories. As mentioned above, several women’s frames or 
organizations were established by the PNM factions and women were entrusted to mobilize the 
grassroots, especially at a time that the PNM organizations were banned by Israel. Moreover, it 
was a time characterized by underground operations by Palestinian males. This is not meant in 
any way to diminish or eliminate the fact that Palestinian women were engaged in militant 
operations against the Israeli occupation. The statistics, indeed, support the view that women 
were engaged in underground PNM activism in the early 1980s (GUPW.ps, 2013, DFLP-
palestine.net, 2013; PFLP.ps, 2013, palpeople.org, 2013; UPWC.org.ps, 2013; AWCSW.org, 
2013; PWWSD.org, 2013).   
The role of Palestinian women as activists in the PNM reached its peak with the buildup 
leading to the eruption of the first Palestinian popular uprising. The first Palestinian Intifada, as it 
is widely known, erupted on the 9th of December 1987 in the aftermath of several military Israeli 
operations of in the Gaza Strip. The Intifada was portrayed as a social movement against the 
Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. It was also depicted as a reaction to the political 
unrest following the Arab defeat in 1967, the confiscation of land and the exile and 
imprisonment of hundreds of Palestinian youth. It also came as a reaction to building settlements 
on confiscated land, the excessive acts of violence by Israeli troops against civilians, the 
strangulation of the Palestinian economy as well as other measures exercised by the military 
occupation forces (DFLP-palestine.net, 2013; PFLP.ps, 2013, palpeople.org, 2013; FATAH.ps, 
2013; YAF.ps; 2013).  
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However, the first Palestinian Intifada is considered as a time when Palestinian women 
activism flourished. The period 1987 to 1990 witnessed an increase in the number of women’s 
enrolment in women’s frames, PWMs and women’s activism organizations. The number of 
women who were detained, martyred, exiled, and wounded increased drastically. The year 1988 
constituted the peak of the First Intifada and calumniated with the Declaration of Independence33 
announced by PLO Chairman Arafat34 on November 15, 1988 in the Palestinian National 
Assembly meeting in Algiers, the Algerian capital (MOWA.pna.ps, 2013; MOWA.gov.ps; 2013; 
Nad-plo.org; 2013; UN.org, 2013, unispal.un.org, 2013). 
There are different accounts for the span of the first Palestinian Intifada it erupted on 
December 9th 1987; however, most scholars mark the year 1990 as the end of the first Palestinian 
Intifada. In the aftermath of the Intifada and the defeat of the Iraqi forces in the first Gulf War35 
and their withdrawal from Kuwait, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
international climate was pushing towards a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 
1991, President George H. Bush36 called on the Israeli government and a representative delegate 
                                                            
33 The Declaration of Independence, adopted by the Palestinian National Council in 1988, provided for the "non-
discrimination in public rights, on the basis of race, religion or color between women and men” (MOWA.pna.ps, 
2013). 
34 The Declaration of Independence, otherwise known as the proclamation of independence, recognized the right of 
Palestinians as a nation to have a state. The state of Palestine was proclaimed in exile. The Palestinian Declaration of 
Independence is a document written by the late Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish and proclaimed by late PLO 
Chairman Yasser Arafat on 15 November 1988 in the Algerian capital Algiers. The declaration stressed the rights of 
the Palestinian nation to establish their nation state in the geographic area known as historic Palestine, as determined 
by the British Mandate. Please refer to Appendices (A) for illustration.       
35 Widely known in the West, or among Western coalition— U.S.A, U.K, and France- as the Desert Storm.  
36 Also known as Bush the father, president of the U.S.A. 1989 -1993. 
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of the Palestinians to meet for negotiations, and thus, the Madrid Conference37 for peace in the 
Middle East was conceived. The Palestinian delegation to the Madrid conference consisted of 
several prominent Palestinian figures in Palestinian academia38, and was led by Dr. Haidar Abdul 
Shafi from Gaza.  However, it is worth to note that women were represented in the delegation by 
Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, a key member of the delegation. (MFA.gov.il, 2013; YAF.ps, 2013; 
Lasensky, 2002; NAD-PlO.org, 2013). 
The peace negotiations which started in Madrid in October 1991 continued under 
American sponsorship for another 22 months in the American capital but did not result in any 
peace agreement between the Palestinians and the Israelis. In 1992, however, the whole world 
was taken by surprise when the newly elected Israeli Labor government and the PLO announced 
that they had opened a secret negotiation channel in the Norwegian capital Oslo. Thus, the Oslo 
Accords39 became public on August 23, 1993 (MFA.gov.il, 2013; NAD-PlO.org, 2013; 
State.gov, 2013). 
The Oslo Accords constituted a turning point in the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli 
conflicts, thus, ushering the end of militant action era of the PLO against Israel. The agreement 
that was devised by FATAH and the Israeli government set the foundation for the creation of the 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA), and the return of the PLO leadership from exile in 
                                                            
37 The Madrid Conference, also known as the Madrid Peace Conference was sponsored by the Unite States of 
America and the former Soviet Union. The conference convened on October 30th 1991 and adjourned on November 
2nd 1991.     
38 It is worth noting that Israel refused any official representation of the PLO in the conference, however, a joint 
delegate of Jordanian and Palestinian was formed as middle solution. The Palestinians were represented by 
academic figures form the different Palestinian Universities in the WB and GS.     
39 Also known as Oslo I, or the Frist Oslo Accord, other names widely used “The Declaration of Principles” 
(MFA.gov.il, 2013).  
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Tunisia. The Oslo Accords were signed by Mahmoud Abass40 on behalf of the PLO and Foreign 
Minister Shimon Perez41 for the Israeli government on the White House lawn in Washington 
D.C. on September 13th 1993.  The Accords were a mutual recognition by both parties: the 
Palestinians, represented by the PLO, recognized the State of Israel and its right to exist; in 
return, the Israeli government recognized the right of Palestinians as a nation to self-
determination and recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian nation 
(MFA.gov.il, 2013; YAF.ps, 2013; PFLP.ps, 2013; DFLP-Palestine.net, 2013; State.gov, 2013; 
palpeople.org, 2013).  
The Oslo Accords, or Oslo I, was followed by the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, in which 
Israel transferred civilian and security responsibilities of the Gaza Strip and the city of Jericho to 
the newly established PNA. The agreement was signed on May 4th 1994, and served as the 
baseline for the second Oslo Accords, or Oslo II (MFA.gov.il, 2013; YAF.ps, 2013; PFLP.ps, 
2013; DFLP-Palestine.net, 2013; State.gov; 2013). Oslo II was signed on 28 September 1995 and 
under sponsorship from the U.S. government. The agreement instituted the transfer of the major 
Palestinian cities in the WB to direct responsibility and administration of the PNA; though Israel 
continued to keep control of the boarders and national security (MFA.gov.il, 2013; YAF.ps, 
2013; PFLP.ps, 2013; DFLP-Palestine.net, 2013; State.gov; 2013; NAD-PLO.org, 2013).  
The first ever Palestinian elections took place on 20 January 1996. All registered 
Palestinian voters in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem were given the opportunity 
                                                            
40 Chairman of the PNA from May 2005 till present. Chairman of the PLO from November 2004 till present. Prime 
Minister of the PNA March 2003 – September 2003.  
41 Shimon Perez: Prime Minister of Israel: April 1977 – June 1977, September 1984 – October 1986, November 
1995 – June 1996, Foreign Minister: October 1986 – December 1988, July 1992 – December 1995, March 2001 – 
November 2002; and Israeli President: July 2007- present.   
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to elect their representatives to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and to elect the 
Chairperson of the PNA. It is worth mentioning that, according to the Central Election 
Commission (CEC), out of 672 candidates competing for 88 seats in the Legislative Council, 
only five women won in those elections, constituting only 5.7% of the LG. More significantly, 
two candidates compete for the leadership of the PNA, the late Samiha Khalil42 the founder and 
chair of the Palestinian Family Relief Society, and late Yasser Arafat43, the Chairman of the 
PLO. Arafat harvested 88.2% of the votes while Ms. Kahlil received the remaining 11% of the 
votes (CEC, 1996, elections.ps; 2013; inash.org, 2013).    
The elections were boycotted by the Palestinian leftist factions, namely, the PFLP, the 
DFLP, the PPP and FIDA in addition to the Palestinian right conservative wing, namely, 
                                                            
42 Samiha Khalil: started her activities at the social and national levels in the mid-1950s and early 1960s. She 
contributed to the founding of the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW), and was active in the 
establishment of the PLO. She participated in the delegation of the Women's Union in the first Palestinian National 
Council PNC convened by the PLO in Jerusalem in 1964. 
Samiha Khalil played a prominent role in the leadership of the Palestinian social and women's movements through 
her presidency of the GUPW in the occupied territories, and her presidency of the Family Relief Society, as well as 
through her role in the leadership of the General Union of Charitable Organizations (GUCO). The Family Relief 
Society had a special place in her heart; she considered its employees and members as her family. Through this 
society, Ms. Khalil put her full capacity to serve the national cause and to serve the Palestinian women, poor 
families and martyrs’ and detainees’ families. Perhaps the most important milestone in her political and national 
journey was her involvement in the 1996 presidential elections competing against Chairman Arafat. She won around 
12 % of the votes, thus, starting a new tradition in the Palestinian and Arab political arena. She proved that any 
qualified person has the right and the ability compete for the highest political positions. Samiha Khalil passed away 
on February 22nd 1999. Her tombstone reads: “She fought for the freedom and the independence of the Palestinian 
people” (inash.org, 2013). 
43Yasser Arafat: Born August 24, 1929 in Cairo, Egypt. He grew up in Cairo and Jerusalem. Arafat founded the 
FATAH faction on January 1st 1965. He was the leader of the PLO from 1967 to 2004. Arafat was the recipient of 
the Nobel Prize for Peace 1999. He took part in the war against the new state of Israel in 1948, when many 
Palestinians were expelled. As a qualified engineer, he took a job in Kuwait. From there, he organized the guerrilla 
group FATAH, which attacked Israel following Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. Arafat 
became the leader of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), an umbrella organization for Palestinian guerrilla 
groups. The groups resorted to terror to attract world attention, but it gradually became clear to Arafat that he would 
have to accept the state of Israel in order for the USA to be willing to mediate in the dispute. He approved the 
meeting of Palestinian negotiators with Israelis at secret negotiations in Oslo. Arafat passed away on November 11th 
2004 and was buried in his headquarters in Ramallah. (nobelprize.org, 2013; Yaf.ps, 2013). 
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HAMAS, the Islamic Jihad, and Tahreer party. The years that followed the Oslo Accords 
witnessed a lot of fluctuation within the Palestinian scene. The years 1993 -1996 witnessed the 
rise of HAMAS as a major player and faction within the Palestinian spectrum. It was the same 
period that witnessed the recession of the leftist parties in Palestine in favor of FATAH and the 
conservative factions. HAMAS gained popularity as a resistance movement that utilized military 
operations against Israeli targets through suicidal booming, known widely as martyred booming 
among Palestinians and other Arabs (Hamasinfo.net, 2013).    
The results of the first Palestinian legislative elections were a disappointment and raised a 
red flag for PWMs, women’s movement organization and women activists in Palestine. 
According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (1995), the 1995 census showed that 
women constituted half the total Palestinian population. Another PCBS survey showed that 
between 1995 and 1996, women participation in public life was minimal. For instance, women 
represented only 8% of the Palestinian National Council (PNC), 8% of the ministers in the first 
Palestinian cabinet of 1994, 8% of workers unions. And although females constitute almost 70% 
of the student body at higher education institutions, only 26% of student union members are 
women (PCBS, 1998; elections.ps, 2013). As a result, women activists mobilized efforts and 
organized what came to be known as the ‘Palestinian Model Parliament’.  The sessions convened 
in different Palestinian cities. These sessions, however, attracted severe criticism from the 
general public as well as conservative factions (Abdo, 1999). 
Many factors served as underlying causes for the eruption of the second Palestinian 
Intifada, also known as Al-Aqsa Intifada; The economic crisis that the PNA were undergoing, 
the increasing unemployment levels among Palestinian youth, the slow and semi frozen 
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negotiations with the Israeli government, especially in the after the assassination of Yitzahk 
Rabin in 1995, and the rise of the right wing to the Israeli government in 1996. Other factors, 
included the general unease due to the continuation of the Israeli occupation, the inhuman 
practices of the Israeli military occupation against Palestinian civilians, and the end of the 
transitional period of the Oslo Accords without resulting in a sovereign Palestinian state and 
(btselem.org, 2013; MFA.gov.il, 2013, MOFA.gov.ps, 2013, FATAH.ps, 2013).   
The Second Palestinian Intifada erupted in September 2000. However, unlike the first 
Intifada, this Intifada was more violent and took a more aggressive and military path. As a result, 
women participation was rather marginal, though in no way can it be claimed that there was no 
women participation in the Second Intifada (Kuttab, 2008).  In fact, there were several incidents 
where women carried out missions against Israeli targets. In some sense, it would be an 
understatement to say that women had a diminished participation in the second Intifada. As a 
matter of fact, women were the most to suffer from the consequences of the Second Intifada, 
economically, emotionally as well as physically. 
HAMAS appeared as a major player in the Second Intifada especially with their 
increasing martyr attacks –suicide bombing attacks—against Israeli targets, which in fact showed 
some developed tactics. However, the international community, namely, the U.S. started looking 
at HAMAS and their approach and role in the Palestinian-Israeli struggle differently, especially 
in the aftermath of the September 11 2001 attacks on New York and Washington D.C. In the 
peak of the second Intifada, FATAH had to catch up with the rising popularity of HAMAS, and 
thus they involved themselves in military actions against Israel, which was realized by the 
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establishment of Alaqsa Martyr Brigades. The military nature of the Second Intifada resulted in 
negative consequences on the Palestinians, both internally or externally.  
Externally, after the September 11 attacks, and President Bush’s war on terrorism, the 
militant resistance of Palestinians against Israelis attracted a wide condemnation by the 
international community, namely the West. As a result, the flow of funding to the PNA started to 
decrease. Unlike the period before the Second Intifada, the PNA no longer had the freedom to 
use the funds as it deemed fit. Instead, funders started to attach specific agendas and requests as 
to how they wanted to see their donations spent. Moreover, countries, particularly the U.S.A, 
required any organization or project that received their federal funds should sign the 
renouncement of terror doctrine. Among the most affected by this new regulations were NGOs, 
and most particularly women’s organizations and PWMs. (USAID.gov, 2013).     
Internally, the Second Intifada resulted in the reoccupation of most Palestinian cities and 
towns, the destruction of the infrastructure in these areas by the Israeli military, city incursions 
and a siege of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the isolation of the Palestinian community 
in East Jerusalem. Construction of the Israeli segregation wall44, which was planned in 1992, 
commenced on April 16, 2002 as a means to diminish the effect of the Palestinian attacks against 
Israeli targets (AREEG.org, 2013; PASSIA.org 2013). It is worth mentioning that the track of the 
segregation wall shifted sharply in favor of the Israelis from the Green Line45 which the PLO46 
                                                            
44 The construction of the Wall has not finished and it will be 8000 kms/ 5000 mls long upon completion 
(AREEG.org, 2013; PASSIA.org 2013). 
45 The Green Line was determined by the UN as the ceasefire line after the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. It is considered 
the geographical border of the GS and the WB including EJ. (UN.Org, 2013). 
46 It is worth mentioning that the PLO considers the Green Line as the reference for the borders of any future 
Palestinian state.   
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and the Israeli government had agreed upon as the reference for the future Palestinian state 
(ARIJ.org, 2013; PCBS.ps, 2013). 
The siege on the WB and GS reached its peak in 2004, when Israel forced a strict siege 
on Chairman Arafat Headquarters in Ramallah. Arafat’s health deteriorated and he was 
transferred to Paris, France, for medical treatment after mediation from several European 
governments, the U.S. government and the Arab League. Arafat passed away on November 11th, 
2004 in the military hospital in Paris. After negotiations, his body was brought back to Palestine 
and was buried in Ramallah. The passing of Chairman Arafat ignited a war regarding his 
successor. Mahmud Abbas was nominated and elected as Chairman of the PLO in May 2005. Six 
months later, Abbas was elected as the new Chairman of the PA. (bbc.co.uk, 2013; YAF.ps, 
2013; FATAH.ps, 2013). 
On September 12th, 2005, Israel completed its withdrawal from the GS. The plan, which 
was called “Unilateral Disengagement Plan”, was devised by Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime 
Minister at that time, and was adopted by the Israeli government in June 2004. The plan initiated 
the withdrawal of Israeli military personnel from the GS as well as the eviction of all Israeli 
settlers from the settlements in the GS. The last Israeli settler left on August 15th 2005, and Israel 
demolished all the infrastructure of the former settlements. Israel redeployed its troops outside 
the Green Line of the Gaza Strip, and the last soldier left the GS on September 12th 2005 
(MFA.gov.il; 2013; bbc.co.uk, 2013).     
The second Palestinian legislative elections were organized in the WB and the GS 
including EJ on January 25th 2006. It was exactly 10 years after the first elections in 1996. These 
elections were different from the first elections. Some of the leftist parties took part in these 
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elections, and most importantly, HAMAS nominated its candidates to these elections. The results 
of the elections were a total surprise to everybody, especially FATAH. HAMAS had won with a 
landslide, earning 74 out of 132 seats in the house. This provided them with the majority to form 
the future Palestinian government. Abbas had no choice but to grant HAMAS’ nominee, Ismail 
Haniyeh to form the new Palestinian government despite international threats to cut financial 
aids from the PA. (PCBS.gov.ps, 2013; election.ps, 2013; bbc.co.uk, 2013).  
Due to the financial crisis resulting from the cuts in foreign aid to the PA, the political 
unrest between FATAH and HAMAS reached its climax in June 2007.  After weeks of unrest, 
HAMAS took over the administration of the GS, and expelled FATAH leadership. As a result, 
Mahmud Abbas considered HAMAS’s actions in Gaza to be a coup. He relieved HAMAS Prime 
Minister Ismail Haniyeh form his duties, and declared Martial Law and a state of emergency for 
three months. However, until this date Haniyeh remains in his post as Prime Minster in the GS. 
Later, Mahmud Abbas appointed Dr. Salam Fayyad as Prime Minister for the PNA in the WB, 
thus ushering an era of Palestinian division/separation between the WB and the GS. The division 
between FATAH and HAMAS created a new status quo in Palestine which is still in effect until 
today despite several mediation and reconciliation attempts by the Arab league, neighboring 
Arab governments and European mediators to end the division. 
Despite international mediation, the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations came to a standstill. 
Meanwhile, the Israeli government continued to exercise unilateral acts. Some of these acts 
include but are not limited to: confiscating land from Palestinians, continuous construction of 
settlements and of the segregation wall, and restricting Palestinian mobility. As a result, the PNA 
leadership started considering other alternatives to the negotiations. The PNA chairman Mahmud 
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Abbas turned to the UN to acquire its membership and thus changing the status quo of Palestine. 
On November 29th, 2012, the UNGA voted to admit the State of Palestine as a UN non-member 
state. Palestine was granted observer status; the resolution was passed 138 pro, nine against, 41 
abstentions and five absences. However, it is worth noting that Abbas filed Palestinian 
membership request to the UN in 2011, and his application was vetoed by the U.S. (UN.org; 
State.gov, 2013; MOFA.gov.ps, 2013; MFA.gov.il, 2013). 
My final stop in this chapter will be the second municipal elections that were held in the 
WB. In June 2012, Chairman Mahmud Abbas decided to hold general elections in the WB and 
the GS, however, his plan was rejected by HAMAS’ government in Gaza. HAMAS demanded to 
reach reconciliation with FATAH before calling for the elections. Nevertheless, municipal 
elections convened in the WB, between October 2012 and June 2013, in which FATAH claimed 
victory (CEC, 2013; elections.ps, 2013). 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it is really a tough mission, if not 
impossible, to condense the history of a whole nation or even a movement in a few paragraphs or 
pages. However, this chapter aimed at giving a synopsis of the major historical events and 
milestones that shaped the history of modern Palestine, and as a result, the PWMs. 






Timeline of Historic Events: 
July 1914:  Outbreak of World War I; the Ottoman Empire joins the war. 
May 1916: Sykes-Picot Agreement, secretly signed by Britain and France, dividing the Arab 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire among them.  
June 1916:  Outbreak of the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire.  
November 1917: The Balfour Declaration.  
November 1918: End of World War I. The Ottoman Empire loses all its territories in the Middle 
East and North Africa. 
April 1920:  San Remo Conference confirms the outcomes of the Sykes-Picot Agreement to 
divide the territories of the former Ottoman Empire among Britain and France.  
January 1920:  Women Rally in Jerusalem - Palestinian women march to the British High 
Commissioner Headquarters; six women shot dead by the British Mandate troops. 
1922:  Official start of British Mandate over Palestine, granted to the Great Britain by the 
League of Nations.  
1929 Al-Buraq Uprising: Women rally in Jerusalem and send letters of condemnation to the 
British High Commissioner Headquarters. 
April- 1936:  Six-month strike in Palestine (April - October 1936), major civil disobedience 
against British Mandate. Also known as: The Arab General Strike of 1936.  
September 1939: Outbreak of World War II. 
September 1945: End of World War II. 
March 1945:  Establishment of the Arab League. The Palestine question and anti-Zionism was 
in the heart of their agenda.    
May 1947:  Great Britain terminates its Mandate over Palestine and submits the Palestine 
Question to the United Nations. 
November 1947: The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 calling for the partition 
of Palestine into two states; an Arab state and a Jewish state. The resolution 
denounced by the Arab League.   
May 1948:  End of British Mandate over Palestine, the State of Israel declared, and the Arab-
Israeli War erupts. 
May 1948: Arab armies lose, the Palestinians forced migrated out of their hometowns and 
cities, thus the Palestinian Nakba “Catastrophe” became a reality.    
1964:  The PLO established by the Arab league to address the Palestine question. 




June 1967:  The Six Day War between Israel and the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. 
Israel captures what remained of historic Palestine, the WB, the GS, and EJ. 
July 1968:  FATAH assumes leadership of PLO. 
September 1970: Palestinian civil war erupts in Amman, Jordan. Clashes end after reconciliation 
by Egyptian President Nasser; Cairo agreement is signed. 
1980:  UPWWC established as a women frame for DFLP. 
1980:  UPWC established by PFLP.  
1981:  AWCSW established by FATAH. 
1981:  PWWSD established by PPP.  
December 1987: Outbreak of First Intifada. 
November 1988: PLO declares the State of Palestine in exile. 
October 1991: The Madrid Conference for Peace in the Middle East convenes, Palestinian 
delegate to the conference includes a woman. 
1993:  Oslo Accords between the PLO and the Israeli Government announced. 
1993:  Women’s Affairs Technical Committee (WATC)47 formed as an advisory 
women’s body.  
1994:  Women Doctrine announced in Jerusalem  
1994:  The Gaza-Jericho agreement signed, the PNA established and the Palestinians 
took administrative control over the Gaza Strip and the city of Jericho. 
1995:  Oslo Accords II was signed; the PNA took administrative control over the major 
Palestinian cities in the WB. 
January 1996: The first Palestinian election took place; out of 88 seats in the senate, women 
harvested five only making 5.6%. 
October 1997: The Model Parliament events took place in different WB and GS cities; the 
agenda of the model parliament was criticized by the public and conservative 
factions.   
July 2000:       Camp David II negotiation collapsed. 
September 2000: The second Palestinian Intifada erupted, the new Intifada took militant path, 
and women’s involvement was diminished compared to the first Intifada of 1987. 
November 2002: The first cabinet amendment. 
                                                            
47 “WATC seeks to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women, to develop the role of women in society, 
and to empower women to assume decision-making positions in all sectors with special attention to marginalized 
and less privileged women, particularly women in rural areas and refugees to facilitate their role in the process of 
national independence and social change. WATC's overall strategic objective for the current three-year strategy plan 




November 2002: The post of a Minster of Women’s Affairs initiated by decree from Chairman 
Arafat; Zahira Kamal first woman appointed for this post.48     
March 2003:  PNA reform, Mahmud Abbas appointed first Palestinian Prime Minister, but 
resigned six month later.  
October 2004: Chairman Arafat’s health starts to deteriorate after 4 years of siege in his 
headquarters in Ramallah.    
November 2004: Chairman Arafat passes away in a Paris military hospital, his body was laid to 
rest in Ramallah. 
May 2005:  Mahmud Abbas elected chairman of PA. 
January 2006: The second Palestinian elections; women win 21 out 132 seats in the Legislative 
Council (=16%). 
January 2006:  HAMAS won the legislative election harvesting 55% of the house seats.  
June 2007:  After weeks of unrest, HAMAS takes over administration of the GS, and expels 
FATAH leadership. 
 Mahmud Abbas considers HAMAS actions in Gaza to be a coup, HAMAS Prime 
Minister Ismail Haniyeh, declares Martial Law and state of emergency for three 
months. 
 Mahmud Abbas appoints Dr. Salam Fayyad49 as Prime Minister for the PNA in 
the WB, thus ushering an era of Palestinian separation between the WB and the 
GS.50  
December 2010: After weeks of unrest, the demonstrations in Tunisia lead to the overthrow of 
Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, thus, ushering what will come to be 
known as the Arab Spring. 
January 2011: Massive demonstrations in the streets of Sana’, Yemen, demanding political and 
economic reforms. Yemeni revolution lasts for 13 months. President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh Steps down in February 2012.  
February 2011: Inspired by the revolution in Tunisia, the Egyptian masses demonstrate in 
Tahreer Square in Cairo, demanding democracy and a change in the regime. 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak steps down on February 18, 2011.  
                                                            
48 Zahira Kamal: born in Jerusalem in 1945, a former activist of the DFLP.  She was detained and put under house 
arrest by the Israelis. In 1990, she joined Yasser Abd Rabbo and other comrades to form the Palestinian Democratic 
Union (FIDA). In 2002 she won the internal election for FIDA becoming the first Palestinian female to assume the 
post of secretary general of a PLO faction. She was appointed as the first Minister of Women’s Affairs in November 
2002.  
49 Fayyad was appointed Interim Prime Minister for three months, but stayed in office until April 2013. 
50 Commonly known as the separation between FATAH and HAMAS 
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February 2011: Massive demonstrations in Ben Ghazi in Libya. Eight months later the Libyan 
President Mu’ammar Gaddafi is captures and killed by rebels while trying to flee 
the country.  
April 2012:  The first free legislative elections held in Egypt; no woman elected to the 
Parliament.  
November 2012: UNGA votes to admit the State of Palestine as a UN non-member state. 
Palestine granted an observer status; the resolution passed 138 pro, nine votes 
against, with 41 abstentions and five absences.     
December 2012: The second Municipal elections organized in the WB. 
June 2013:  Complementary elections in the WB. FATAH claims victory.   
 






III. a. Introduction  
III. b. Resource Mobilization & Resource Dependence 
III. c. Types of SMOs Resources 
III. d. Political Opportunity 
III. e. Framing 
III. f. Frame Alignment 
1. Frame Bridging 
2. Frame Amplification 
3. Frame Extension 
4. Frame Transformation 
5. Frame Transformation 
III. g. Diagnostic, Prognostic and Motivational Framing 
III. h. Women Activism in Palestine 
1. The First Palestinian Intifada (“uprising”) (1987-1990) 
2. The Oslo Accords (1993-2000) 












III. a. Introduction  
This chapter aims at laying out the theoretical framework that inspired my study, namely 
framing theories, resource dependence and resource mobilization theories, and social movement 
theories. The literature review section will focus on the milestones in women’s activism in 
Palestine and Palestinian women’s social movements. It is worth noting that the term 
“Palestinian Feminist Movements” (PFMs) and “Palestinian Women’s Movements” (PWMs) 
may sometimes be used interchangeably to denote women’s activism in Palestine and Palestinian 
women’s social movements. Ferree & Mueller (2004) distinguished between women’s 
movements and feminist movements. They defined women’s movements as: “mobilizations 
based on appeals to women as a constituency and thus an organizational strategy” and 
characterized feminism as having the “goal of challenging and changing women’s subordination 
to men” (p. 577). Moreover, this section will provide the reader with a critical perspective of 
theories related to PWMs. Finally, I will talk about political opportunity and how PWMs and 
PNM took advantage of such an opportunity.  
This chapter starts by exploring social movements and defining them. Snow et al., (1991) 
defined social movements as: “one of the principal social forms through which collectivities give 
voice to their grievances and concerns about the rights, welfare, and well-being of themselves 
and others by engaging in various types of collective action, such as protesting in the streets, that 
dramatize those grievances and concerns and demand that something be done about them.” (p.1). 
On the other hand, other scholars have defined social movements as contentious politics. Tilly 
(2004) perceives social movements as modern means for social change and acknowledges that 
these contentious politics can overlap with someone else’s interests, in most cases governments: 
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“Social movements are contentious politics; contentious is the sense that social movements 
involve collective making of claims that, if realized, would conflict with someone else’s interests 
political. in the sense that the government of one sort or another figure somehow in the claim 
making, whether as claimants, objects of claims, allies of the objects, or monitors of the 
contention.” (p.3). Finally, Clemens (1993) defines social movements as “agents of change” (p. 
755).  
If we try to apply the previous definitions to the Palestinian example, we find that they 
are all applicable to the contemporary Palestinian context. For instance, the Palestinian 
Nationalist Movement, and the PWMs as an extension, portrayed themselves as a collective 
action against the authorities, in the Palestinian case, the Israeli occupation. On the other hand, 
based on Tilly’s definition, the PNM expressed contentious politics which was conflicting with 
the occupation. Finally, as is common in most universal social movements, the PNM and the 
PWMs promote themselves as agents of change and, in most cases, have set their vision towards 
that end (Staggenborg, 2011; Tarrow, 1994; Tilly, 2004; Clemens, 1993; McAdam & Tarrow, 










III. b. Resource Mobilization and Resource Dependence  
Now if we arguably agree that social movements are mediums for collective actions and 
agents for change, it will be important to understand how movements maintain their existence. 
The assumption that resource availability enhances the likelihood of collective action is generally 
taken for granted by contemporary analysts of social movements (Snow et al., 1991; Clemens, 
1993; Buechler, 1993). However, the availability of resources is necessary, but not sufficient to 
maintain a movement. Resources should be coupled with coordination and strategic planning to 
transform available resources into collective action. Financial resources along with human 
resources are considered fundamental to motivate public action. The mobilization of money and 
the mobilization of human effort “labor” have a direct influence on the creation of social 
movement or organizational construction (McAdam, 1996; Edwards & McCarthy, 2003, 
Buechler, 1990; Buechler, 1993). 
For instance, in 2007 there were around 1500 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
operating in Palestine (MAS, 2008). This is a relatively large number compared with the size of 
the Palestinian population in WB and GS and the geographical area of the Palestinian territories. 
On the one hand, it increases competition and makes financial resources which makes these 
NGOs sound major and takes priority in mobilizing the Palestinian  economy. On the other hand, 
the ability to mobilize financial resources does not guarantee that these organizations will be able 
to survive. A study carried out by the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute revealed that 
external aid to the WB and the GS swelled to $3.25 billion, i.e. by over 600% per year between 
1999 and 2008. During the same time period, external aid to (PNGOs) increased by over 500% - 
from $48 million in 1999 to $257 million in 2008. Nnonetheless, the flow of cash could not 
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guarantee the continuity of some of these organizations, most probably due to the overlap in their 
services and goals (Edwards & McCarthy, 2003; MAS, 2008; Snow et al., 1991). 
As noted above, the availability of resources is no guarantee that these resources can be 
transformed into collective action. The resources must be both present in a specific socio-
historical context and reasonably accessible to potential collective actors. For example, some 
Palestinian women’s organizations lack a grassroots base, or lack the mechanisms to transform 
their resources into collective actions that are supposed to mobilize grassroots in the first place, 
in spite of possessing the necessary financial resources (Edwards & McCarthy, 2003; Clemens 
1993; Baker & Nelson, 2005).  
As nutrition and water are essential for living things in order to grow and develop, 
resources are also essential if social movements and organizations are to continue to maintain 
their ability to stimulate collective action. Nevertheless, not all social groups have fair and open 
access to resources and this makes resource inequality likely in some or most social movements. 
Control of resources varies from one social group to another within organizations and within 
social movements. In other words, within the same movement, different people can have 
differential access to resources. According to MASS (2008), funding to Palestine is now being 
directed towards specific projects sponsored by PNGOs. Such situation, however, raises the 
questions about how movements that lack such organization would compete for such resources, 
particularly, political parties and factions of PNM. (Edwards & McCarthy, 2003; Cress & Snow, 
1996; Buechler, 1993; Baker & Nelson, 2005).  
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According to Edwards & McCarthy (2003), the second half of the 20th century 
encountered a serious change in the types of resources that can be mobilized by (national) 
movements. With the boom of the communication revolution, the types of resources took a 
different path. Technology had a major role both in determining members’ access to resources 
and their ability to mobilize these resources. For example, the availability and volume of 
resources available in a specific context vary over time, and so does their use-value. Innovations 
and the distribution of these innovations in communication, such as land-line and cellular 
telephones and electronic-mails, have accelerated.51 The processes of mobilizing grassroots 
participation has fundamentally changed and, at the same time, compromised the importance of 
participation in community organizations or events as a means of sharing a movement’s 
information (Edwards & McCarthy, 2003; Cress & Snow, 1996; Buechler, 1993; McCarthy & 
Zald, 1977; Bunis & Snow, 1996). 
Moreover, since public gatherings of Palestinian activists in the WB, the GS and EJ were 
prohibited under Israeli military rules, telephones have facilitated social movement mobilization 
among Palestinians. Later, e-mail52 also greatly accelerated communication among many 
members of organizations and movements in Palestine and neighboring countries. Prior to the 
advances in communication technology, communication among Palestinian activists was usually 
done through word of mouth,53 most particularly, since Palestinian printed media was under 
                                                            
51 Of course, innovations in technology come at a disadvantage for those who have limited or no access to such 
technologies. Moreover, public gatherings were still a necessity in relation to the Palestinian struggle with Israel.  
52 Later on in the 90s, a more current example is the use of social media such as Facebook to mobilize people to 
demonstrate in Tahreer Square in Cairo Egypt.  
53 Old communication methods  were also a constrain to the ability to mobilize resources abroad, outside of 
Palestine, taking in consideration that the government of the Israeli occupation  had never and will never allocate 
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Israel’s military censorship; similarly, the production and distribution of flyers and pamphlets 
was considered a crime. The ready access to telephones and radio explains the boom in national 
activism in Palestinian territories (WB, GS, and EJ) in the 1970s and mid-1980s. The 
introduction of e-mail in the 1990s also contributed significantly to that boom. Moreover, 
technology facilitated communication between Palestinian leaders and leaders outside Palestine 
(Tarrow, 1994; Tilly, 1993; Edwards & McCarthy, 2003; Buechler, 1990; Buechler, 1993; 
Clemens, 1993, McAdam & Tarrow, 2000).   
It is important to bear in mind that the availability of resources other than technology has 
also fluctuated over time. Variations in the availability of resources recur because the number of 
groups competing for those resources changes over time (Clemens, 1996; Clemens, 1997; Baker 
et al., 2003; Baker & Nelson, 2005). In fact, while some organizations fade, many others appear, 
and on certain occasions, some organizations undergo transformation in order to survive. Scott 
(1998) stressed the fact that movements are in an unremitting exchange relationship with their 
surroundings, which in turn determines their adaptation habits and the way they function. To 
quote Scott, movements are “dependent on continuing exchanges with-and constituted by-the 
environments in which they operate” (p.28). 
Inspired by Hannan and Freeman’s (1984) population ecology theory, Baker & Nelson 
(2005) explained that variations in resource environments, the access to financial and human 
resources and the constraints to access them are usually what shape organizations’ outcomes. 
They further explained that the patterns of resource scarcity create selective environments that 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
resources for Palestinian social movements, especially since almost all of them were nationalist in their nature or 
affiliated with a Palestinian nationalist movement. Moreover the majority of financial resources came from 
donations and funders outside Palestine such as Gulf States, Europe, and the U.S. through the USAID.        
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determine patterns of organizations survival. They also indicated that many organizations evolve 
in develop the nature of their services or the ways that they mobilize collective action and 
members of their grassroots constituencies.  
In other words, organizations “make do with whatever is at hand,” or what Strauss (1967) 
calls bricolage.54 Sometimes, organizations evolve to offer services that they did not have upon 
establishment as a means to survive and mobilize resources. That is, they filter their resources, 
and search for new approaches and mechanisms to build on what they have, and restructure 
themselves to cope with the new situation. Bricolage is a three-step procedure: first, accounting 
for the resources at hand; second, recombining resources for the new purpose(s); and finally, 
making do with the new resources. (Clemens, 1993; Clemens, 1996; Clemens, 1997; 
Staggenborg, 2011; Baker et al., 2003; Baker & Nelson, 2005; Innes & Booher, 1999).  
To provide some examples, illustration, the women’s organization Health Works 
Committees in Palestine started as an entity that aimed at mobilizing the grassroots politically, 
but ended up providing services such as health care advocacy, medical services or even financing 
micro-enterprise projects and home economies. The Palestinian Medical Relief Society was 
created as an extension to Palestinian Peoples Party (PPP) and was established as a frame to 
promote the ideology of PPP, mainly targeting physicians who graduated from the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Bloc countries. The majority of these physicians were polarized by the 
Marxist and Leninist ideologies and therefore PMRS tried to mobilize the grassroots through 
providing some health advocacy. Surprisingly, after the establishment of the PNA and the boom 
in the civil society sector in 1994, PMRS ended up as a center for providing affordable medical 
treatment (HWC-pal.org, 2013; PFLP.org, 2013; PPP.ps, 2013; PMRS.ps, 2013).  
                                                            
54 Bricolage: a concept first developed by Levi-Strauss (1967) and is often described as making do with “whatever 
is at hand” (Baker & Nelson, 2005: p.3). 	
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In contrast with scholars such as Edward and McCarthy (2003) and Tilly (1993), who 
consider, that there are certain scholars who emphasize the importance of other resources such as 
demographic trends. Over time, demographic trends inform patterns of resource availability; in 
other words, the dynamic changes in the targeted group have their own effects on the nature of 
services offered by Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) and on their ability to mobilize 
members to join in direct actions (Edward & McCarthy, 2003; Tilly, 1993). A good case in point 
is education in Palestine. Prior to 1948 the majority of Palestinians, especially females, were 
illiterate. As a result, many SMOs and civil society organizations, including foreign missionaries, 
focused on the education sector and the alleviation of illiteracy. However, in the 1950s and 
1960s, education for boys and girls, and for men and women was institutionalized by the 
Jordanian authorities and by the international community through the UNRWA. This 
transformation in literacy among Palestinian grassroots resulted in major changes in some SMOs 
and the nature of the services they offered (Tarrow, 1994; Tilly, 1993; Edwards & McCarthy, 
2003; UNRWA.org, 2013; UPWC.org, 2013; Baker et al., 2003; Baker & Nelson, 2005; Innes & 
Booher, 1999; McAdam & Tarrow, 2000).  
The unevenness in the allocation of resources among societies in general and social 
groups in particular is a determining factor in the continuation of collective action. Moreover, 
different social classes and different individuals within these classes have control over and 
access to differential resources (Tarrow, 1994; Tilly, 1993; Baker et al., 2003; Baker & Nelson, 
2005). In the Palestinian case, the unevenness in the allocation of resources was apparent through 
representation in the PLO. For example, SMOs affiliated with FATAH were able to mobilize 
more resources than those affiliated with leftist factions such as PFLP, DFLP, and PPP, 
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especially if we take into consideration that FATAH is the largest faction in the PLO. This 
example proved to be true even after the Oslo Accords, when, after more than 13 years of its 
establishment, the PNA was the only political manipulator until the election of 2006 that brought 
in the government of HAMAS to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting that the 
leftist factions, such as the PFLP and the DFLP, opposed the Oslo Accords and consequently, 
their ability to mobilize resources in the Palestinian territories dwindled even further 
(elections.ps, 2013; PFLP.org, 2013; DFLP-palestine.net, 2013).   
 
III. c. Types of SMOs Resources 
 
SMOs have various resources, among which are moral, cultural, social-organizational, 
human, and material assets. Since each SMO controls different resources, this allocation is a key 
factor in the distribution of power among Palestinian SMOs and in the patterns of conflict with 
each other. For instance, moral resources include: legitimacy, solidary support, sympathetic 
support, and celebrity (Cress & Snow 1996). Neo-institutional organizational Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) emphasized the controlling role of external resources and resource dependence 
on organizations, and organization formation and survival in their book “Resource Dependence 
Perspective” (Nienhüser, 2008). Claim that the importance of legitimacy arises from an 
organization serving as a link between macro-cultural contexts and meso- and micro-level 
organizational processes. For example, despite the fact that the PLO factions identify themselves 
as leftist and secular movements, they all embrace the cultural heritage of the Palestinian society, 
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including, but not limited to, celebrating religious occasions, whether Islamic or Christian. 
Although moral resources may spring from within a movement or an organization, they are less 
influential compared to those granted by an external force (Staggenborg, 2011; Cress & Snow, 
1996; Klanderman & Staggenborg, 2002; Klanderman, 1984; Buechler, 1990; Buechler, 1993).   
Cultural resources are a set of skills that are needed to accomplish specific tasks 
(Nienhüser, 2008). These skills become popular among groups or society members and include, 
but are not limited to, the ability to write poetry, perform arts, and address the public; the 
knowledge of how to organize a meeting or a rally, initiate an organized a protest or a press 
conference, or even establish an organization. These skills vary among different individuals in 
the group.  For instance, a close look at the radical factions of the PLO reveals that each one of 
them has a poet, a journalist, or thinker who is close to it, or directly affiliated with it, or even a 
member of it. Examples include Mahmood Darwish;55 a poet who was close to FATAH, and 
Gassan Kanafani,56 a writer and a novelist, who was a leader in the PFLP (PFLP.org, 2013).  
Cultural and moral resources differ from each other in that cultural resources are more accessible 
to the masses than moral resources. At a more operational level, the value of cultural skills arises 
from having individuals who are trained in leading groups and in instructing them on how to 
perform activities that keep an organization alive and well. Cultural skills and products are 
crucial in attracting supporters to the cause of the organization and in maintaining a large base of 
loyal members and activists (Tarrow, 1994; Tilly, 1993; Staggenborg, 2011; Cress & Snow 
                                                            
55 Mahmood Darwish, , Palestinian poet, born in Al-Barwah behind the Green Line, chose to live in exile, and joined 
the Palestinian Militias in Lebanon and he became the revolution’s poet, He died in Ramallah in 2006. 
56 Gassan Kanafani, Palestinian writer and journalist, was assassinated in Beirut, Lebanon by Israeli Special Forces 
in 1972 (PFLP.org, 2013). 
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1996; Klanderman, 1984; Buechler, 1990; Buechler, 1993; McAdam & Tarrow, 2000; Meyer, 
1996). 
Since the presence of social-organizational resources increases the likelihood of 
movement mobilization and action in that setting, social-organizational resources include both 
intentional and appropriable social organization. Both forms of resources have proven crucial in 
explaining patterns of movement mobilization. Yet, there is a significant difference between the 
appropriable social organization and the intentional social organization. The former is created 
specifically to further social movement goals. The latter, on the other hand, is created for non-
movement purposes. For instance, in the mid-1990s, a new type of women movement 
organizations appeared on the Palestinian women’s movement scene. These organizations were 
specialized in ideological mobilization and were able to attract funding based on their 
philosophy, vision and goals. However, they lacked the means to mobilize the grassroots most 
importantly because did not provide actual services that would appeal to the needs of the targeted 
group (Cress & Snow, 1996; Klanderman, 1984; Buechler, 1993; McAdam, 1996; McCarthy, & 
Zald, 1988).  
Social organizational resources comprise three different factors: infrastructures, social 
networks, and organizations. The use of, need for, and access to such resources depend on the 
matching of organizational form, goals, tactics and specific legitimacy (Cress & Snow, 1996; 
Klanderman, 1984; Buechler, 1993; McAdam, 1996; Tilly, 1993; Meyer, 1996).  
Human resources are more sensible than moral, cultural and social resources, which were 
discussed earlier. They include labor, experience, skills, expertise and leadership. SMOs can 
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recruit individuals who are rather portable compared to social-organizational resources. 
Nevertheless, this deployment depends on the cooperation of the individuals involved. SMOs 
often require various sets of skills, with access to lawyers, web designers, dynamic speakers, 
organizers, and, at times, outside experts. For example, Yasser Arafat, leader and founder of 
FATAH, was an architect; George Habbash, founder of PFLP, was a physician (yaf.ps, 2013, 
PFLP.ps, 2013).  
Finally, material resources include both financial and physical resources, including 
monetary capital, property, office space, and other forms. Material resources have been exposed 
to a great deal of analytic attention because they are generally more tangible and therefore more 
highly prioritized than other resources. Monetary resources have been the most analyzed of all. 
Regardless of any other resources the organization might have; certain costs will arise, and there 
is a need by the organization to answer its financial liabilities (Cress & Snow, 1996; 










III. d. Political opportunity: 
In this section I will review the basic constructs that underlie the concept of political 
opportunity. I will offer examples of how the Palestinian nationalist movement, in general, and 
Palestinian women’s movements and movement organizations, in particular, took advantage of 
political opportunities to expand their capacity for mobilization and extend their legitimacy.  I 
will show that seizing political opportunities enabled PNMs,57 PWM and PWMOs to gain more 
momentum, mobilize the grassroots, and be a major manipulator of collective action. 
Zald (1996) claims that certain events can constitute a political opportunity for certain 
social movements to advocate their cause, especially if movements’ spokespeople can amplify a 
social frame to the extent of causing a “break point,” which can give them more momentum than 
others who are competing in the same social/political field. Such a claim proves to be true in the 
Palestinian context. Palestinian national movement leaders, both from the left and right, spared 
no opportunity to utilize cultural, political or even social events to advance their goals, by 
stimulating the crowds emotionally. A good example of crowd stimulation is the Friday 
sermons58, which should supposedly focus on religious preaching; however, they have most 
often been employed to frame issues and leaders politically. Following the First Intifada of 1987, 
most, if not all, Friday sermons were followed by public acts such as demonstrations or protests.  
                                                            
57 Note that these abbreviations have been used before.  
58 Muslims around the world gather for Friday congregational prayer around noon. The prayer is distinguished from 
the daily noon prayer because it contains an address known as “Khutba” in Arabic, in which the Imam address 




Like other leaders, Arafat, was a talented public speaker and utilized his speeches to 
stimulate people so as to achieve the targeted breaking point.  
Political and mobilization opportunities are often created by cultural breaks and 
surfacing of long dormant contradictions that reframe grievances and injustices 
and the possibilities…. Further they explain that contemporary framing of 
injustice and of political goals almost always draw upon larger societal definitions 
of relationships, of rights, and of responsibilities to highlight what was wrong 
with the current social order, and to suggest directions for change. (Zald, 1996: 
267 – 68).  
It is not uncommon for movement scholars nowadays to emphasize the relationships 
between broader political systems in configuring the opportunities for collective actions. Social 
movement scholars have sought to explain the rise of particular movements on the ground of 
changes in the institutional structure or informal power relations of a certain national political 
system (McAdam, 1996; McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004, Minkoof, 2007). 
Nonetheless, the concept of political opportunity structure is at risk of becoming a fluid 
expression that absorbs virtually every aspect of studying social movements, including but not 
limited to political institutions, culture, political crises, policy shift, political alliance, among 
other aspects (McAdam, 1996; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004).  
Tarrow (1988; 1996) explains that the main focus on political opportunity implodes when 
scholars try to study the relationship between political opportunity, culture and framing. 
“Political opportunity may be discerned along so many directions and in so many ways that it is 
less a variable than a cluster of variables – some more readily observed than the others” (Tarrow, 
1988: 430).  
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To get a better understanding of how political opportunities guide collective action, it is 
important to differentiate political opportunities from other facilitative or similar conditions. In 
other words, it is important to filter out confounding factors that lurk behind the concept of 
political opportunity structure, such as culture, political alliance, and vulnerability of a regime or 
a government. Earlier attempts to study social movements, including any environmental factor 
that facilitated movements’ capacity for mobilization, were perceived and conceptualized as 
political opportunities. Nonetheless, the sets of factors relevant to social protest can vary across 
issues and constituencies, although much of the literature focuses on general elements in the 
political system, regardless of constituency (McAdam, McAcrthy & Zald, 1996; McAdam, 1996; 
Tarrow, 1996; Clements, 1996; Clements, 2002; Clements & Cook, 1999; Meyer & Minkoff, 
2004).  
For instance, what provokes mobilization for one movement or constituency may depress 
or have a rival effect on the capacity of mobilizing another movement and it might be 
suppressive, or completely irrelevant to a third. Some studies emphasize factors completely 
outside the control of activists, such as demographics, i.e., population growth, social welfare and 
internal migration. Others yet suggest that perceptions of opportunity are far more important to 
collective action than the actual strength of a regime. Obviously, understanding the relationship 
between context and action becomes quite critical to a discussion of the larger theoretical 
question about the relationship between structure and agency (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004).  
Even though it is possible to associate changes in political opportunity with changes in 
mobilization or policy change, it would be rather inconclusive if the indicators given by key role 
figures encourage mobilization, or if structural changes in opportunity are in fact what allows 
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mobilization efforts to advance more than they usually do under other circumstances (Meyer, 
1996; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996; Staggenborg, 2011; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Minkoff, 
1994). 
In the Palestinian context, we can see how the different political factions of the PLO, 
namely FATAH and the leftist nationalist movements Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine PFLP, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine DFLP, and the Palestinian 
Peoples’ Party PPP, took advantage of the political atmosphere in the mid to late 1960s to pursue 
and gain legitimacy, as well as to seize the opportunity to mobilize the grassroots. For instance, 
FATAH took over the leadership of the PLO from the Arab League following the defeat of the 
Arab armies in the 1967 war between Israel and neighboring Egypt, Jordan and Syria, seizing the 
opportunity of the decline of Nasser’s Pan-Arabism project.  
Furthermore, similar to Leftist Palestinian nationalist movements (PFLP, DFLP and 
PPP), Arafat took advantage of the Cold War between the Eastern Block, under the leadership of 
the Soviet Union, and the Western Powers, under the leadership of the United States. The Cold 
War constituted a political opportunity for PLO factions to gain financial, political, and logistic 
assistance from the former Soviet Union and the Eastern Block in contrast with Israel, which 
received logistical and military support from Western Powers, namely the United States 
(McAdam, McAcrthy & Zald, 1996; McAcrthy, 1996; Meyer, 1996; Meyer & Staggenborg, 
1996; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Minkoff, 1994; Tarrow, 1996).             
Palestinian nationalist movements and the PLO factions also found in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, international treaties and conventions, namely the Geneva 
Convention and its protocol, a legitimate cover and a political opportunity to mobilize the 
58 
 
grassroots in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in 1967. As a nation under occupation, 
the Palestinians seized the opportunity to mobilize public opinion against occupation both 
regionally and internationally (nad-plo.org; 2013; palestineun.org, 2013).  
The Palestinian women’s movements also took advantage of the prevalent political 
opportunities to mobilize the grassroots. For example, while Israel restricted and prohibited the 
activism of Palestinian nationalist movements, particularly those affiliated with the PLO, women 
activists took advantage of the low censorship on women’s activism and were able to mobilize 
the general public both politically and socially. Obviously, this should not suggest that 
Palestinian women activists were not detained and obstructed from practicing their civil rights by 
the Israeli military occupation. In fact, they were forced on many occasions to operate 
underground (Staggenborg, 1999; Staggenborg, 2011; GUPW.ps, 2013).  
Another example of political opportunity that comes to mind, is the ability of current 
Palestinian women’s movements and women’s movement organizations and women activists to 
mobilize the public, both men and women, towards more progressive legislations that guarantee 
social and cultural equity and equality for Palestinian women, especially in the absence of a 
Palestinian constitution. Exploiting political opportunities in this way came as a consequence of 
the marginalization of women in the 1996 legislative elections. Mobilization took different 
shapes and levels: rallying and public demonstrations, lobbying with local and international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society agencies, and taking advantage of the 
targeted funding by international donors, i.e., funding dedicated to women and feminist oriented 




III. e.  Framing 
The recent literature on framing and framing processes has focused on the significance of 
cognitive praxis, framing, and collective identity formation in social movement organizations 
(SMOs) and social movements’ activism (Williams & Ranter, 1996; Williams, 1995; Williams, 
1999). Benford and Snow (2000) maintain that framing and framing processes are fundamental 
to understand the character and the course of social movements in line with resource 
mobilization and political opportunity. The term, “framing,” which was inspired by the writing 
of Erving Goffman in the mid-1970s, made a breakthrough in the 1980s. According to Goffman 
(1974) framing and framing processes are: “schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to 
locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large by 
rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experiences and guide 
action whether individual or collective” (cited in Benford & Snow, 1986, 2000; Cress & Snow, 
1998).  
 
III. f.  Frame Alignment 
 
Frame alignment is considered as a conceptual bridge linking social psychological 
perspectives and resource mobilization views on movement participation. According to Benford 
et al., (1986), four major frames can be identified. The first is frame bridging, which refers to the 
linking of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a 
particular issue or problem. Bridging can occur between a movement and individuals through the 
linkage of a movement organization with an un-mobilized sentiment pool or public opinion 
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cluster, or across social movements. The second is frame amplification, which involves the 
idealization, embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs. The third 
is frame extension which entails depicting an SMO’s interests and frame(s) as extending beyond 
its primary interests to include issues and concerns that are presumed to be of importance to 
potential adherents. Finally frame transformation refers to changing old understandings and 
meanings and/or generating new ones. 
Frame Bridging: 
Frame bridging is a framing technique which refers to the linkage of two or more 
ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected cognitive matrices regarding a particular 
issue or problem. The issue or problem may be political, social, or cultural and is one that a 
social movement organization focuses on. The issue or problem is one that is salient for 
mobilizing participants and other resources. However, frame bridging does not sufficiently 
explain all varieties of participation in all forms of movements or movement activities. 
Nonetheless, most work within the resource mobilization tradition concerned with participation 
has used frame bridging as a technique (Benford et al. 1986; Benford & Snow, 2000; Cress & 
Snow, 1996; Cress and Snow 1998; Benford & Hunt, 1992). 
As a technique, frame bridging is affected primarily by organizational outreach and 
information diffusion through interpersonal or intergroup networks, mass media, the telephone, 
and direct mail. In recent years, opportunities and prospects for frame bridging have been 
facilitated by the advances in modern communication technologies such as the internet, social 
media and smart phones. 
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The use of bridging techniques and venues is not peculiar to a certain social, gender or 
political group.  For example, a study on the peace movement in Texas revealed that peace 
groups utilize direct mail and acquire their mailing lists from a variety of sources. The lists 
include individuals who attend events sponsored by other liberal organizations and those who 
subscribe to left-oriented periodicals such as Mother Jones (Benford et al., 1986; Schrock & 
Reid, 2004; Benford & Hunt, 1992; Williams, 1999). 
Nonetheless, the sole focus on networks as a basis for understanding participation 
patterns can easily yield a misguided and overly mechanistic analysis. Wallis & Bruce (1982) 
and Williams (1995) indicate that networks frequently function to structure movement 
recruitment and growth, but do not tell us what transpires when constituents, bystanders or 
adherents get together. They also maintain that evidence for frame bridging abounds in 
contemporary social movements. It is apparent for many SMOs today that frame bridging 
appears to be the primary form of alignment (Benford et al., 1986; Schrock & Reid, 2004). 
 
Frame amplification: 
The third framing technique used in framing alignment techniques is frame amplification. 
It refers to the explanation and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a meticulous 
political, social, gender or cultural issue, or problem or set of events. Frame amplification is 
embedded mainly in value amplification and belief amplification. Value amplification refers to 
the identification, idealization, and elevation of one or more values presumed to be basic to 
prospective constituents but which have not inspired collective action for any number of reasons. 
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Benford and snow, explain that in the process of value amplification, values can be construed as 
modes of conduct or states of existence that are thought to be worthy of protection and 
promotion (Benford et al., 1986, Williams, 1995; Williams, 1999). Values refer to the goals or 
end-states that movements seek to attain or promote, while beliefs can be construed as ideational 
elements that cognitively support or impede action in pursuit of desired values (Benford et al., 
1986, Williams, 1995; Williams, 1999).  
Belief amplification, on the other hand, is broadly conceived; beliefs refer to presumed 
relationships “between two things or between something and a characteristic of it” (Bem, 1970:4 
as cited in Benford et al. 1986) 
 Benford and Snow (1999), and Snow (2000), explain that in circumstances in which the 
nature of action toward any object is contingent in part on beliefs about that object, it follows 
that participation in movement activities to eliminate, control, or change a category of individual 
behavior, a lifestyle, or an institutional practice is more likely to be given a positive articulation 
between beliefs about the object of action and the nature of that action. Consequently, 
participation in movement activity is frequently contingent on the amplification or 
transformation of one or more of the foregoing sets of beliefs. In the Palestinian context, For 
instance, the participation of women in the struggle against colonial powers, Great Brittan and 
later Israel, was not widely accepted among the Palestinian public in the early 1930’s and 
1940’s. However, there was an increase of awareness about the importance of Palestinian women 
participation in the struggle against occupation, due to an increase in Palestinians’ enthusiasm 
towards education, especially in the wake of the Palestinian 1948 Nakba (i.e. catastrophe) that 
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resulted in the forced displacement of almost a million Palestinians (Benford et al., 1986; 
Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow, 2000; UNRWA.org, 2012). 
Moving from beliefs about antagonists to beliefs about the efficacy of collective action, 
Benford, et al. (1986) shift to what has been the primary concern of recent efforts to integrate 
social-psychological considerations with the resource mobilization perspective. They explain that 
the basic proposition, rooted in value-expectancy theory, is that social action is contingent on 
anticipated outcomes (Klandermans, 1984; Benford & Hunt, 1992; Benford & Snow, 2000). If 
people are to act collectively (Willams, 1995; Williams, 1999), it is argued, then they “must 
believe that such action would be efficacious, i.e., that change is possible but that it will not 
happen automatically, without collective action” (Oliver, 1985:21 as cited in Benford et al., 
1986).  
Frame Extension: 
Frame extension is one of the framing technique used by SMOs if they have to extend the 
boundaries of their primary framework so as to encompass interests or points of view that are 
incidental to their primary objectives, but are of considerable salience to potential adherents. The 
authors Benfored and Snow (2000), Williams (1995) explain that such a technique is used when 
the programs and values that some SMOs promote may not be rooted in existing sentiment or 
adherent pools or may appear to have little if any bearing on the life situations and interests of 
potential adherents. For example, DFLP was in opposition of the Oslo Accords signed between 
the PLO, namely FATAH and the state of Israel. DFL’s position was that the Accords do not 
meet the basic rights of the Palestinians in having a sovereign state which promotes their 
aspiration for liberty and human rights. Nonetheless, the DFLP and the other Palestinian leftist 
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factions in general failed to provide an alternative especially that they could not resume armed 
resistance and thus assumed a secondary role in the Palestinian nationalist spectrum.59 In order to 
avoid alienation from the Palestinian political scene, the DFLP leadership came to the realization 
that Oslo was an inevitable fact which they had to deal with. Consequently, they adapted their 
strategies to the new facts on the ground. Their participation in the 2006 legislative elections 
attests to the change in their position towards the Oslo Accords (Williams, 1995; DFLP-net.ps, 
2013; Snow, 2000).  
Frame Transformation:  
Frame transformation is a framing technique used when the programs, causes, or values 
that a given social movement organization promotes may not be consonant with conventional 
lifestyles or rituals and extant interpretive frames. In such a case, new values may have to be 
planted and nurtured, old meanings or understandings jettisoned, and erroneous beliefs or 
“misframings” reframed (Goffman, 1974:308 as cited in Benford et al, 1986). In order to acquire 
support and secure participants, Benford et al, (1986) borrow Goffman’s (1974) explanation that 
such a transformation, which he refers to as a “keying,” redefines activities, events, and 
biographies that are already meaningful from the standpoint of some primary framework, in 
terms of another framework, such that they are now “seen by the participants to be something 
quite else” (Goffman, 1974 as cited in Benford et al., 1986). The obvious similarity is that both 
frames involve a reconceptualization of some set of conditions, be they biographic or social, 
past, present, or future (Benford et al., 1986; Cress & Snow, 1996; Benford & Hunt, 1992; 
Williams, 1999). This is quite evident from the example of FATAH, which at some point saw no 
                                                            
59 In comparison to FATAH and HAMAS.  
65 
 
other route to achieve the liberation and freedom of Palestine and the Palestinian people but 
through armed struggle.  Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the collapse of the former Soviet 
Union and the Gulf War in 1990, FATAH, led by Yasser Arafat, came to the realization that 
armed struggle was not achieving its goals, and therefore shifting to negotiations was the most 
feasible alternative to achieve sovereignty and liberation (YAF.ps; 2013, nad-PLO.ps, 2013; 
Williams, 1999).  
 
III. g.  Diagnostic, Prognostic, and Motivational Framing.  
Diagnostic framing involves problem identification and the attribution of blame or 
responsibility. The importance of diagnostic framing arises from the fact that it brings one issue 
into the center of attention and criticism. Diagnostic framing also facilitates shaping the manner 
in which the issue is perceived by identifying the source of the flaw (Cress & Snow, 2000; 
Benford & Hunt, 1992). 
Prognostic framing involves the articulation of a proposed solution to the problem or at 
least a plan of attack and the strategies for carrying out the plan. In addition, prognostic framing 
plays a great role in defining goals and the means needed to achieve these goals by the SMO 
(Cress & Snow, 2000; Zucher & Benford, 1995). 
Finally, in motivational framing, SMOs use such technique as a repertoire to guarantee 
targeted recruits a more permanent emotional resolution—one which could drag them into the 
movement and provide incentives for participation, “motivational framing would seem to have a 
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great deal to do with emotions because it is apparently what gets people actually to do 
























 III. h.  Women’s Activism in Palestine & Palestinian Women’s Social Movements 
 
According to some researchers the realm of women’s movements organization is 
relatively new. Bendle (2005), for example, links the recognition of gender orientation in social 
movements, in general, and organizations in particular, to the postmodernism era. He further 
explains that mainstream organizations, or what he calls “male-stream organizations”, are 
actually male-oriented. 
The inception of the Palestinian women’s movement, embodied in the founding of the 
Women’s Union in Jerusalem in 1919, came as a result of the political atmosphere that emerged 
in the aftermath of World War I at the end of the Ottoman Empire (Abu-Nahleh, et al., 1998). 
Studies on the early women’s movement(s) in Palestine indicate that the early activities of 
women’s activism in the 1920s were limited to demonstrations and sending letters of 
condemnation to the British High Commissioner denouncing the practices of the British Mandate 
and the Zionist movement in Palestine (Abu-Nahleh et al., 1998). Later in the 1930s, their 
activities evolved to include boycotting the products of the Israeli colonies, mainly those goods 
that were produced and manufactured in Jewish Moshavim60, as well as foreign products, 
namely, those produced and manufactured in Great Britain and other British colonies around the 
world (PASSIA, 2011).     
The nucleus of early Palestinian women’s movements consisted of spouses and relatives 
of leaders in the Palestinian nationalist movement in addition to a few other educated women. 
Both groups of women came mainly from Palestinian elite families, a fact which later on 
                                                            
60 Moshavim, plural form of moshav in Hebrew: “a cooperative village in which members own and operate their 
farms individually” (Haruvi & Kislev, 1984: p.75).  
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restricted the women leaders’ ability to develop a grassroots movement.  However, most scholars 
argue that women’s activism in that period was spontaneous and was mainly focused on 
charitable activities.  It should also be noted that the early activities led by Palestinian women 
did not focus on feminism and excluded hard-core political participation61 (Abu Awdeh & 
Kuttab, 2004).  
Women’s activism, as described above, continued in relatively the same vein until the 
early 1960s, an era which witnessed the foundation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) in 1964.  The emergence of the PLO is considered a turning point in the history of the 
Palestinian nationalist movement, and therefore, in the Palestinian women’s movement. With the 
establishment of the PLO quickly came the foundation of the General Union of Palestinian 
Women (GUPW) in 1965 as an official body within the PLO. Accordingly, GUPW is 
considered, to this day, to be the official representative body for Palestinian women around the 
world (Al-Khalily, 1977 as cited in Abu Awdeh & Kuttab, 2004; GUPW, 2011). 
The Palestinian women’s movement in the mid-1960s can be characterized briefly as 
follows.  First, the formation of women associations and assemblies was a means for serving 
needy Palestinian families, which had positive echoes at the national level, but no more than that. 
Second, the PLO was the main factor behind the creation and, later on, the manipulation of the 
GUPW. Third, the different political parties did not present women with an equal opportunity to 
partake in the decision-making process. Yet, despite that lack of attention to women’s concerns, 
women cadres played a leading role in the field – the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East 
                                                            
61Hard-core political participation refers to the involvement in a variety of community mobilization activities, which 
include but are not limited to civil disobedience, going out on demonstrations, distributing pamphlets, which were 




Jerusalem -- in the period following 1967. The involvement of Palestinian women in political 
parties had a positive impact as it reflected their awareness of the significance of taking part in 
the political movement. It is worth highlighting that the charitable model continued to be the 
dominant framework that governed women’s activism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the 
decade following the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967 (Abu Awdeh & 
Kuttab, 2004).  
In the following few pages I will provide a summary of the major milestones that shaped 
the PNM in general and the PWM in particular. These milestones coincide with major historical 
events and turnovers that are recognized by scholars who explored the Palestinian Israeli 
conflict. I will present a brief encapsulation synopsis of these historical events in a chronological 
order up to the present.  
The First Palestinian Intifada (“uprising”) (1987-1990)  
The Palestinian Intifada was considered a defining moment in the history of women’s 
movement in Palestine and gave momentum to their involvement in national activism. For 
example, women organized demonstrations and protests; several women were martyred and 
hundreds of women were detained by the Israeli authorities. In addition, women had to assume 
the role of bread-winners in their families, especially in cases where the man of the household 
was detained or martyred. Nevertheless, this momentum was crushed in the peak of the Intifada 
in 1989 due to the escalating violent practices of the Israeli military occupation. As a result, the 
suppression of the Intifada constituted a parallel setback for the development of the Palestinian 
women’s movement (Abu Nahleh, 2005; Jad, 2010). 
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The Oslo Accords (1993- 2000)  
The Oslo Accords phase was a setback to the popular uprising and was considered a 
turning point for the Palestinian national movement and its transformation towards a more 
organized and well-established cluster of political parties (Jad, 2008). Nonetheless, the 
relationship between these parties and the public sphere, including women’s movement, took a 
bureaucratic form. Moreover, this phase is defined in the literature as a period in which 
conservative movements, i.e. the Islamist movements, gained unprecedented popularity. This 
popularity stemmed from the conservative movements’ reservations against the women’s agenda 
for development, labeling it as a Western agenda (Jad, 2008; Jad, 2010). This can explain why 
women’s organizations emerged as entities which were separate and independent from political 
parties. These women’s organizations adopted the social concerns of women, stimulating 
democratic arguments about women’s liberation. They were also successful in prioritizing a 
feminist agenda and pushing the conventional women’s movement in the Palestinian territories 
to adopt items on that agenda (Hamami & Kuttab, 1999).   
Palestinian women’s activism during the Oslo Accords and post-Oslo Accords phase 
focused mainly on the social issues of women; this was in line with the state-building phase that 
the PLO and other political parties were undergoing at the time. The focus was on legislation 
regarding women’s issues and women’s participation in decision-making positions. In fact, 
Palestinian women’s activism worked/struggled towards the achievement of the social and civil 
rights of women, all of which were marginalized on the women’s movement agenda before Oslo 
(Kuttab, 2007; Hamami & Kuttab, 1999; Jad, 2010).  
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Abu Awdeh and Kuttab (2004) indicated that the momentum of the feminist agenda in 
the Oslo phase resulted from several factors. First, the momentum emerged from the weakness of 
the political parties and the establishment of women’s specialized organizations that reinforced 
the pre-Oslo women’s movements. Second, the momentum of the Palestinian women’s 
movement was fueled by foreign financial aid. Outside, donor countries placed a high priority on 
the women’s movement agenda to insure alliance with the post-Oslo phase especially that most 
of the women’s programs that were supported by these donors were detached from the 
grassroots.  One example is GUPW, which was founded by the PLO as the entity that represents 
and cares for Palestinian women in Palestine and the Diaspora. Nevertheless, the union that does 
not offer any kind of services lacks social enterprise resources and since the establishment of the 
PNA, is heavily reliant on external funding. In other words, though the GUPW is set forth as an 
umbrella to all Palestinian women, it is actually dysfunctional when it comes to mobilizing those 
women. GUPW became the umbrella which all Palestinian Women’s movements came under 
and mobilized for the achievement of equity and equality for Palestinian women. Nonetheless, 
with the establishment of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs by the PNA in 2002, some women 
movements and organizations started to question the role of the union.  
Finally, it is important to note that the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was not 
serious in addressing the women’s movements’ issues (Abu Awdeh & Kuttab, 2004; Jad, 2008). 
Its leaders considered women’s issues to be secondary to national developmental concerns. The 
PNA’s vision for Palestinian women’s development was later translated into the foundation of 
the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA). In most probability, this step was a cosmetic 
solution to the problems facing women and did not touch on core issues, such as the reform of 
both personal and criminal law, encouraging women’s civic engagement, eliminating all forms of 
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discrimination against women, and equity and equality in opportunities based on equal 
qualifications among other issues (MOWA.gov.ps, 2013; MOWA.pna.ps, 2013). 
 
The Second Intifada (2000)  
The Second Intifada witnessed a decline in women’s participation in the struggle against the 
Israeli occupation in comparison to the First Intifada between 1987 and 1990. Kuttab (2003) 
maintains that this decline was a reflection of the transition in the women’s movement agenda 
and the women’s movement structure during the Oslo and post-Oslo periods. She further 
indicates that the women’s movement’s frame had been transformed from a set of community 
organizations that were working to bridge the gap between women’s comprehensive liberation 
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IV. a. Study Design  
This study followed a qualitative design, in particular, a qualitative case study. This 
research is a case study of the women’s movement(s) organizations62 in Palestine, to come to a 
better understanding of the Palestinian women’s organizations, which constitute the backbone of 
women’s movements’ activism and their relation to the Palestinian national movements (PNMs).  
The significance of case studies stems from the need to comprehend complex social phenomena; 
this method allows researchers to maintain the holistic and the meaningful features of real life 
events (Yin, 2009).  
George and Bennett (2005) indicate that the case study is an analysis of a distinct 
characteristic of a historical era that the investigator analyzes in lieu of examining the actual 
historical event. They further point out that this process includes both within-case analysis and 
cross-case comparison within a single study or a research program. They define a case as “an 
instance of class of events.” The term “class of events” refers here to a phenomenon of scientific 
interest, such as revolutions, types of governmental regimes, kinds of economic systems, or 
personality types that the investigator chooses to study with the aim of developing a theory (or 
“generic knowledge”) regarding the causes of similarities or differences among instances (cases) 
of that class of events” (p.17-18).  
The goals of a case study’s are mainly to understand the experiences of individuals and 
groups, in addition to illuminating participants’ subjective meanings, actions, and social 
contexts, as understood by them. It is a very useful method in examining social, cultural, and 
                                                            
62 My study aims at understanding the nature of women activism in Palestine and whether or not it solidified to the 
level of a movement in its sociological and philosophical perspective. The answers of the study informants have 
indeed shed the lights on this theme and gave their perspective about their vision. I will discuss the issue of 
movements and movements’ organizations in more details in Chapter Five “Findings”.  
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political factors that impact people, in addition to organizational and managerial processes (Yin, 
2009).  
While many quantitative studies may be portrayed as case studies, in contrast to statistical 
methods and quantitatively-oriented methods, qualitative case studies have key strengths that 
make them valuable in assessing and developing new theories. (Lincoln & Guba 1989; Lincoln 
& Denzin, 2000). The first strength is their conceptual validity. Case studies allow for conceptual 
modifications with a higher level of validity over a smaller number of cases. They further 
distinguish and assess the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts that the 
researcher intends to capture. The second strength is deriving new hypotheses; case studies are 
strong in investigating and identifying new variables and hypothesis through studying deviant 
and outlier cases.  
The third strength is the case study’s ability to explore causal mechanisms. Case studies 
have the advantage of examining a large number of extraneous and mediating variables and 
inductively observing any unexpected aspects of the operation of a particular causal mechanism.  
Finally, case studies have a relative ability to accommodate causal relationships, such as 
equifinality, path dependency, and complex interaction effects (George & Bennett, 2005). 
The qualitative nature of this study has a key strength that emerges from the 
comprehensiveness of the perspective it gives to the researcher and to the deeper understanding 
of the subject matter it provides. Another key strength is its ability to recognize the various 
nuances of attitudes, behaviors, and environmental setting that might pass unnoticed when other 
designs and methods are used. In particular, I will adopt a case study approach as a method of 
idiographic examination of women’s movement(s) organizations in Palestine (Maxwell, 2005).  
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This study provides an opportunity to examine in-depth the case of women’s 
movement(s) organizations that have been active in the field of women’s equity and equality in 
Palestine following the Six Day War of 196763,64 and reaching to the present. Equally important 
to this research project is the relation of PWMs to the overall Palestinian Nationalist Movement 
from a historical perspective, in addition to understanding the contemporary case of women’s 
movement(s) organizations in Palestine and their structures.   
 
IV. b. Study Questions  
This study will try to answer some fundamental questions focusing on the milestones in 
the development of women's movement(s) in Palestine. First, the study attempts to focus on the 
major themes that have shaped contemporary women's movement(s) in Palestine. My study tries 
to shed light on this key question and relate the thematic answers to the historic development of 
the women's movement(s) in Palestine.  
Second, how can one assess the particular context within which the activists in the 
Palestinian movements operated and the influence that this context had on their actions? Just as 
in the previous question, here also a contextualizing move is necessary. In considering the 
                                                            
63 The General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) was established in 1965 as an arm of the PLO to follow up on 
women’s concerns. Upon its conception, it was meant to be the unifying umbrella for all women’s activism in 
Palestine, and as an entity that represents all Palestinian women both within the Palestinian Occupied Territories and 
in Diaspora. The union was seen as focal organ in the PLO that represents women and defends their rights especially 
against occupation’s violation of their human rights. Many scholars, as well as my study participants, consider that 
the founding of the GUPW marks the turning point and the beginning of organized Palestinian women’s activism.   
64 In the aftermath of the 1967 defeat, the PNM factions came to the understanding that the Arab-Israeli conflict is 
now the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, especially after the fading of Pan-Arabism that was led by\Nasser, the Egyptian 
President. Arafat and his FATAH faction seized the leadership of the PLO from the Arab League, and asserted the 
right of Palestinians to self-representation and their right to freedom and sovereign state (Sirriyeh, 2000). For more 
information, please refer back to Chapter II “Palestine Location and History”.   
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women’s movement(s) in Palestine, one has to explore the different nationalist movements that 
emerge alongside of it. More importantly, no understanding of Palestinian women’s 
movement(s) is complete without an understanding of how they emerged nationally and how 
they addressed the issue of national liberation and their position vis-à-vis the occupation. More 
specifically, although the majority of the Palestinian nationalist movements were banned from 
operating in the Palestinian Occupied Territories by the Israeli Military Administration, women’s 
movement organizations –albeit almost always affiliated with a nationalist faction of the PLO—
were permitted to operate. Such affiliation also allows the researcher a clear view of their 
organizational structure. 
However, a majority of those women’s movements/organizations in their inception were 
a reflection of the social structure in the society. Many of them were founded by prominent 
women of the Palestinian elite, and they have to be initially situated as such with an eye towards 
the shifts that they took in their development, especially in conjunction with the larger 
Palestinian problem.  
Finally, this study attempts to investigate the issue of the objectives and aspirations of the 
Palestinian women’s movement(s).  Starting from the premise that these are women groups and 
that they address the concerns of women in Palestine, one would want to determine who the 
antagonists are. This question does not presuppose clear-cut gender demarcations, as they are, for 
instance, in liberal theory. A clear difference the objectives and aspirations of the Palestinian 
women’s movement(s) from the latter, liberal theory, is the field of the struggle: The state and 
the law are (pre)givens in such theorizations, which posit the institution of law as the most 
significant target of change. In the Palestinian context, the existence and mode of operation of 
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such institutions – needless to say that the state here is still an aspiration in the Palestinian 
imagination – cannot be easily translated into an academic register that evolved in conjunction 
with its object of study in other nation-states not only in Europe and America, but also in 
neighboring Arab countries. Here a comparativist stance would elucidate not only the formation 
of the women’s movement in Palestine, but also in other countries as one would have to address 
the historical contingencies of such formations. 
 
IV. c. Study Population 
The study targeted former and current activists, in addition to serving as former or current 
chief executive officers (CEOs) of Palestinian women’s movement organizations. There were no 
strict inclusion and exclusion selection criteria for the selecting of the study population, with one 
exception.  Participants/informants are all self-identified former and current activists, in addition 
to serving as former or current chief executive officers (CEOs) of Palestinian women’s 
movement organizations in the West Bank, Palestine.  These are women between mid-40s to 
late-80s of age. They have witnessed and lived the defining moments of the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict, and in certain cases took active part in it. Moreover, some of these participants worked 
closely and shared experiences with pioneers of PWMs, and are cited as references when talking 
about such pioneers.    
According to Bailey, (2007), potential informants should be selected based on predefined 
criteria. For example, the researcher should consider whether or not they are in a position of 
regular interaction with other members of the targeted population or if they are familiar or 
isolated from the settings.  Moreover, the researcher has to make sure that his or her informants 
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have the appropriate knowledge about the organization’s structure, vision and philosophy. Do 
they possess knowledge or information limited to their roles or do they represent the various 
aspects of the targeted organizations and setting? Ideally the researcher should be aiming at 
informants who are experienced members in and endorse the aspirations of the organizations 
being studied.   
My study requires that I, the researcher, reach out to current and former women’s 
movements’ activists in Palestine and try to cover a time span that goes back to the early 20th 
century. If this criterion were to be taken literally, then it would be quite likely that a significant 
proportion of the pioneers of women’s activism would have either passed away or would be 
unable to participate due to health reasons or aging. This population limitation was overcome by 
locating alternative informants, such as people who worked closely with the pioneers, successor 
CEOs, and annual records of the agencies that the pioneers were active in. In other instances, I 
utilized archives to bridge the gap of time line interruption or the absence of adequate 
informants. 
Scholars such as George and Bennett (2005) point out that, unlike researchers employing 
statistical methods that require a large sample of cases and a significant level of 
representativeness, case study researchers do not have to seek to select cases that are directly 
representative of a diverse population. Instead, they should make clear that they are studying a 
discrete phenomenon and avoid making any claims about the representativeness of the study or 





IV. d. Study Instruments 
The study utilized face-to-face, semi-structured interviews as the principal instrument to 
collect data. The interviews consisted mainly of a set of semi-structured questions that gave the 
opportunity for the participants to share their personal experiences. (See Appendix B for a copy 
of the interview questions.) However, since semi-structured interviews were used, I moderated 
the interview and kept track of the order of questions and included probing questions where I 
deemed necessary. The interviews were conducted entirely in Arabic. The interviews as well as 
the notes that were taken during the interviews were also transcribed in Arabic. The notes were 
later used to synthesize the discussion in Arabic, which was translated into English in the final 
stages of the dissertation write up.  
The interviews focused on seven major themes that address the study questions as 
described in the study questions section above. These seven themes are: 
1. PWMs’ historical relationship with the Palestinian nationalist movement  
2. Palestinian women’s movement(s) structure and objectives historically 
3. Activists in the Palestinian women’s movement(s)  
4. Contemporary women’s movements in Palestine as compared with earlier formations 
5.  Resource dependencies and resource mobilization 
6. Activism and community mobilization of PWMs 
7. Organizational structure of the organizations under study  
81 
 
In addition to the interviews, I also utilized organizational archives of both activist and 
educational organizations as an integral source of data for the study. Fortunately, I was granted 
unconditional access to the targeted population organizations’ archives where applicable and 
possible. In fact I was able to examine a large number of records, annual reports, bylaws and 
publications. I reviewed and synthesized these documents in their original language (i.e. Arabic) 
and incorporated the information derived from them into the discussion in Arabic. Then I 
translated the major findings obtained from these archives into English, and used these 
translations in the final dissertation write up.  
 
IV. e. Study settings: 
1. Time settings: The study covered the Palestinian women’s movement(s) between 191565 
and 2011, focusing on the following historical eras and key events in the history of 
modern Palestine.66  
 The British mandate (1917 - 1948) 
 The war of 1948 “Al-Nakba”   
 The Jordanian administration (1948 - 1967)  
                                                            
65 World War I (WWI) marked the birth of the concept of the modern Arab nation or what some orientalist 
historians refer to as “Ummah” (or nation in English). Though it is almost impossible to find participants/informants 
who witnessed WWI, most scholars who studied Arab nationalism and Palestinian nationalism and PNM, and as 
such PWMs, refer to the year 1915 as the milestone of Arab identity and from it the Palestinian identity. Some of my 
study participants actually went back to 1915 to mark the beginning of the PNM and the PWMs and women’s 
activism in Palestine. (Sirriyeh, 2000; Khalidi, 1991).     
66 It is important to note that I spared no effort to reach out to informants who either were pioneers activists in the 
field of Palestinian women’s movements or informants who were closely associated with such figures. In instances 
where such informants were absent, I studied organizational and movement archives to bridge the gap in the time 
line covered by my study.  
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 The Six-Day War of 1967 
 The First Intifada of 1987 
 The Oslo Accords of 1993 
 The Second Intifada of 2000 
 The post-Arafat era (2004 - 2011) 
 
2. Location setting: The study covered the following geographical locations: 
 Historical Palestine, 1915 – 1948. 
 The West Bank and the Gaza Strip 1948 – 1967 
 Occupied Palestinian territories 1967 – 1993 
 Palestinian (National) Authority 1993 – 2011.  
Please note that women’s activism within refugee camps in the Diaspora was not 
included in this study. I decided to exclude refugee camps in the diaspora because my study 
focuses on the Palestinian women’s activism within what remained of historical Palestine. More 
importantly, my study focuses on women’s activism under occupation. Finally, there were 
logistic complications in reaching out to women activists in Palestinian refugee camps outside 
the West Bank including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. These complications include, 
though not limited to: the unstable situation in hosting countries, namely, Lebanon and Syria, 
restrictions on accessing Palestinians refugee camps, especially in Lebanon; and finally, the 
constraints on activism within the Palestinian refugee camps, namely in Jordan. 
The interviews took place in the headquarters of the women’s movement(s) 
organizations, particularly in the offices of their CEOs. The actual interviews only cover the 
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West Bank and East Jerusalem due to security and mobility restrictions. I had no access to 
women’s movement organizations located in the Gaza strip67. Access to the Gaza strip is denied 
by Israeli military forces starting June, 200768.  
 
IV. f. Sampling  
To reach out to the targeted population in this study, I used non-probability sampling 
techniques, particularly purposive sampling, also known as judgmental sampling, of current and 
former activists in the Palestinian women movement(s), in addition to current CEOs of women’s 
movement organizations in Palestine.  I also employed a snowballing technique in which women 
informants in my study suggested other names of women, who it made sense to interview, given 
the present study aims and parameters (Patton, 1990; Seidman, 1998). As anticipated, I was able 
to recruit and interview 11 key informants from the targeted population, in addition to 5 
informants used in the pilot study. 
Participants/informants were selected in a manner that provided a broad view of the 
group being studied; they were selected based on the researcher’s prior information about their 
own knowledge of and experience in PWMs. Informants were chosen precisely because they 
were thought to have some knowledge about a certain group and were willing to talk about their 
experiences. Furthermore, I based my selection criteria on the fact that the informants were either 
                                                            
67 Because of methodological and technical constraints, former and current activists as well as former and current 
CEOs of PWMs from Gaza Strip (GS) were dropped from my sample especially that I intended to conduct face-to-
face interviews.  
68 After the so-called coup led by HAMAS in the Gaza Strip, Israel imposed a military blockade against GS and 
restricted Palestinians’ and foreigners’ access to it.  
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current or former activists in the Palestinian nationalist movement. I also made sure that my 
sample reflected the wide spectrum of the different PNM’s, making sure not to exclude those 
who represent themselves as independent from the PNM.   
IV. g. Procedures for Recruiting Subjects  
The participants received an invitation letter via e-mail asking them to take part in this 
study. The letter included some background about the study and a brief explanation about the 
purpose of the study. The letter also included a section explaining the role of the participants and 
what is expected of them, should they choose to participate in this study, including information 
the time that the participants are expected to spend taking part in this study.  Finally, the 
invitation letter included a section about confidentiality, informing the participants that, should 
they agree to take part in this study, they will receive an informed consent form, which they must 
sign before an interview may be conducted. Furthermore, I provided the participants with a copy 
of the support letter I obtained from my academic supervisors at Columbia University.  A copy 
of the invitation letter can be found in (Appendix C) and a copy of the academic support letter 
can be found in (Appendix F) 
 
Each participant/interviewee received a informed consent form requesting his/her 
approval prior to the actual interview The informed consent form (see Appendix E.) explains the 
nature of the study, the duration of the interview, and it advises the prospective participant that 
participation is voluntary, and that s/he has the right to withdraw at any time.  
One week after the invitation letters were sent, I made follow-up telephone calls to work 
out the logistics of each interview and gave the participants more information about the purpose 
85 
 
of this study and the procedure for acquiring their consent.  The telephone calls were an 
opportunity for me to explain to my informants about the measures taken to guarantee their 
confidentiality and privacy. I also explained to the interviewees what is expected from them as 
participants and I pointed to them that participating in this study is voluntary and that they have 
the right to withdraw from the study at any time.  
I scheduled the times for the actual interviews, explaining that informants will be asked 
to sit for an interview lasting between 2 to 3 hours and we decided on a convenient location for 
the interview that guarantees the interviewee’s privacy. Most interviews took place in the 
informants’ work headquarters. In cases where the interview took place out of an informant’s 
work location, I worked out other arrangements with the informant and covered transportation 
and other expenses when necessary and where applicable.  All participants were offered a $5069 
monetary compensation for their time upon the interview’s completion if they chose to accept it.  
Moreover, I explained to the interviewees/informants that as the study progresses, I might 
contact them for further information or an integral interview to fill some gaps in the original 
interview, or to answer some questions that presented themselves in the course of the study or 
the interview process and were not part of the original interview questions.  
A copy of the E-mail invitation letter that the participants received, followed by the protocol of 
the phone call, can be found in (Appendix D). 70 
 
                                                            
69 The monetary compensation was paid in U.S. Dollars to avoid complications related to the fluctuating exchange 
rates for the U.S. Dollar and New Israeli Shekel.    
70 The invitation letters were sent in both English and Arabic, while the phone calls and interviews were conducted 
in Arabic.   
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IV. h. Data Sources 
The data sources were classified under two major categories: primary sources and 
secondary sources. The researcher tried to obtain as much data as possible from the primary 
resources, particularly the notes synthesized from the audio recordings of the interviews with the 
informants. Manuscripts and records obtained from the interviewees’ organizations were also 
studied.  
The primary resources included, but were not limited to, the following: archives, annual 
reports, bylaws, executive reports, newspaper archived articles, open-ended interviews, and 
focus group discussions71. The secondary resources included: articles, books, journal and 
magazine and newspaper articles. It is worth noting that these materials were not translated into 
English. The researcher analyzed them in the original language, reported on them and then 
translated the findings into English.   
 
IV. i. Data Analysis 
This study employed a qualitative analysis, which is a process of reviewing, synthesizing, 
and interpreting phenomena to describe and explain them. The qualitative researcher examines 
segments of texts, conversations and discussions to ascertain their meanings, in addition to 
coding, sorting, and organizing these segments to find patterns, themes and connections among 
                                                            
71 I was planning to conduct a focus group discussion that includes a good cross-section of the targeted population, 
among which some of the informants whom I interviewed would be included. However, circumstances beyond my 
control, such as limited mobility among the West Bank residents imposed by the Israeli military occupation, it was 
not possible, sadly, to convene participants for a focus group discussion in one place.  
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patterns and themes. A qualitative analyst seeks to comprehend the multiple interrelationships 
among magnitudes that emerge from the data. Accordingly, coding and thematic analysis are 
conducted to label segments of interview transcriptions that highlight points of consensus and 
disagreement.  In addition, coding and thematic analysis were utilized to analyze pertinent 
content among primary and secondary sources. Moreover, qualitative designs are predominantly 
focused on exploration, discovery, and inductive logic (Patton, 1990).   
As mentioned earlier in chapter one, this study aims at unveiling the thematic relationship 
between the PWM(s) and the PNM, therefore I will utilize thematic analysis as a major technique 
to look up for the patterns in the participants’ answers (Grbich, 2004). Such themes and patterns 
may include, but are not limited to: PWMs and PNM dynamics “Political Opportunity”, PWMs 
organizations and funding dynamics “Resource Dependence and Resource Mobilization”, PWMs 
framing and networking issues “Framing and Master Frames”, PWMs leadership features 
“Framing and Master Frames”, and where applicable PWMs and religion dynamics “Political 
Opportunity”.  The previous themes were derived from the dimensions that my semi-structured 
interview questions focused on. These themes developed and took shape during the transcription 
process of my interviews.   
Thematic analysis, though inadequately acknowledged, is considered a fundamental and 
genuine part of qualitative research (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Boyatizis, 1998). Thematic analysis 
is: “a process for encoding qualitative information. The encoding requires an explicit [code]” 
(Boyatizis, 1998: 161).  Braun and Clarke (2006) define thematic analysis as: “a method for 
identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns themes within data (p.79) while a theme is: “a 
pattern found in the information that at the minimum describes and organizes the possible 
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observation or at the maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon. A theme may be identified 
at the manifest level (direct observable in the information) or at the latent level categorizing 
issues underling the phenomenon).” (Boyatizis, 1998: 161).   
But what counts as a theme? A theme should capture and report something important 
about the data in relation to the researcher study question. Moreover, it should reflect the 
presence of at least a minimal level of a pattern in response or meaning within the data set 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). As such, what level of a pattern should reflect a theme; in other words, 
how much of a pattern should be considered as a theme in the researcher data?  Similar to other 
types of qualitative studies, there is no quick and straightforward answer to the question of what 
proportion of one’s data set needs to display evidence of the pattern for it to be considered a 
theme. For instance, it is not a matter of quantifying the presence or prevalence of a theme like in 
quantitative studies or even some qualitative studies that codes the data and looks for the 
frequency of a pattern.  
For example if a theme is present in 40% of the interviewees’ answers, this does not 
mean that it is the dominant or the most important theme, and as such, a theme pattern that does 
not seems to appear in more than 30% of the interviewees’ answers does not, by any means, 
make it a subordinate theme, or something that the researcher should overlook (Holliday, 2007; 
Straus, 1987; Eliot 2005). To sum up, the “keyness” or the importance of a theme is not 
determined by frequency, but rather on whether or not it captures indicators that are important in 
relation to the overall study question and its context. So the researchers’ judgment and expertise 
is necessary to determine what accounts as a theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Bailey, 2007; 
Boyatizis, 1998; Eliot, 2005; Patton, 1990). 
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My study is guided by an inductive72 perspective in thematic analysis; however, I do not 
aim at coming out with a grounded theory at the conclusion of my study. Although, I planned my 
study to be inductive73, it would be inevitable to have some deductive perspectives74 for some of 
the study themes. Moreover, my study will be of a latent theme nature; that is, the themes will be 
identified in advanced stages of my analysis in contrast to semantic themes that focus on literal 
and surface meaning of the words or themes75.  Thematic analysis at a latent level goes beyond 
semantic content of the data— literal verbatim and surface meaning of the words- and looks 
instead for assumptions and underlying causes, in other words, look for the abstract constructs 
within the words or themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Bailey, 2007; Boyatizis, 1998; Eliot, 2005; 
Patton, 1990; Grbich, 2004).     
Finally, since the interviews were conducted in Arabic, there was a need for a translation 
and back translation to guarantee the quality of information and findings reported. However, I 
did not translate and back translate the entire interviews from Arabic to English. Instead, I 
                                                            
72 “Inductive analysis is therefore a process of coding the data without trying to fit it into a preexisting coding frame, 
or the researcher’s analytic preconceptions” (Braun & Clarke, 2006: p.83). 
73  
 An inductive approach means that the themes identified are strongly linked to the data themselves (Patton, 
2002). 
 “The strategy of inductive designs is to allow the important analysis dimensions to emerge from patterns 
found in the cases under study without presupposing in advance what the important dimensions will be” 
(Patton, 1990: p. 56). 
74 “Once patterns, themes, and /or categories have been established through inductive analysis, the final, 
confirmatory stage of qualitative analysis may be deductive and appropriateness of inductive content analysis, 
including carefully examining deviant cases or data that do not fit the categories developed”  (Patton, 1990: p.454). 
 
75 “With a semantic approach, the themes are identified within the explicit and surface meanings of the data, and the 





collected notes from the audio-recordings in Arabic, coded them, analyzed them, synthesized 
them, and then translated the synthesis of these findings to English.  
IV. j. Instrument Piloting: 
 
The interview protocol was piloted with five (5) former or current activists in Palestinian 
women’s movements, or chief executive officers (CEOs) of Palestinian women’s movement 
organizations in the West Bank, Palestine including East Jerusalem. I was able to recruit five 
pilot participants and conduct interviews with them in which I asked them to answer the study 
questions in order to test the clarity and the comprehensiveness of the study questions. The 
participants were asked for feedback about the nature of the questions that were presented to 
them. The feedback from these pilot interviews and interviewees was used to review and finalize 
the interview questions that were used in conducting the actual study. These results were very 
helpful in testing the merits of the study instrument.   
The participants were chosen from a list including all organizations and societies 
registered through the Palestinian Ministry of Interior, in addition to a list of all charitable and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) published by the General Union of Palestinian 
Charitable Organizations in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. 
During the five pilot interviews and the eleven study interviews, I underwent all the 
processes of inviting, recruiting and conducting the interviews, taking all necessary measures and 
precautions to guarantee confidentially and privacy.  Throughout all interviews, I abided by the 
Columbia University IRB regulations, paying utmost care to guarantee compliance with 
protocols concerning human subjects’ protection. The participants received an invitation letter 
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via e-mail asking them to take part in this study. The letter included, first, a briefing and a 
background about the study, in addition to a section explaining the purpose of the study. 
Moreover, the letter included a section explaining the role of the participants and what is 
expected of them, should they choose to take part in this study. Furthermore, the letter included 
an explanation about the time that the participants are expected to spend taking part in this study.   
Finally, the invitation letter included a section about confidentiality, informing the 
participants that, should they agree to take part in this study, they will receive an informed 
consent form, which they must sign before an interview may be conducted. Furthermore, I 
provided the participants with a copy of the support letter I obtained from my academic 
supervisors at Columbia University.  A copy of the invitation letter can be found in (Appendix 
C).  A copy of the academic support letter can be found in (Appendix F). 
An informed consent form was given to each participant/ interviewee requesting their 
approval prior to the actual interviews, explaining to them the nature of the study, the duration of 
the interview, in addition to advising them that participation is voluntary, and that they have the 
right to withdraw at any time. A copy of the informed consent form can be found in (Appendix 
E).   
 
IV. k. Instrument Trustworthiness: 
 
The instrument was tested for validity and reliability; face and content validity were 
established. The validity of a measure refers to how well it measures what it is believed to be 
measuring. Does it reflect the “real” (or generally agreed upon) meaning of the concept of 
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interest? (Finnegan, 1992).The study questions were reviewed and examined by experts from UN 
agencies, who corroborated the content validity of the study instrument. Among the measures 
that I took to maintain an acceptable level of validity was to make sure that:  
 Arguments were internally consistent. 
 Interpretations were thorough and complete. 
 Conviction, interpretations were the most compelling given the evidence. 
 Interpretations were meaningful. 
 
A crucial part of maintaining the quality of my study and establish the credibility of my 
research instrument and that of the data collected was using it to establish the trustworthiness of 
the information collected. In other words, I wanted to find out whether what my participants said 
in their interviews was true or not? Does it corroborate what other participants said about the 
same issue? And being more cautious, would other people doing the same interview perceive the 
information gathered in a different way?  Many qualitative researchers disagree with the 
epistemological assumption underling the notion of validity and reliability, and instead focus on 
the trustworthiness of the instrument (Seidman, 1998; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).   
Trustworthiness: “is the quality of an investigation (and its findings) that made it 
noteworthy to audience” (Schwandat, 1997: p. 164). In qualitative research, trustworthiness 
addresses concerns similar to validity and reliability in quantitative research. Such concerns 
include, credibility, which is parallel to internal validity and relates to the issue of the researcher 
presenting evidence to insure the compatibility between the respondents’ views of their ways and 
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the researcher’s reconstruction and representation of such views are the same. Transferability76, 
mirrors external validity and addresses the issue of generalizability in terms of case-to-case 
transfer. In seeking transferability, the researcher is responsible for presenting the readers with 
sufficient evidence and information about the coherence of the case(s) being studied.  
Dependability, which is reflective of reliability in quantitative designs and is focused on the 
process of inquiry and the researcher’s responsibility for insuring that the process entails sound 
logic, is documented. Therefore, dependability is traceable to actual people and events involving 
the targeted group.  Dependability, in turn, leads to consideration of the feature of 
conformability. A qualitative research concept which models objectivity, is concerned with 
establishing the fact that the data and interpretations of an inquiry are rooted in informants’ 
experience or observations, rather than being figments of the researcher’s imagination 
(Schwandt, 1997; Barroso & Sandelowski, 2007; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Finngan, 1992). 
Other researchers add more criteria to establish trustworthiness, such as establishing the 
integrity of data, balancing the tension between subjectivity and reflexivity, and finally clearly 
communicating the findings and their applicability to research and practice (Williams & Hill 
2012; Williams & Morrow, 2009).  The integrity of data focuses on providing details about the 
method(s) that used to collect the data, triangulation methods where applicable and checking for 
saturation. Reflexivity and subjectivity are concerned with the balance between participants’ 
responses and how the researcher perceives, interprets and reports them. Finally, clear 
communication of findings is concerned with the means with which researchers clearly and 
                                                            
76 “Transferability is fostered when researchers provide detailed information about participants and the research 




transparently present the implications of their finding and link them to motivations behind their 
study. Sound qualitative research also establishes the limitations of one’s methodological 
approach, stimulates future research, and encourages dialog between researchers, study 
participants, practitioners, and policy makers (Williams & Hill 2012). 
My interviews utilized an open-ended structure, which aimed to explore the participants’ 
responses and their reactions to a set of questions that my instrument included, thus, making the 
participants - reconstruct their own experiences and aspirations about Palestinian women in 
general, Palestinian women activism in particular, civil society in Palestine, women and culture 
in the Palestinian context and Palestinian women’s movements as social movements (Seiman, 
1998; Finngan, 1992). My interviews examined the complex issues in the areas of my study 
topics, as mentioned above, by examining the actual experiences of the people in that area, and 
the meaning and implications that such experiences meant to them.   
As mentioned earlier, before conducting pilot interviews, I asked two UN experts 
working closely with women’s organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to review my 
interview questions. In other words, I used their expertise in critically reviewing my questions to 
establish content validity. Moreover, the interview included some double-checking questions. I 
purposefully included questions late in the interviews that would ask about similar ideas and 
practices as in the first set of questions that I had asked.  In some cases, these questions yielded 
new information; in other cases, they received exactly the same responses as earlier in the 
interview. Through this process I intended to check whether my participants’ responses were 
coherent with what they said earlier in the interview. Furthermore, such questions were helpful 
later on in the analysis phase, when I was able to compare participants’ responses one with 
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another and all others, and, later, cross-test them with literature. “…by interviewing a number of 
participants, we can connect their experiences and check the comments of one participant against 
those of others…” (Seidman, 1998: p. 17).    
The interviews allowed me to get closer to understanding and have a better grasp of the 
aspirations of women activists in Palestine. Moreover, I had the opportunity to unveil a piece of 
the history of Palestine in general and Palestinian women’s movement(s) in particular. The 
uniqueness and thoroughness of the stories made it easier for me to have a better understanding 
of what went on in the first Intifada – I was ten years old then -- and the roles that Palestinian 
women assumed in the struggle against the Israeli military occupation. I also gained a better 
grasp of the Palestinian culture and the gender-based roles of both men and women in the 
Palestinian society, something that I would not have been able to capture using other methods 
such as a structured questionnaire or observation. Finally I was able to capture, reconstruct, and 
document a piece of the Palestinian women’s imagination of an untold segment of Palestinian 









IV. l. Strategies for managing, recording and assuring quality of data 
Prior to audio-taping each of the interviews in my research study, I acquired the 
informants’ permission. To ensure the quality, I audio-recorded each interview, took notes of 
each interview and transcribed the recordings. And to ensure the accuracy of the data, I 
compared the recordings with the transcription and notes for each interview. 
The recordings, notes, and transcription were used for the study analysis only by the 
researcher. The recordings did not include the informants’ names, or any other identifiers. 
Instead, each tape was given a code which was matched with the information of the interview. 
All tapes were locked in a safe cabinet. Upon the completion of the interviews, the recordings 
were stored on the researcher’s computer account on the Columbia University server, which is a 
protected server, requiring a password for access. Transcriptions and recordings of the interviews 
were kept in a locked file cabinet with no link to the subject's identity at Columbia University 
School of Social Work in New York City and will be destroyed within five years after the 
researcher has successfully defended his dissertation.  
 
IV. m. Study Risks 
Inconvenience, though not a risk, accompanies the process of taking part in this study. I 
took note of the inconvenience of the subjects’ giving two to three hours of their time in order to 
participate in an in-depth interview in which they discussed and explained the history of women 
movement(s) organizations in Palestine.  
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There were no anticipated risks associated with participating in this study. Prior to the 
Oslo Accords, the issue of confidentiality between the State of Israel, as a force occupying the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the PLO, was quite a controversial, sensitive issue. Israel had 
banned any political, social or ideological activism among the Palestinians from 1967 to 1993, 
when the Oslo Accords were signed. This ban forced many activists and leaders of the nationalist 
movement, including the leaders of women movements, to keep a low profile and operate 
underground. However, under the rule of the PNA, activists no longer feel threatened or fear a 
breach of confidentiality when they talk about their activism and the history of their political and 
social activism.  
 
IV. n. Study Benefits 
No tangible benefits were expected from participating; subjects did not receive any 
personal (direct) benefits from taking part in this research study. There were no material benefits 
from participating in this research study except the $50 ‘honorarium’ mentioned earlier and the 
reimbursement for transportation expenses for the interviewees, when necessary. The 
information collected from this research may help other PWM leaders and members in the future 
as a baseline for scholars to launch their research. Participation is expected to help document the 
oral history of the women’s movement organizations in Palestine and their progress over the past 
few decades. In addition, participants will help explain the nature of the relationship between the 
Palestinian women’s movement organizations and the Palestinian nationalist movement and help 




IV. o. Human Subjects Protection Protocol 
The study was submitted to the Columbia University Morningside Heights Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) for approval77.  Documents indicating satisfactory fulfillment of the Human 
Subjects’ Protection Protocol requirements were submitted to the Doctoral Office.  Work on this 
study commenced upon receiving approval. 78,79,80 
Ensuring confidentiality is greatly important in protecting the rights of the study human 
subjects. Any information that was collected during this study that can identify the informants by 
name was kept confidential and locked in a safe cabinet, to which only the researcher had access 
(Royse, Thyer, & Padgett, 2010).  I followed all possible measures to keep this data secure. I 
abided by the guidelines of the Columbia IRB protocol81 in order to guarantee human subject 
protection throughout the span of the entire study. All personal information was held 
confidential. Personal information and transcriptions of the interviews were uploaded and stored 
on the researcher’s account on Columbia University server, which is a protected server, requiring 
a password for access. Transcriptions and recordings of the interviews were kept in a locked file 
cabinet with no link to any subject's identity at Columbia University School of Social Work in 
New York City, and only the researcher will have access to the actual contents and the 
transcription of the interviews that were conducted with the participants.  
                                                            
77 The Columbia University Morningside Heights Institutional Review Board has approved the protocol for this 
study.  
78 A copy of the protocol and approval letter can be found in Appendix. 
79 The Morningside IRB granted approval for this study expiring on 30 September 2012 
80 An extension was filed.   
81 For further information about Columbia IRB regulations and guidelines, please visit the Columbia IRB on the 
following link  IRB.columbia.edu  
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To ensure abiding by the Columbia University IRB, and to apply the Human Subject 
Protection Protocol, all informants were required to sign an informed consent form prior to their 
participation in the study. See Appendix E for a copy of the consent form.  
 
IV. p. Study Recruits  
The researcher consulted the list of organizations and societies registered through the 
ministry of interior, moreover, he consulted the list of all charitable and nongovernmental 
organizations published by the general union of Palestinian charitable organizations.  
1. Women’s Studies Center (WSC)/ Jerusalem 
2. Palestinian Family Relief Society (Inash) / Ramallah  
3. Institute of Women Studies at Birzeit University  (BZU) / Ramallah  
4. Union of Palestinian Women Committees (UPWC) / Jerusalem – Ramallah    
5. Hind El-Husini Foundation – Dar Al-Tifel Al-Arabi / Jerusalem  
6. General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW)/Bethlehem  
7. Association of Women’s Committees for Social Work (AWCSW)/ Bethlehem 
8. Arab Women’s Union Society / Ramallah  
9. Women’s affairs Technical Committees (WATC) / Ramallah 
10. Society for Developing Rural Women /Bethlehem 
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11. Women Media and Development (TAM) / Bethlehem  
12.   Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counseling (WCLAC) / Hebron  
13. Arab Women’s Union Society / Beit Sahoor 
14.  Palestinian Working Women Society (PWWS) / Bethlehem  
15. Mihwar Center: Secure Home for Battered Women / Beit Sahoor  
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"The Palestinian Women's and Nationalist Movements: A History of Cooperation & 
a Future of Challenging Partnership" 
 
V. a. About this chapter and what to expect 
The following chapter aims to give the reader a comprehensive idea of the major findings 
of the present study, focusing on the following five themes of women’s activism in Palestine and 
women’s movement(s) as either social movements or part of social movements. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, “Chapter (IV), Methodology”, I have used thematic analysis to come up 
with the following themes through questions that have been asked to the participants of my 
study. Due to time constraints and the nature and the scope of my study, I have classified my 
findings under the following five major themes: 
1) Movement(s’) and factions’ dynamics  
2) Organizations and funding dynamics 
3) Framing and networking issues;  
4) Leadership features; 




This chapter will provide some answers about the relationship between the PWMs and 
the PNM and the nature of the relationship between the two movements. This segment of my 
analysis will also focus on the following aspects of the relationship between the two entities, the 
roots of this relationship, when it started, how it developed, where the relationship stands today 
and what the reasons are behind it. Furthermore, this chapter will explore how the activists and 
the leadership of PWMs envision the future relationship with PNM. 
The second part of this chapter focuses on the theme of organization and funding 
dynamics, particularly stressing concerns that address issues of recourse mobilization and 
resource dependence. This segment of the analysis will address questions about the nature of the 
women’s activism in Palestine and whether or not it rises to the level of a movement. This 
segment of my analysis will also focus on tactics of survival and sustainability adopted by 
women’s organizations.  
Moreover, this chapter will focus on the relationships between women’s organizations, 
that is; I will address issues of networking dynamics among PWMs and their affiliate 
organizations. Furthermore, I will focus on the issue of networking and the ability of 
organizations to mobilize the grassroots and their ability to frame them. That being said, it is 
inevitable to address the concept of leadership within these organizations, particularly addressing 
the concept of charisma, and whether or not, there is a charismatic leader among the PWMs 





V. b. Movement vis-à-vis Movements  
Before I proceed with my analysis, it is important to bring to the readers’ attention the 
issue of the nature of the women’s activism in Palestine, particularly, in relation to its unity and 
level of collaboration. The readers of my work so far would have noticed that the word 
movement in the concept/expression Palestinian women’s movement(s) is always inclusive of a 
bracketed (s) letter indicating a plural notion of the Palestinian women’s movement. However, 
this is not to be confused with the notion of the presence of a movement in its sociological 
definition per se.   
Snow et al. (1991) emphasized the collective nature of a social movement. They defined 
social movements as:  
“Social movements are one of the principle social forms through which collectivities give voice to 
their grievances and concerns about the rights, welfare, and well-being of themselves and others 
by engaging in various types of collective action, such as protesting in the streets that dramatize 
those grievances and concerns and demand that something be done about them.” (p.1). 
Other scholars focused on the goals and survival tactics when defining a social 
movement: “…First, social movements arise, and, assuming they survive, continue to exist in a 
situation of conflict; they are involved in struggles with adversaries. Second, social movements 
are complex social entities with vague and shifting boundaries. They are often composed of 
networks of groups and organizations.” (Ruth, 2003, p. 1).  
I will address the question of whether what is present in Palestine can be characterized as 
a social movement later in this chapter. Nonetheless, it is fair to presume that if a movement is 
present, it is not a single unified movement that has a clear and solid ideology, philosophy, 
vision and aspiration, or an organizational structure. However, all the participants I interviewed 
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agreed that there are common grounds that unify the unorganized women’s activism in Palestine 
and present common denominators on certain levels.  This concept is further explained later in 
this chapter when I discuss framing and networking dynamics. 
For instance, interviewee (A) explained that there are different types of entities that are 
concerned with women’s rights in Palestine. These organizations have different hierarchies, 
funding sources, services and organizational levels, and they all seek to enhance Palestinian 
women’s rights, their opportunities, and mobilize for their equity and equality. However, these 
entities are not unified in their efforts; one can always find common grounds that, under certain 
circumstances, can bring them to work together. This capacity of unity is quite evident when 
Interviewee (A) said: 
There are women’s movement(s) but there are also women’s organizations. Women’s 
movement(s) in Palestine follow the political parties and the nationalist movement. Some 
women’s movements fall on the religious spectrum with religious ideologies - Islamist 
ideology, on the other side of the spectrum you find Leftist movements. There are movements 
that are in between these two extremes, and are affiliated with a more patriotic nationalistic 
ideology (discourse) rather than a women’s ideology. They are still, however, named 
women’s movement(s).   
 
In contrast, Interviewee (B) indicated that there is no unified Palestinian women’s 
movement. She explained that there was actually a misuse of the term of movement singular to 
denote one unified movement, while in fact there are multiple movements. She further elaborated 
that the issue of disunity is a result of the presence of different factions within PNM, in which 
each faction has its own satellite women’s organization. She explained: 
The Palestinian women’s movement is only a name. In reality it is only a political party like 
any other, there should be a unified women’s movement in Palestine82. 
                                                            




A third interviewee, Interviewee (C), further said that women’s activism in Palestine 
indeed rises to the level of a movement; it is organized and is in a transitional phase and is 
materializing as a social movement. However, she added that, regardless of the ideological 
background of these movements, they always had a unifying priority.  
Is it a movement in the sense that there is a mobilization83? There are different forms of women 
organizations that express different views and ideologies in Palestine. In the 1980s when there was 
an overwhelming national burden, the mobilization turned into a movement, thousands of women 
went out to the streets with social and national demands. In the years 2005-2006 a new form of 
women’s movements started to materialize within the Palestinian scene. A deeper and more 
mature form of mobilization, which is still in its beginnings, appeared in Palestine. It focused on 
different issues, ideologies, perspectives but there still is a strive to unite these priorities. 
 
Nonetheless, she still agreed that it is hard to imagine the presence of a unified entity that 
represents women in Palestine at this stage. 84 In other words, it is hard to point to a single entity 
as a sole representative of the Palestinian women. She actually corroborated other interviewees’ 
perspective about the reasons that made the Palestinian women’s movements a scattered force 
within political parties, with their varied framing ideologies. That being said, I can quote my 
interviewee when she said:      
It is a deep delicate question; I think it is a normal thing since we, as a Palestinian society, were 
incoherent. We were not unified in class, we had different classes, different national and religious 
aspirations. This made it hard for us to have a unified women’s movement. Moreover, the 
dominance of the political issues which has created vertical hierarchal cracks and divisions 
sometimes hindered the women efforts from forming themselves in a unified form. 
 
Interviewee (C) gave a different account of the nature of women’s activism in Palestine 
and what she thought about the level of unity or the level of organization of the women’s 
                                                            
83 Rhetorically asking. 
84 She means up to the day when the interview was conducted - June 2012. 
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movement(s). However, she did concur with what her colleagues had mentioned about the 
presence of a common ground and unifying denominators that, from her point of view, is a step 
in the right direction to establish a solid and functional women’s movement in Palestine.  
According to the participants, these denominators include: the unmistakable role of women in the 
struggle against occupation, the unquestionable role of women as half of the Palestinian society, 
women’s aspiration for Palestinian women’s equity and equality, and the un-negotiable role of 
women as partners in building the future of modern Palestine. Interviewee (A) explained: 
There is activism by some of the Palestinian feminist women to shape a unified vision for the 
feminism ideology, in isolation of any political affiliation. There is a push for feminist activists to 
work together towards the greater good of Palestinian women regardless of their organizations. 
There is no clear agenda for the women’s movement(s) in Palestine; even the general union 
(GUPW) which is the umbrella that is supposed to reflect the needs of women does not have a 
clear agenda.  Institutionalization of the women’s movement(s) does indeed limit their 
achievements. Moreover, it divided, weakened, and created separate visions for each organization. 
If women’s movement(s) want to reach a wide base of people, they need to go through service 
oriented organizations. 
 
She further explained that the nature of the mobilization carried out by women’s 
organizations in Palestine has not gone beyond the basic level. She further elaborated that the 
mobilization by PWMs is still focused on the services level, which is a common denominator 
with other NGOs and other civil society organizations that are active in Palestine. Moreover, she 
emphasized that even the achievements at that level were the result of pressure imposed by the 
donors85 on the PNA and were not the result or the outcome of a successful grassroots 
mobilization. Regarding the onset level of sophistication of the Palestinian women’s 
movement(s), she said:  
                                                            
85 More details on the influence of donors on the functioning of PWMs, will be shown later in this chapter under 
“Funding Dynamics”.  
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There is no clear agenda or goals for the women’s movement(s) and women’s organizations in 
Palestine. Instead, there are talks about political participation, social security and voting; 
nonetheless, these are the basic goals and rights of a balanced civil society in general and not 
specific to women’s movement(s). Some of these goals were only achieved through the blessing of 
the political leadership. For example, having a women quota of five female ministers in the 
government was only done through the blessing of the PNA which came as a response to pressures 
imposed by international donors. Even though women’s movements had been calling for this for 
years, I do not think that the right women were appointed in the right positions. 
 
Interviewee (B) was in agreement that there is a common ground of collaboration to work 
for common goals between the different organizations, activists, and parties that support a 
women’s-oriented agenda.  This was clear in the feedback she provided: 
I think that women’s organizations in Palestine should complement each other, support each other, 
and work for one agenda; that is, to eliminate occupation, promote women’s empowerment, and 
social justice. 
 
She further pointed out to the reasons for the absence of a unified Palestinian women’s 
movement that represents women in Palestine. She attributed the absence of a unified Palestinian 
women’s movement to the presence of the different PNM’s factions in addition to the variety of 
ideologies that each faction embraced: 
 
The reasons for the nonexistence of one unified women’s movement are that the cadre for 
women’s affairs has multiple organizations following it. For instance, some civil society agencies 
follow political parties; take our organization86as an example, we are part of the Palestinian NGOs.  
On the other hand, you find that some organizations follow the Islamic parties. We do not have 
any cooperation between us. We do not have communication with them. In other words, we sense 
the inability to work together.  There are some goals that all parties have agreed upon; particularly, 
we are all against occupation, the need for social justice, the need for freedom. Despite all these 
common goals, there is still no clear women’s movement….  
 
                                                            
86 The name of Interview B’s organization is kept confidential. 
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Nonetheless, she perceived the presence of multiple women’s movements in Palestine to 
be a healthy practice. But she acknowledged the need to unify women’s efforts in order to 
achieve and sustain positive change. She said:  
Had we been like any other nation, free and not under occupation, the existence of multiple 
women’s movements would have been normal. But, as a nation still under occupation, we need to 
unify our forces; we need to establish a strong women’s movement that is cable of making change.  
 
In contrast, an interesting testament that gave a crucial example in regard to the presence 
of scattered PWMs, and how their diffused nature negatively affected the progress of Palestinian 
women and diminished their chances of assuming leading positions, came from Interviewee (H). 
She gave a detailed explanation of the absence of a unified PWM, and how women activists had 
to suffer the consequences of such an absence. She actually attributed the under-representation of 
women in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) to the absence of an umbrella that unifies all 
activism that targets women in Palestine. This was clear when she said: 
In 1996, when the first Palestinian elections took place after the return of the PA87, the results 
were not satisfactory to any Palestinian woman. As a matter of fact, these results were disgraceful, 
and did not reflect the scope and the size of sacrifice that we gave as Palestinian women.  From 88 
seats in the parliament, women harvested only five. This did not reflect the real size of our 
sacrifice as women or our role as nationalist activists or as Palestinian women. 
So we say, if women were unified in 1996, and forced their way in the elections, we would have 
achieved better results. In 2006 we became 1788, this is a better result, but still not our best score 
or ambition, however, we made some change.”            
However, as she explained, there were lessons to be learned in this situation; being 
scattered, in no way suggests that there are no means of or grounds for collaboration. In addition, 
she gave examples of means of collaboration with the PNM and other PWMs organizations in 
                                                            
87 She is referring to the return of the PLO leadership to Palestine (West Bank and Gaza Strip) in light of the Oslo 
Accords and the establishment of the PA. 
88 She means the17 women representatives in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC).  
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Palestine. The following segments of my analysis will elaborate on this point much further. I will 
provide more details about the relationship between PWMs among each other and how that 
affects their ability to mobilize resources as well as the grassroots under the heading 
“Networking and Framing Dynamics”.   
To sum up, it is obvious that my study participants, regardless of their current or former 
status: activists, CEOs of women organizations in Palestine, or those who are involved in 
academia to promote gender equity and equality, did, indeed, agree that there are different 
entities that work in the field of Palestinian women’s rights, seeking their equity and equality on 
different levels. There are different levels of struggle for Palestinian women’s equality with their 
fellow male citizens that have resulted in the foundation of different organizations aiming at 
mobilizing Palestinian women and the grassroots. The emergence of these different organizations 
confirms this background of diffusion, which in turn corroborates that Palestinian women’s 
activism in Palestine is scattered, unorganized, and not represented by one solid movement that 
is capable of mobilizing, pressuring and pushing towards change. As my participants indicated, 
these entities have different hierarchies, goals, objectives, and target different groups of women 
within the Palestinian society.  
Despite the fact that the Palestinian women organizations are working towards the same 
goal, and in many cases target the same groups, it is apparent that they have different approaches 
in achieving their goals, and in the way they mobilize the grassroots. In most occasions this 
resulted in an overlap and collision in their interests and was a waste of their resources. All these 
factors inevitably pose obstacles in the way of achieving the desired development and progress.  
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It is true that at a certain point most of these organizations had a unifying goal, which 
centered on resisting occupation and achieving national sovereignty. Yet through the years the 
attention shifted from the nationalist focus to a more women-oriented agenda. This should not 
suggest, in any way, that the common nationalist goal lost its importance totally; instead, women' 
activists came to the realization that nationalist activism was the dominant target of their efforts, 
and that women’s concerns for equity and equality took a subordinate role. Therefore, realizing 
the need to rearrange their priorities, women organizations shifted into focusing on women’s 
issues while in most cases maintained their nationalist activism.  From a legitimacy point of 
view, the leaders of women’s movement(s) needed to remain at the front of the nationalist 
campaign and in the meantime emphasizing the importance of fighting for Palestinian women’s 
concerns.  
Finally, the presence of scattered women’s movements in Palestine does not eliminate the 
fact that from time to time common denominators rise to the surface and unify the efforts of 
women activists in Palestine. However, these are particular incidents, usually lose their 
momentum fairly quickly, and tend to set the desire for unity back. Therefore, it is safe to 
conclude that there are several women’s movements in Palestine and not a single movement. 
Consequently, I will continue using the term Palestinian women’s movements or its acronym 
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V. c. Movement(s’) and Parties’ Dynamic   
V. c. 1. PWMs and PNM: Background  
The main focus of my study, and accordingly my interviews, centered on the relationship 
between Palestinian women’s activism, PWM(s), and PNM. During my interviews, I insisted on 
learning whether my study participants used to be affiliated or active, still affiliated or active, or 
in some way affiliated or active with one of the Palestinian nationalist movement’s factions, 
regardless of the faction that the participants aspire or aspired to.  In other words, I made it clear 
to my interviewees that their political and ideological affiliation is not an issue in this study, but 
rather whether such affiliation, if present, has in any way affected their relationship with 
women’s activism or influenced their decision to be part of the Palestinian women’s movement. 
This question was meant to give me, as well as my audience, a clear view of the motivations of 
my study participants, the motivations that led them to join and become active in the field of 
Palestinian women’s rights and mobilize Palestinian women and the grassroots.    
It is, however, crucial to keep in mind that some of my interviewees, whether they are 
still affiliated with a specific Palestinian political party or a faction of the PNM, gave my study a 
new perspective, especially when it came to answering the theme question about the relationship 
between the PWMs and the PNM. In other words, although my study population did not include 
representation of the PNM, the presence of interviewees who were or still are part of the PNM 
and PWMs, helped resolve one of my study’s limitations, i.e. the absence of a rival view by the 





After reexamining my interviewees’ answers about their background, I became aware of 
the effect that their affiliation with the PNM and PWMs had on the maturation of their characters 
as activists in the Palestinian social activism, namely the women’s movement. The majority of 
my participants did admit that at certain points of their lives they were affiliated, or are still 
affiliated and/or embraced a nationalist agenda and were part of the PNM at a certain point of 
their professional development and ideological maturation. Indeed, the majority of my study 
participants admitted and explained that their affiliation with a PNM faction or embracing the 
aspirations of the PNM in general was a defining factor for them, whether at the personal, 
ideological, or professional level.  
As the participants explained in their own words, such affiliation was a defining element 
in their lives; in other words, a base line for their objectives and a turning point for their future. 
For example, like many other participants, Interviewee (W) explained that being an active 
member and an affiliate of the PNM90, and embracing the philosophy, goals, vision, and ideology 
of a PNM faction helped shape and develop her personality, widened her horizon and on certain 
occasions determined her career and ambition as a Palestinian and as a woman. I am quoting her 
here when she said: 
Of course, my affiliation with the PNM deepened my understanding of the society. It made me 
aware of the obstacles that we face, and how to search for mechanisms to eliminate these 
obstacles. It cleared my vision, it helped me set my goals, and it helped me identify the 
mechanisms needed to evolve and mature. Moreover, it gave me the perspective of my nationalist 
identity, and pointed out the actual practical things we can do, as women, to reach these goals. I 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
90 Many interviewees actually mentioned what political party or faction of the PNM they embraced, and in many 
cases, they did mention that they are or were at a certain point active members in the PWM. However, for 
confidentiality purposes, I omitted the names of the specific political party or faction of the PNM that they are or 
were affiliated with. This omission complies with my objectives of preserving the anonymity of the interviewees of 
never promoting any political party, as I mentioned earlier in the introduction of this chapter.  
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think this had a great deal to do with shaping the person I came to be, even on a professional level, 
I feel that my patriotic aspiration helped me to be successful in my career. 
 
Interviewee (W) went on to provide a detailed testament of how her affiliation with the 
PNM helped her make choices in life, namely, her decision to engage in women’s activism. As 
she explained in her own words, she had the determination to make and be part of the change, 
but she lacked the skills and the mechanisms to do so. She explained that she acquired those 
skills through her affiliation with the PNM, especially the Palestinian Leftist91 movements. 
…to be honest, I carried the burden and the concerns of the Palestinian women since I was very 
young. To be more specific, since I was a teenager, when my personality was shaping, I realized 
that a lot of changes had to be made to improve the situation of the Palestinian woman, but the 
mechanism or the means and skills to achieve such a change were not clear to me. My 
involvement with the PNM helped me find the needed mechanisms to involve Palestinian women 
in all aspects of public life. I used to feel rage inside me that in spite of the Palestinian women’s 
sacrifice, giving, and contributing to her family and society, there were still obstacles at the 
cultural, social, legal and financial levels keeping her from shaping her own personality and 
claiming her dignity in the household. I was always searching for how to change this reality. To be 
honest, my involvement in the PNM was motivated by my desire to learn how to envision projects 
that aimed at empowering Palestinian women, and how to carry out these projects. My 
involvement in the PNM allowed all these feelings that I had toward the Palestinian woman to 
come out. 
 
Other participants considered being part of the PNM to be part of their personal and 
professional identity. For instance, interviewee (B) identified herself as a feminist and as a PNM 
activist saying: 
I am a nationalist and feminist activist, the former includes the latter. My upbringing in Al-Azza 
Camp 92 under occupation pushed me to be involved in the nationalist movement and later on in 
the feminist movement… 
 
                                                            
91 She explained earlier that she is part of the Palestinian Leftist movement; however, the specific details will be 
kept confidential.  
92 A refugee camp in the city of Bethlehem/West Bank.  
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Interviewee (G) claimed that even if a person identifies him/herself as independent, it 
would be impossible to say that they have not been affected by Palestinian nationalism. In other 
words, if we look closely at every woman leader’s personality, respecting her uniqueness as an 
individuals, we will find that at a certain stage of her professional career and her feminist 
ideology maturation, she was indeed affected by Palestinian nationalism, Palestinian patriotism 
and the PNM. Interviewee (G) elaborated on this by saying:  
I am an activist in a women’s movement; that being said, this does not eliminate me from being 
politically independent, in spite of the fact that at some point I was supporting a certain group, the 
...93. I consider that women’s involvement in the political arena, even if as independents, is what 
shaped their personalities and what equipped and motivated them to be leaders in the Palestinian 
women’s movement(s) and within the civil society organizations. To take this a step further, even 
the men who are working within human rights organizations and NGOs94, that built the Civil 
Society Organizations in this country [Palestine], can be traced back to the Palestinian left95      
 
Yet another participant, Interviewee (E), indicated that no matter how she looks back in 
time, she has always identified herself as a nationalist activist first. Only then will she consider 
herself a woman activist in the PWMs. She admitted that her identity as an activist in the PWMs 
derives from her identity as an activist in the PNM. The primacy of her nationalist work and 
identity is self-evident in this excerpt: 
Yes, I started as an activist in the PNM, I identified with their political and nationalist ideologies 
and aspirations, and then I moved to be engaged more in the PWM. To be honest, my engagement 
with the PNM shaped my identity and was the reason behind my political and nationalist maturity. 
Moreover, it actually motivated me to get involved in women’s concerns and become a women’s 
activist. The way I looked at it back then, is that I perceived my activism as a woman to be in line 
with my activism as a nationalist.  In other words I could not make the distinction between my role 
as an activist in the PWM and an active member of the PNM. 
 
                                                            
93 The exact name of the political affiliation is kept confidential.  
94 None Governmental Organizations.  
95 She is referring to the Palestinian leftist movements, namely: PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and FIDA.  
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An interesting story about the motivations behind joining the PWMs and how being 
involved in the PNM helped inspire and inform such a decision came from Interviewee (H), who 
provided a very detailed account and recounted the sequence of events that made her decide to 
get involved in the PWMs’ activism. She also gave an example from her own personal 
experience of how she was influenced by the PNM, how she was framed and inspired by their 
ideology, and how she matured politically and professionally because of her engagement with 
the nationalist movement.  
Interviewee (H) gave a personalized and thorough example of how her motivation to join 
the PWMs evolved from being an activist in the PNM. She provided details on the underlying 
causes and the atmosphere that surrounded some of her life defining moments. In addition, she 
explained in rather some detail how internal and external factors can collaborate to motivate a 
person and actually shape her or his future. The following quote gives a comprehensive 
illustration of how some of my participants chose their path in life and came to be the people 
they are today:  
Yes, I am a member of the PNM, an active member of the PNM, was and still am. My choice to 
join the PMN and get involved with their nationalist activism stemmed from my belief and 
agreement with their aspiration and ideology, and my personal belief in the role of women within 
the PNM. Regardless of the circumstances, the presence of women within the PNM meant a lot; it 
constituted a step forward. The women’s presence in the PNM was and still is an advantage.  
I joined the PWMs when I was in detention. I was detained by the Israelis from 1979 to1981, and 
then I was on parole for three more years. I was a child back then. I was just 15 years and four 
months old when I was arrested. This was the time I decided to join the PWMs; it was during my 
stay in detention. My decision was spontaneous. It was after my cousin was martyred by the 
Israeli forces. I considered him as a brother as we grew up together. He was martyred96 on May 1st 
1975.  Then a year later, on May 16th, 1976, my classmate and one of my closest friends “Lina 
Nabulsi97” was also martyred. [Me interrupting, is she the one meant by the song “Lina” by 
                                                            
96 She sounded very genuine. Moreover, remembering the exact date after almost 40 years means that the fact that 
her cousin was martyred really affected her life fundamentally.  
97 A song was made to commemorate Lina al- Nabulsi, and many streets have been named after her in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip., She was a teenager who was killed by the Israeli forces when she was walking back home 
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Ahmad Qaboor? She confirmed that]. She was my classmate. The following horrific events and 
the loss of these dear people motivated me as a child to get engaged in resisting the occupation and 
to be part of the nationalist movement. I prepared and threw a Molotov bomb, and I was arrested, 
sentenced and detained for five years for that98, two years were actual while I was on parole for 
the other three years because I was a minor.  
During my stay in prison, I got inspired by the PNM activists who were detained with me in the 
same prison, and my nationalist identity started to shape. I even met PWMs leadership who were 
detained in the same prison, for example, Zahira Kamal, Teresa Halaseh, who is still in exile until 
today, and Rawda Al-Baseer. All these women were my patrons and they taught me the meaning 
of nationalism and being part of the PWMs.  
I still remember my evaluation back then99, these were kind of counseling evaluations in prison. I 
was evaluated by Zahira Kamal, who envisioned me as a field leader that can enjoy the skills of 
leadership and is able to mobilize the grassroots.  I was so active in prison, I used to do kitchen 
duties, I was athletic and was so close to and socialized with my peers.  
Yes, I was very active in prison; I consider imprisonment to be an academy100, a Palestinian 
academy of nationalism. Despite the unjust and isolationist nature of prison, but for me personally, 
detention was a very important phase in my life, it was an academic and educational experience 
for me. My true ideological identity was shaped back then. I might have turned to be something 
else or somebody else if I had not been detained, but I feel that detention embraced me, especially 
with the presence of the feminist cadre and the leadership of PWMs detained there, in addition to 
Fida’iyyat101   who were able to shape my identify. I continued my basic education in prison and 
within a year I was a member of many committees. I participated in a committee that monitors 
violations against detainees. I was in kitchen committees, in athletic committees. I worked as a 
messenger between detainees whether young men or women in “Ramla Prison”.  
The first women frame/entity I joined was the Union of Palestinian Working Women Committees 
(UPWWC)102  in the years 1978-1979.  The charter was conceived in prison when the PWMs 
leadership was detained; Zahira Kamal was the head of this movement in prison.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
from school. She was unarmed and was not even involved in any demonstration or any act of resistance against the 
occupation when she was shot dead. The song is titled “O pulse of the West Bank” [يا نبض الضفة] and is considered 
part of the Palestinian resistance literature heritage. The lyrics were written by Hassan Daher and the song was tuned 
and performed by Ahmed Qaboor, a famous Palestinian singer from the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. 
(www.ahmadkaabour.com, 2013; www.PASSIA.org, 2013)   
98 Later on during the interview, she told me that after her release on parole, she was rearrested, tortured and forced 
to complete her original sentence.  
99 She means her evaluation in prison duties by her peers and fellow detainees.  
100 A blessing in disguise.  
101 Feminine; an expression used in Arabic to describe a woman who is willing to sacrifice her life with her own will 
for her country’s freedom and sovereignty.   
102 Established in 1980.  
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I was convinced by the UPWWC ideology, vision and philosophy, and I joined immediately. I felt 
that I belonged there and that I did not have other alternatives.  
For me personally I had to choose from a variety of factions and parties, but mostly DFLP, PFLP 
& FATAH. All my brothers are FATAH, but I am not103.  
I remember one of the dilemmas I had to face, while in detention, was the month of Ramadan104. I 
wanted to join a faction that is not conservative about religion. I never fasted in Ramadan; we 
were not a conservative or religious family. Back in the old days, religion was not a paradox for 
people, you were free in your worship, and nobody forced you to pray or fast. The FATAH female 
activists in prison used to enforce fasting and made it binding to everyone. I informed them that I 
was not used to fasting in my family’s house. My parents did not force me to fast during 
Ramadan, and now on top of prison, you want me to fast; I cannot do that. 
I asked to be transferred from the cell that housed the FATAH activists, so they moved me to 
another room. It happened that that room was full of Christian detainees and DFLP activists.  
They never discussed religion with me. Regardless of ideology or religion, I naturally do not fast, 
and I do not want to be forced to do that. I was rebellious since my early years; I rebelled against 
everything I did not like…. 
 
Looking back at the previous quote by Interviewee (H), one can understand how the 
individual experiences the political atmosphere and the circumstances combine together to 
influence the future decisions and choices these young women had to make. Moreover, the 
previous example reflects how fundamental the detention experiences were on Palestinian 
women, and in a way, explain the motivation for some women activists to join the PNM and the 
PWMs. The previous quote also demonstrates an example of the different tactics the PNM and 
the PWMs leadership utilized to mobilize and frame young women detainees in prison. In 
addition, the previous quote shows how prison was an intermediate phase in the life of the 
majority of former and current PNM and PWMs activists.    
                                                            
103  The true political affiliation is kept confidential.  
104 Ramadan is the fasting month for people who follow the faith of Islam. Those who fast abstain from drinking or 
eating anything from dawn to dusk.    
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Looking back at the previous testaments of my interviewees, it becomes evident that 
being an active member of the PNM was an intermediate phase in the life of the majority of, if 
not all, PWMs activists and leadership. The indicators form my interviewees’ experiences 
actually gave the sense of a co-evolving nature of relationship. In other words, the feminist 
identity of the majority of feminist and women’s activists emerged, developed, and evolved from 
the fact that they were active members of the PNM.  
The PWMs activists and leadership were influenced by the PNM’s faction ideologies, 
philosophies and visions. And as the majority of my interviewees stressed that the nucleus of the 
modern PWMs was, indeed, conceived by the PNM, i.e. that the decision to have women 
involved in the struggle against occupation came from the PNM. All PNM’s factions had in fact 
founded women entities that functioned as arms to these factions. However, these entities were 
used as a method of women representation in the PNM and Palestinian nationalism. These 
entities were utilized as a medium to mobilize the grassroots, particularly focusing on Palestinian 
women.  The nature of the relationship between the PWMs and the PNM will be further explored 
and discussed in the following segment of my analysis where I will discuss “The roots of the 
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V. c. 2. The roots of the relationship  
Having presented examples that reflect the way some of my participants identified 
themselves, especially in relation to their affiliation with the PNM, I will now turn to a 
discussion of the nature of the relationship between the PWMs and the PNM. The following 
section will investigate the relationship between the two entities, PWMs and PNM will pave the 
way for me to draw reasonable conclusions whether or not the two entities are separable and can 
be perceived independently of each other. Furthermore, this section will present a briefing about 
the early days of women’s activism in Palestine, and the early relationship with the PNM.  
This section aims at determining the nature of the relationship between the PNM and the 
PWMs in relation to the following questions: Where did this relationship stand previously, and 
where does it stand today? How did the study participants perceive this relationship and what 
were their reasons? Finally, I will try to explore how my study participants envisioned the future 
relationship between the PWMs and the PNM and of course their reasons for their vision. 
Throughout my analysis, I have focused on the following issues: first, the history or the 
roots of the relationship between the PWMs and the PNM. Second, the nature of the current 
relationship between the PWMs and the PNM and how the future of this relationship can be 
envisioned. Finally, and also related to the previous point, the ability to mobilize resources and 
whether PWMs consider the PNM as a competitor.  
Having gone through the personal interviews and the interview notes, audio-recordings 
and transcripts, and the process of synthesizing my analysis, I came to the realization that my 
interviewees had diverse perceptions about the relationship between the PWMs and the PNM. It 
123 
 
was apparent, however, that despite the diversity of perceptions, there was a common 
denominator among my participants’ perspectives: they all confirmed the importance of the 
relationship between the PWMs and the PNM and maintained that this relationship goes back to 
the early beginnings of the PWMs and the PNM. Equally importantly, they emphasized the fact 
that, as it is inherent in the nature of all relationships, the relationship between PWMs and the 
PNM had its ups and downs, ebb and flow.   
 All my participants argued that it would not be possible to study, document, or 
understand the presence of PWMs and their roots independently from the PNM, and that the 
PWMS were an outcome of the PNM. Most of the study participants claimed that it was not until 
the early 1990s that the distinction between the PWMs and the PNM could be discerned. PWMs 
and the PNM were perceived by activists within both PWMs and the PNM as one single entity. 
For example, all activists in the PWMs would have identified themselves as PNM activists rather 
than PWMs, indicating that their nationalist identity was the dominant identity.  
As indicated by the majority of my interviewees, the history of early women activism in 
Palestine in general, and assuming that we want to take the liberty of using the concept of 
Palestinian women’s movement, was embedded in the history of the Palestinian nationalist 
movement. My participants also indicated that the history of the two movements is inseparable, 
especially in the early beginnings (1930s-1940s). Interviewee (Q), for instance, explained that 
going back to the roots of the PWMs, one can easily notice that their start coincided with the 
onset of the struggle against the British Mandate over Palestine and later on continued with the 
struggle against the Israeli military occupation. Linking the PWM and the PNM in anti-colonial 
action and ideology is quite obvious in the following excerpt from Interviewee Q interview: 
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The relationship between the nationalist movement and the women’s movement(s) started in the 
early beginnings of the two movements, back in 1936 and 1948. Throughout the development of 
the Palestinian struggle, women started taking an active part at the national, social and public 
levels. 
 
Another participant, Interviewee (E) explained that the main access to PWMs was only 
through PNM. According to her, it was hard and almost impossible to imagine the existence of a 
movement that embraced a women-oriented agenda without the existence of a nationalist-
oriented agenda. In other words, the nationalist agenda always took priority over the woman- 
oriented agenda, which took a subordinate role: 
My early beginnings were in the nationalist movement and in getting engaged in nationalist 
activism. This was the nature of women’s reality at that time. There was nothing called women’s 
movement or feminist movement.105 
 
She further elaborated that no matter how one looks at this relationship or how far one 
goes back to the foundation of the PNM and the PWMs, one will always find that they shared the 
same roots, milestones, and defining moments in their history. She further explained that 
understanding the roots of the relationship between the two movements helps the observer of this 
relationship comprehend what they have come to be at present. This is evident in the following 
excerpt:  
Most activists in the PWMs started as activists in the PNM, embraced their political ideology, and 
identified with a specific PNM faction. In other words, they started as political and nationalist 
activists, and then got more involved in the feminist and women’s activism. The framing was 
political rather than feminist. 
 
                                                            




According to Interviewee (E), one cannot comprehend feminist framing independently of 
a nationalist framing perspective, and being part of the PNM is a necessary and essential part of 
any PWM’s identity. Moreover, she asserts that the PNM needed women activists within their 
cadre to mobilize the grassroots, especially fellow women. Yet, the nationalist agenda, as 
mentioned previously, anteceded the feminist- or women-oriented agenda. This hierarchy was 
also existent in the framing processes, where nationalist concerns came first, followed by 
feminist concerns. The following excerpt summarizes Interviewee E’s position:  
If you look closely at women’s concerns and the formation of the women’s frames106 
from a historical point of view, you find that these frames107 in Palestine, came as a result 
of the presence of political parties and the presence of the various factions within the 
spectrum of the PNM and the need to have women representation within these factions of 
the PNM. It also stemmed from the necessity to have women to mobilize the grassroots. 
In other words, the PNM need the presence of women among their cadre to mobilize the 
grassroots, especially fellow women. The nationalist and political ideology took priority, 
then came the trends towards a more women orientated agenda. 
 
This point of view was corroborated by Interviewee (H) when she explained that any 
historian that wants to look back at the history of the two movements will notice that they 
descended from the same origin, but she made it clear that the original movement was the PNM 
and that the PWMs were actually an offshoot of the PNM. She actually pointed out that the PNM 
factions founded the PWMs, or the feminist frames, as she called them, as feminist arms for the 
PNM factions: 
Let me say this: the beginning of the PWMs as women’s frames, starting in the early 1920s until 
now, there were PWMs. The women’s frames were established between 1978 and the early 1980s,  
 
                                                            
106 She is referring to women’s entities in Palestine, which in turn are a reflection of the Palestinian political and 
nationalist spectrum.   
107 She means political frames and the process of political framing.  
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I would say 1982-1983. That was when the last women’s frame108 was formed. These women’s 


















108 Interviewee H used the term frame to describe the women’s entities that were formed to mobilize 
fellow women, attract their attention to their political rights as an occupied nation and spread political 
ideologies that mirror the ideologies of the PLO factions. Examples include the Union of Palestinian Working 
Women Committees (UPWWC) which is affiliated with the DFLP; the Association of Women Committees for 
Social Work (AWCSW), which is affiliated with FATAH; The Union of Palestinian Women’s Committees (PWC), 



































One theory demonstrates that PNM and PWM both co-evolved, while the rival theory 
claims that the PWMs emerged from the PNM. 
The continuous arrow (       ) denotes the strength of the direction of the relationship. 
The dashed arrow (           ) denotes the weakness of the direction of the relationship.  
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V. c. 3. Where does the relationship between PNM and PWMs stand today? 
 
Supposing we agree that the PWMs and the PNM share a common history as the majority 
of my participants pointed out, it would be important to ascertain whether this relationship was 
always harmonious or whether it went on a collision course at some point in time. We also need 
to determine whether this harmonious relationship is still existent at present and to find out the 
factors behind its subsistence? We further need to establish the nature of the future relationship 
between the two movements and how the PWMs study participants/activists envision that 
relationship in the future? 
During the interviews, different opinions surfaced about the nature of the relationship 
between the PWMs and the PNM. The participants also provided a variety of reasons to justify 
their points of views. However, they all agreed that in spite of the fact that some PWMs may 
have disagreements, and in some cases conflicts, with the PNM, the fundamental national 
concerns, such as national liberation and national sovereignty, were always and will continue to 
be a unifying factor and a common denominator with various spectrums of the PNM.  
In this regard, I will quote one of my participants, Interviewee (E) who asserted that:   
… the nationalist concerns such as national liberation and national sovereignty and building the 
future Palestinian state took priority in determining the relationship between PWMs and the PNM, 
the rights and the nature of rights of the Palestinian individual in the future  Palestinian state… 
I am against separating the two entities; I would not say that they ever reached the stage of a 
divorce - there is NO divorce. I would say that the PWMs are not separated from the PNM, they 
are still together, and they complement each other in the political and social scene in Palestine. 
 
Several participants claimed that up to a certain point in their joint history, the PWMs and 
the PNM had many common issues, namely ideology and national aspirations. This harmony, 
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stemmed from the fact that the “national burdens,” as some participants chose to call it, were the 
common denominator that unified the PWMs and the PNM. In addition, the maturity that some 
pioneer feminists acquired, due to their engagement within the PNM, widened their horizon and 
made them aware of new disciplines in which they could be effective, and progressive and 
balance their role as activists in regard to their nationalist quest and their desire to be liberated of 
cultural constrains as feminists.  
Representing this position is Interviewee (Q), who pointed out to the turning point in the 
relationship between the PWMs and the PNM and the underlying causes of such diversion in the 
relationship between both entities:  
The relationship between the nationalist movement and the women’s movement(s) started at the 
early beginnings of the two movements, back in the 1936 and 1948. Throughout the evolution of 
the Palestinian struggle, women started taking an active part at the national, social and public 
levels. This participation ignited their search for their own feminist identity. At that time, there 
was a social acceptance of their struggle because they were affiliated with the national struggle. 
Since then, the relationship evolved, and it can be said that in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s, 
the women’s movement(s) and the political parties moved hand in hand. That state pushed women 
to start looking for their own identity, and that also led to their abuse and rejection, which led to 
the struggle between the two entities. Few women had enough maturity and awareness to search 
for their identity. The majority of women wanted national activism to achieve their own goals as 
women, which was to merely escape the traditional frame that was governing them.  
 
Other interviewees had a different point of view especially regarding the determination of 
the nature of the relationship between the PWMs and the PNM. For instance, Interviewee (C) 
gave quite a different account on how the relationship between the PWMs and the PNM 
developed. Contrary to other interviewees, she considered that engaging women in the nationalist 
movement was a necessity for the PNM in the first place. She actually gave a co-evolving 
account rather than a hierarchal perspective, compared to other interviewees, when describing 
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the roots of the relationship between the two movements. Following is an excerpt from 
Interviewee (C):  
In reality, each historical stage had its own nature of relationship between the two.  Basically the 
PNM emerged on good terms and hand in hand with the Palestinian women movement, which is 
proven by the studies that demonstrated that the rising of the PNM was greatly related to the 
development of the Palestinian woman. 
 
Considering what Interviewee (C) provided more closely, one can conclude that while 
she did not deny the presence of a relationship between the PNM and PWMs, she actually gave a 
different account. She did, indeed, explain that the presence of women within the nationalist 
movement was a necessity for their survival. She supports her position by giving examples of 
how women took the initiative even without being affiliated with a specific nationalist party or 
ideology. Instead, they had a spontaneous nationalist aspiration to serve their country and their 
people. Consider the following excerpt by Interviewee (C): 
The role and activism of the Palestinian women were related to the deterioration of the Arab 
Israeli struggle and the development of the Palestinian society in resisting the Zionist occupation.  
When the conflict increased, the resistance of the Palestinian people grew bigger and the role of 
the Palestinian women grew bigger… The Palestinian women took part in that struggle as a way to 
serve the demands of the Palestinian people who were harmed by the occupation. In the beginning, 
their work started as charitable but with a national foundation - charitable in the sense that it 
supported the families of the martyrs and the wounded, people harmed by imprisonment, people 
who were affected financially due to losing their lands or their source of livelihood. These 
organizations were stages for women to work, serving the Palestinian society and the Palestinian 
cause. With an Arab and an international horizon, the first Palestinian women union was 
established in 1929 before any other Arab women unions were formed. There were women’s 
demands calling for the dignity of women, freedom, educating women and also calling for 
women’s resistance to the Zionist occupation of the Palestinian land. They were calling on the 
Arab countries and the Arab women to aid them in this demand. 
 
Reflecting on what Interviewee (C) said, it becomes apparent that her account of the roots 
of the relationship between the PWMs and the PNM differs from that of the other participants. 
She argues that the concept that PWMs were the outcome of the PNM is not necessarily always 
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the norm. She claims that a considerable number of women acted spontaneously and were self-
motivated to take part in the struggle against the colonial power and did not have to wait until 
they were framed and mobilized by political parties. According to her, Palestinian women were 
conscious of the consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and understood that as part of the 
Palestinian society they should have a role in resisting colonialism. Interviewee (C) further 
explained that women’s involvement in the PWMs and the PNM took different shapes, and as 
such, women activism should not necessarily be associated with active membership in a PWM or 
the PNM. 
Having exhibited the main different perspectives about the roots of the relationship 
between the PWMs and the PNM, it would be important to attempt to answer the pivotal 
question: Where does this relationship stand today? In other words, how can one interpret the 
bond between the PWMs and the PNM? Is it a relationship based on harmony and coexistence, 
or is it a relationship of competition? Is it a relationship of hierarchy in which one is dominant 
and the other is subordinate? Or is it a relationship of equivalent partnership.  
Yet again, it might be difficult to come up with definitive answers to these questions. It 
could be claimed that that the ideological background and diverse nationalist identities of my 
interviewees were influential and determined their vision of the relationship between the PWMs 
and the PNM and where it stands today.  
There was a variety of opinions about that relationship. Some considered the relationship 
to be eternal and unbreakable; others perceived the relationship between the two movements as 
changeable with the constant ups and downs, a condition which they considered to be healthy 
and expected. Others perceived that the relationship between the two entities is shifting in steady 
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steps towards separation and that this relationship has lost its vitality and momentum. Yet others 
perceived it to be, and claimed it shall always be a relationship, or a “partnership,” of harmony 
and integration and complementation.  
In the few paragraphs below, I will present examples of these different opinions, and 
attempt to draw some conclusions from them. 
I will start with an interesting quote from Interviewee (E), who thought that any study or 
investigation of the PWMs and the PNM should focus on the fact that the two entities are 
inseparable, even in a futuristic sense. In other words, she rejected any discourse that perceives 
the two movements to be separate from each other. At the same time, she maintained that there 
are certain disagreements that should be resolved and obstacles that should be overcome. But 
these obstacles and disagreements do not suggest that the cooperation between the two 
movements had come to an end, or that each movement went in its own way. She explains: 
I am against separating the two entities, I would not say that they reached the stage of a divorce, 
there is No divorce. I would say that the PWMs are not separated from the PNM. They are still 
together, and they complement each other within the political and social scene in Palestine. But, I 
can say that this relationship, such as any other relationship, went through an ebb and flow 
process. This was especially when it came to the fundamentals of our feminist concerns, such 
concerns that affect the very being of us as PWMs. We want to be visible within the Palestinian 
spectrum. This resulted in the ebb and flow process that I just mentioned, and it usually centered 
on feminist and social concerns. For example, where are we in the sociopolitical scene? What is 
our role in mobilization? How can [we], as women, be effective in the Palestinian sociopolitical 
scene.  
 
Interviewee E’s position is quite clear: Regardless of any alienation or estrangement that 
characterized the relationship at certain instances, it was apparent to both entities that partnership 
was the only path to move forward. 
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A similar position towards the current relationship between the two movements was 
expressed by other participants. For instance Interviewee (H) argued that there are always 
common denominators between the PWMs and the PNM, both at the nationalist level and the 
social level. She further explained that in addition to the nationalist concerns, such as the 
sovereignty of the Palestinians and their right to build their own state, there are other social 
concerns that bring the PWMs and the PNM together. These include concerns which are shared 
by Palestinian men and women such as domestic violence, sexual harassment, equal 
opportunities and social justice: interview (H) provided this insight: 
First and foremost is the struggle against the occupation. The presence of the occupation actually 
unified our efforts. We as PWMs were established to assume our role in resisting the occupation. 
The common denominator for us as PWMs and PNM was to resist the occupation. Second comes 
the issue of social justice. There should be social justice; there should be equity and equality. All 
factions embrace this slogan. As PLO factions we are secular; we believe in secularism; we 
believe in freedom and pluralism, etc. These were the common denominators that brought us 
closer to each other109. Resisting the settlements110 and resisting the wall. All of these concerns 
brought us closer. Although they were part of the consequences of the occupation, they were 
unifying factors for our efforts. The issue of Domestic Violence (DV), on many occasions, I 
witnessed men going out in demonstrations renouncing DV, and sexual harassment. You always 
find young men who believe in our aspirations and are willing to support us. They are part of the 
political parties; they come from the Palestinian leftist parties, though some embrace FATAH 
ideology. All are backing women’s demands. We find a lot of common ground. We all want a 
state that has functional institutions that bring us closer as men and women, and as PWMs and 
PNM. We communicate with each other; we want a sovereign state with an enforcing law, a 
secular state that has a civil society with civil society organizations. [A society] where justice 
prevails, where there is equity and equality, etc. These aspects always bring us together. 
 
                                                            
109 She refers to the PWMs and the PNM  
110 In the aftermath of the Six Day War of 1967 and the fall of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem 
under Israeli military administration, Israel granted permission to Zionist settlers to build settlements on confiscated 
Palestinian lands. The settlements are considered illegal under international law; many UN resolutions such as 
Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22nd 1967 and Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22nd 1973   
have condemned the confiscation of Palestinian land and the building of these settlements, and asked for their 
removal.       
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In contrast, other participants believed that the PNM and PWM are at a crossroads and if 
the relationship between them is to continue in the direction of harmony and cooperation, there 
are certain concessions that have to be made by the PNM. Some activists, including some CEOs, 
in the PWM organizations strongly believe that, in a partnership, there should not be main and 
subordinate elements in order for this relationship to continue and progress. Following is an 
excerpt from Interviewee (J): 
All of us are arms for the factions. Now if you take into consideration that males were dominant in 
the PNM factions, and that there was some marginalization of the role of women, you would 
understand why we have not achieved our ambitions as PWMs. The question is: Are we as PWMs 
subordinate to the masculine leadership?  From my point of view, as long as men are on top of the 
pyramid of the nationalist parties and factions, patriarchy will prevail. 
 
However, she further explained that women’s activism, whether in the PWMs or in the 
PNM, is focused nowadays on how to bridge the gap between men and women within the PNM, 
namely, the representation of women in leading positions within the PNM. She indicated that 
women within the PNM as well as the PWMs mobilize for equality within the PNM factions. 
Nonetheless, she felt that achievements were still modest and were in their early beginnings. In 
this light I will consider Interviewee (J)’s reflections on this issue: 
This is what we mobilize to achieve: developing women’s role and involvement in the leadership 
of the political party. We, as women, are not auxiliary in political parties. As men were active and 
presented sacrifices at the nationalist level, women were there and presented sacrifices, and they 
deserve to have a say. They deserve to assume binding and effective roles within the PNM 
factions. This is what we have been pushing for in the past few years. We started with a handful of 
initiatives to make ourselves heard. Only very few women reached a decision-making position 
within the Palestinian factions. Today, we mobilize and struggle to guarantee quotas for women, 




Yet another participant, Interviewee (C), shared some of her personal experience to give 
a better picture of what went on between the PWMs and the PNM, especially after the signing of 
the Oslo Accords between the PLO and Israel. She argued that the 1990s were a turning point for 
both the PNM and the PWMs. She gave her own account of how the overlap in priorities resulted 
in a backlash among PWMs’ activists and leadership and made them shift their course away 
from the nationalist movement and in certain instances focus on a more women-oriented agenda.     
The period after the 1990s and specifically when the Palestinian Nationalist Movement Leadership 
moved offices from abroad to Palestine, was when the cadre abroad started putting pressure on the 
cadre in Palestine. We started feeling that there was a sense of incoherence between our own 
convictions and the projects we were supposed to carry out on the ground. At that point, I started 
feeling a contradiction between the convictions we had and the instructions of the central 
leadership of the nationalist movement. I started to feel that I was under pressure and that there 
was oppression to my feminist beliefs for the sake of the orientations of the PNM. At that stage, I 
felt a great shake in my performance to the extent where I expressed it by continuing my graduate 
studies and withdrawing bit by bit from my role in nationalist activism and focused on the feminist 
movement using the desire to develop myself academically as a cover. I was not the only one that 
felt this shake and this contradiction between our nationalist role and feminist role. I think all 
activists in the women’s movement after the 1990s until 1995-1996 felt it.  There was a regression 
in the momentum of the woman movement compared to how it was in the 1980s. This goes back 
to a sense of dependency on what is called the Palestinian Authority, and the fact that they can 
carry the responsibility of building the society, and advancing it. But sadly, this did not 
materialize. We continued in that phase until 2005 when the women’s movement started to 
strengthen itself and put demands on the nationalist table. That was the time when the Palestinian 
women started to have a higher voice, and when their demands started coming out and their role in 
the different aspects in the Palestinian life became tangible. 
 
Finally, Interviewee (B) considered the two movements to be in competition mode, 
especially with regard to resources. She explained that within today’s global economy and due to 
constraints imposed by donors, the PWMs and the PNM are competing for financial resources as 
means for survival: 
The relationship between the women’s movement and the national movement is competitive. It 
should be complementary. Funding had some negative effects and influenced the support of men 
to the women’s movements. Sometimes I feel that external funding is nothing but temporary aid as 
if they are giving us a sack of flour or sugar to stay alive. But they are not helping us to get rid 
occupation so that we can live freely and with dignity as free people and build a modern society. 
Moreover, it is creating a competition on these resources. 
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Reflecting on the previous examples, one can conclude that due to a variety of 
circumstances, the relationship between the PWMs and the PNM evolved and took new shapes 
and paths. It is true that we cannot come out with a definitive picture that portrays the 
relationship between the two movements. However, it is perhaps safe to say that such a 
relationship has witnessed a shift in its course. Moreover, it could also be sound to say that in the 
aftermath of the Oslo Accords and the return of the PLO leadership from exile, the relationship 
between the PWMs and the PNM became stale.  
Some participants perceived the results of the first Palestinian election in 1996 as a red 
flag about the future of women as partners in building the future Palestinian state. Many said 
quite clearly that they did not want to be a mirror image of the Algerian women’s example even 
though they had always looked up to the central role that the Algerian women assumed in 
resisting the French in Algeria. However, after of the Algerian independence in 1964, women 
were marginalized and alienated from decision-making positions. Their role was reduced from 
being partners in the nationalist struggle to being only house-makers. This point of view was 
expressed by several participants.  
Interviewee (B): 
The Palestinian women’s movements were influenced by the Algerian experience, the one million 
martyr revolution, the negativity of this experience made us aware not to allow that happen to us. 
Interviewee (E):  
Algerian women were as active as their fellow Algerian men in their nationalist struggle. After 
independence, Algerian women found that they were marginalized. So as PWMs we looked 
thoroughly at this example. As PWMs we had a major role in the PNM, and at the point when 
national sovereignty is achieved and the state is being built, we want to know our stance and 
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status. That is why in the late 1980s and early 1990s activists from inside and outside of Palestine 
came together and declared the women’s manuscript.111 
Interviewee (J): 
Let me take the Algerian example, when [the Algerian women] were freed nationally and socially, 
they continued their struggle. The nationalist leadership told them had to stay or go back home. 
Go back to the kitchen, they were told, as if they had not had any role in achieving independence 
and freedom.  
So as PWMs, we asked ourselves if we wanted to be a replica of what happened with Algerian 
women and their tragic example or if we wanted to be cautious not to fall in the same trap! [We 
wanted to] strike a balance between our nationalist and social activism, and have the men on our 
side and not against us. And how can we unify our effort to plan for our future. The Feminist or 
Women’s Manuscript was declared and all consider it as a base line or reference line and the spirit 
that inspires our efforts as PWMs activists. 
 
In contrast, other participants like Interviewee (Q) argued that different times in the 
history of the relationship between the two movements entailed different defining moments and 
crossroads. Yet, re-stressing the ebb and flow in the relationship between the two movements. In 
fact, she was among a few who clearly claimed that some sort of separation between the two 
movements did indeed occur. According to her, the 1990s witnessed a turning point in the 
relationship between the PWMs and the PNM, especially after the PLO leadership came back 
from exile and established the PNA following the Oslo Accords. At that time, women realized 
they were marginalized and alienated from participating in decision-making. There was a general 
feeling of injustice and women realized that they had been exploited. It was also at this moment 
that the leadership of the PWMs realized that they needed to rearrange their priorities.  
In this regard Interviewee (Q) said: 
                                                            
111 The Feminist Manuscript is a document that was conceived by all feminist organizations operating in the West 
Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. In essence, this document stressed the nonnegotiable role of women as 
active member in the Palestinian society, with their own ambitions and goals. In this document, these organizations 
pleaded the leadership of the PLO and any future Palestinian government to acknowledge and honor the historic role 
of women, and ensure their rights as equals in the Palestinian society. See Appendix (G). 
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In the past, women’s rights were invisible in the midst of the nationalist rights and the general 
agenda; however, women were under the false impression that there was recognition of their 
rights, and that any gain on the national level would reflect on them. After the arrival of the PA, 
women found that they had only been used by the nationalist movement to reach certain goals, and 
that the true ideology of the nationalists was patriarchal and did not recognize women’s rights. As 
a result, women were left with nothing. This was the main reason behind the separation between 
the nationalist movement and the women’s movement(s). Nowadays, women are more aware and 
are able to differentiate between their rights as women and their national rights. 
 
The last testaments clearly illustrate that the base and the leadership of the PWMs are 
conscious of the necessity of establishing rules and regulations that should govern their 
relationship with the PNM now and in the future. They indicated that they learned lessons from 
other examples in history, namely the experience of the Algerian women and they took into 
consideration. Moreover, as shown earlier in this section, the activists of the PWMs considered 
the marginalization of women in the first Palestinian election to be a warning about the ongoing 

























          
VI. c. 4. The Future of the Relationship  
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The rival claims about the nature of the contemporary relationship between the PWMs and the 
PNM. These claims fluctuate between integration and cooperation, to completion, and finally 
shifting and separation.  
The continuous arrow (        ) denotes the strength of the direction of the relationship. 
The dashed arrow (           ) denotes the weakness of the direction of the relationship.  
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V. c. 4. The Future of the Relationship.  
Now, in light of these examples, would it be possible to foresee the future of the 
relationship between the two movements? As I am going to demonstrate shortly, a good number 
of my participants still see a light at the end of the tunnel and think that there are still viable 
channels for future cooperation between the PWMs and the PNM. But, the question remains, 
whether the relationship between the PWMs and the PNM will be harmonious. 
It is true that the majority of my participants, if not all, insisted on the fact that the 
national fundamentals, namely the liberation of Palestine and building a sovereign modern state, 
will always unify the PWMs and the PNM. Moreover, they added that PWMs cannot and should 
not be eliminated, dismembered and isolated, or even stripped from their historic relationship 
with nationalism and the nationalist movement. By the same token, does this mean that, upon 
liberation, women in general and the feminist leadership in particular will be partners in building 
the modern state of Palestine? In the paragraphs below, I will present some of my interviewees’ 
perceptions about the future of the relationship between the PWMs and the PNM.  
For instance, I find Interviewee (A)’s opinion rather interesting. She thinks that there is 
still some possibility for cooperation between the two movements in the future, even though the 
nationalist movement is now currently divided, particularly, in light of the division between 
FATAH & HAMAS. She also thinks that the Palestinian left112 has shrunk, lost its ability to 
mobilize the public, and is now focused on its NGOs and civil society organizations. She 
believes that the nationalist movement is torn, and consequently she predicts that each part of the 
                                                            
112 Namely: PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and FIDA. 
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spectrum within the nationalist movement will try to frame or attract the PWMs to be on their 
side: 
If you want my opinion, I think that in the future, the relationship between the nationalist 
movement and the women’s movements will continue with an overall sense of unity. They will 
work together in certain fields. Take the religious frames as an example; FATAH is trying to 
keep a firmer grasp on its supporters, fearing the PNA falls down and HAMAS will win the 
elections in Gaza. At the same time, the Leftist frames, especially the original founders who built 
and shaped the leftist frames in the old times, have separated completely and went in the 
direction of the civil society organizations, and will never be back. Leftists groups are 
represented mainly by males nowadays. Back in the old days, representation by men and women 
was equal. It takes time to achieve that equality in representation. Nowadays, Leftist 
parties/guerillas are under close surveillance by the Palestinian Authority; anyone that is 
affiliated with a political party, except for FATAH, is unemployed. People do affiliate 
themselves with parties. How can we frame them? How will they live and build families? Leftists 
themselves are being their own enemies. The women’s movement(s) that once were leftist will 
not go back to the leftists. 
 
The excerpt clearly shows that Interviewee (A) was expressing her frustration at the 
results of the division in the Palestinian community following the so-called coup by HAMAS in 
the Gaza Strip113. There is also a subtle hint that, as a reaction to the events of June 2007, the 
PNA leadership in Ramallah started, albeit unofficially, a containment policy in which it 
delegitimized any sort of activism that does not embrace the ruling part policy (i.e. FATAH). 
Interviewee (E) expresses a somewhat different viewpoint, and argues that the national 
burden will always have its importance in the political and the social scene in Palestine. It, 
therefore, becomes incumbent upon both movements, PWMs and PNM to work together to 
fulfill the dream of the sovereign state. Moreover, she stresses that the relationship should take 
the form of a partnership, in which both movements have equal rights and duties in their path 
                                                            
113 It is worth noting that HAMAS won the majority in the Palestinian legislative elections as well as the majority of 
the municipal elections in 2006 
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towards achieving national independence. She concluded that it is the right of all Palestinian 
women to have equal access to decision-making positions: 
Nationalist concerns, such as, national liberation and national sovereignty and building the future 
Palestinian state, take priority in determining the relationship between PWMs and the PNM, in 
addition to the rights and the nature of rights of the Palestinian individual in this future state. I 
want to add that the perception of the PNM towards the concerns of the PWMs is also important. 
Our concerns as PWMs should not be dismissed by the PNM and should not take a subordinate 
role. The way our culture and social traditions look to Palestinian women and their rights also 
should govern the relationship between the PNM and the PWMs. You cannot take Palestinian 
women out of their context, which is translated in the laws and the legislations, and the women 
representation in decision-making positions. Having women in the national leadership level, in 
planning and deciding on policies should be a priority for the PNM. 
 
Interviewee (C) corroborated Interviewee (E)’s opinion and gave even more emphasis to 
the issue of partnership between the two movements. She also stressed the necessity that such 
partnership should be based on equivalent and balanced roles between the two movements. 
Moreover, she strongly argued that such a partnership should be of a coevolving nature rather 
than a hierarchy and explained that there are lessons to be learned from the current Palestinian 
experience; that is, the temporary clouds that hover over the relationship between the PWMs and 
the PNM, alongside the regional and the global experiences, especially in the aftermath of the 
Arab Spring movements.114 Following is an excerpt from Interviewee (C): 
I think the lessons were very deep, hard and effective, to the extent that they will not be permitted 
to happen again in the future, and no detachment between the PNM and the women’s movement 
will be permitted to occur again, because we demand social change and this needs all classes and 
the entire society spectrum, men and women. Women on their own cannot change these things 
alone. So I do not think there will be any segregation in the future. There might be other strategies, 
mechanisms, but it should be in cooperation with the social movement as a whole, specifically the 
political factions. They are the changing factors, if they are convinced of the legitimacy of the 
women’s movements, youth, labor or general freedom, the efforts will be targeted in that direction. 
                                                            
114 The Arab Spring is a term that is used to describe the rebellions that occurred in the Arab countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa against authoritarian regimes that had been in power for more than 30 years. The Arab Spring 
started in Tunisia and then spread to Egypt, neighboring Labia, and later to Yemen and Syria.       
143 
 
Another participant, Interviewee (G), believed that the relationship between the two 
movements should always be of a cooperative nature, and that both movements should work 
together to avoid conflict or coming to a collision with each other. She further explained the 
PWMs are an integral component of the PNM. She warned that taking the PWMs out of the 
scene will threaten the very existence of the PNM: 
As feminist activists, we mobilize to bridge the gap between the PWMs and the PNM. We do not 
desire to get to a collision course with the PNM and we should prevent this from happening. We 
all unify our forces to bring the two entities closer to each other. As PWMs we do not want to get 
to a divorce with the PNM, because we are a genuine part of it. The PWMs and all its 
organizations, perceptions and cadre are a vital part of the PNM. Without the PWMs there is no 
PNM. Because women are an inseparable part of the history of the PNM and are a genuine part of 
the PNM, we, as PWMs, cannot say that we have reached a dead end with the PNM and we have 
divorced them. We cannot separate ourselves from the PNM. We cannot and we will not let 
ourselves get to the point of no return. We would not say that each of us should go on in its 
separate way. We cannot as PWMs alienate ourselves from the nationalist activism whether in the 
public or the private realm. If we alienate ourselves from the PNM, then we alienate ourselves as 
PWMs from our country, our national dream, and the grassroots. This is not what we want or what 
we desire as PWMs. 
 
Finally, I would like to quote Interviewee (H), who said that any change should include 
both men and women in the Palestinian society. According to her, any sustainable development 
should be the fruit of cooperation between the PWMs and the PNM and the relationship between 
the two movements should always be a relationship of integration, consultation and respect:  
I say it is a relationship of integration and consultation; we support each other. Let me tell you 
something, if I want to make a change is the society alone as a women’s movement, I would not 
be able to make such a change unless men are on board. We, men and women, should work hand 
in hand to make this change possible. Therefore our relationship of integration and consultation is 
based on pluralism and human rights, and respect of opinion and rival opinion. 
 
From the diverse points of view in response to my questions about the PNM and the 
PWM, we can see that different members of the PWM, some of whom were at some point part of 
the PNM, have different perspectives of the future of the relationship between the PWM and 
144 
 
PNM. The lessons learned from past cooperation or struggle between the two entities also seem 
to be different. Taking these differences into consideration, it can be said with confidence that 
the future of the relationship between the PNM and the PWM is going to be a challenge. 
One issue that both PNM and PWMs appear to agree on is the fact that the presence of 
the two movements and the cooperation between them are inevitable and vital for attaining the 
higher common goal of national independence. However, the PWMs are now in a position where 
they are stronger than they had been in earlier periods, with a clearer vision and determination to 
have their priorities integrated among the top priorities of the PNM. Therefore, the leadership of 
PWM has a strong opinion and a great part in shaping any future relationship between them and 
the PNM. They will ensure that any relationship or cooperation is going to serve the best interest 
of the PWMs and the PNM, rather than one serving the other, as it was done in the past.   
Furthermore, the PWMs realize that establishing an independent state is a goal that if 
realized, will serve the best interest of all sectors of the Palestinian society, the PWMs included. 
They are well aware that in order to reach equality, and in order to maintain their achievements, 
they are in need for a constitutional state, with laws, legislations and institutions that are 
structured around serving the best interest of women as equal partners in the society. The PWMs 
insist on having a part equal to that of the PNM in building an independent state.  
It can be inferred that the separation from the PNM did not come as a result of their 
unwillingness, as PWMs, to participate in the struggle to establish a sovereign state. Their 
segregation and persistence on their individuality as PWMs stems from their desire to assist the 
PNM in solving their internal struggles. The PWMs realized that they were unable to assist in 
unifying or reforming the PNM from the inside, and thus, their segregation also served another 
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purpose – PWMs’ offering a helping hand to the PNM from the outside. As PWMs, they want to 
help the PNM reach their reform, since the PWMs realized that unless the PNM is strong enough 
to carry on the national struggle, their efforts and those of the PWMs will go to waste.  
Finally, the PWMs came to the realization that the reform they wish to see in the society, 
and the changes that they are working to accomplish should affect women as well as men. They 
are aware that for change to be sustainable, consistent and effective, it should include the society 
as a whole, and in order for them to reach out to both men and women, the PWMs need to work 
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Scenario (A): the PNA, in this case FATAH will have the upper hand and control the PWMs 
and maybe other PNM factions.  
Scenario (B): the PNM will have the upper hand, maybe nominate the leadership of the 
PWMs and other PNM, but it is not the case for women’s representation in the PNM. 
The continuous arrow (        ) denotes the strength of the direction of the relationship. 
The dashed arrow (           ) denotes the weakness of the direction of the relationship.  
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Having exhibited the roots of the relationship between the PNM and PWMs and 
investigated the different phases that this relationship or partnership, as some participants would 
prefer to call it, went through, I will move to the next theme in my analysis, which focuses on 
organizations and funding dynamics.  
This segment aims to investigate the nature of the PWMs and the organizations affiliated 
with them, their organizational structure and their ability to mobilize resources, namely financial. 
This segment of the analysis will also address questions related to the nature of women’s 
activism in Palestine and whether or not it ranks to the level of a movement. This segment of my 
analysis will focus on the tactics of survival and sustainability adopted by women’s 
organizations. The theme of organizations and funding dynamics will serve as an introduction to 











V. d. Organizations and Funding Dynamics.  
V. d. 1. The Nature of Activism in Palestine.  
To study any organization, it is important to have a good understanding of its 
organizational structure and its ability to mobilize financial resources and thereby, their ability to 
survive and continue. My study focuses on the circumstances which shaped the PWMs; that is, 
the general climate in which the PWMs were conceived and developed within. As mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, there were several opinions about how the PWMs emerged and how one 
can understand what they have come to be at present? These points of views can be classified 
into two types: the coevolving aspect and the hierarchal aspect. The first type centers on the fact 
that the PMWs and the PNM were established at around relatively the same time and they 
actually developed together, while the second type stresses the fact that the PWMs were the 
outcome of the PNM.  
Regardless of the model of development selected, it is important to stress the fact that the 
PNM and PWM possessed, and still do, a dynamic relationship, with each other or within each 
one. In other words, it is vital for the study of any movement to observe its development and 
interaction with similar or rival movements and to observe how such dynamics affect their ability 
to mobilize resources and consequently their survival.  
But before I proceed further with my analysis, it is very important to address the question 
of whether the PWMs in Palestine actually rank to the level of a movement. As mentioned in the 
literature review chapter, Snow et al., (1991) emphasized the collective nature of a social 
movement. According to Snow, et al. (1991), social movements: “are one of the principal social 
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forms through which collectivities give voice to their grievances and concerns about the rights, 
welfare, and well-being of themselves and others by engaging in various types of collective 
action, such as protesting in the streets, that dramatize those grievances and concerns and 
demand that something be done about them.” (p.1). 
However, when asking my participants about their perspective of the PWMs and how 
they envisioned those PWMs from a movement’s perspective, they gave diverse responses. For 
instance, Interviewee (H) claims that there is a desire to unify the efforts of all women’s 
organizations, especially those advocating women’s equity and equality. Unity, according to her, 
this is a strength, and so women should stand united. She also considers the scattered nature of 
women’s organizations to be an obstacle to achieving equity and equality between males and 
females in the Palestinian society. She explains that unifying the efforts of all women 
organizations has been a long standing dream, which was partially came true with the 
establishment of the GUPW back in 1965. However, as she points out, all women’s 
organizations in Palestine mobilize to have one unified PWM. Following is an excerpt from her 
interview: 
As activists within the PWMs we all mobilize to have a unified feminist movement; we all work 
under the umbrella of the GUPW. This union is the reference and baseline for all Palestinian 
women. It encompasses all Palestinian women who are 18 years of age or older and who are 
willing to abide by its charter and be part of it and participate in the projects and programs hosted 
and delivered by this union and embrace its ideology; they all have the right to be part of this 
union. 
We all are under the umbrella of the GUPW which is an organ or an arm of the PLO. Therefore, 
we all mobilize to have one movement, one feminist movement. The more unified we are, the 
more we can be a pressuring group towards change, but what is going on now in reality is having a 
women’s frame here and there, and women’s societies here and there, or a women’s organization 
here and there, which scattered our efforts and wasted our resources. As a matter of fact, this is 
working against us as women. We need something that unifies our efforts to make the change 




The desire for having a unified PWM, as Interviewee (H) depicted it, can be understood 
from two major perspectives: The first is based on the fact that there are PWMs but they are not 
unified under one agenda, while the second is based on the idea that a unified PWM in fact does 
not exist. However, the absence of a clear and solid PWM does not eliminate the fact that there 
are women’s organizations that are mobilizing to establish one solid unified women’s movement 
in Palestine that has a clear organization, vision and feminist agenda. Other participants had a 
more extreme stance about the nature of women’s activism in Palestine. For example, 
Interviewee (M) states clearly that women’s activism in Palestine does not exceed the 
organizational level; i.e. while women’s organizations do exist, they are not part of a larger 
movement.  
If you ask for my frank opinion, I would say there is no movement, but there are women’s 
organizations. I cannot rank these organizations as movements. I would say that these 
organizations are manipulated by the PNM and their political ideology. … If I want to differentiate 
between a movement and activism, I would say this is hard core activism and collective action but 
not a movement. Why do I call it activism? It is because we actually react to contemporary issues 
and we do not have a long standing vision or goals. We all go with what is current, including 
myself. Do not believe anyone who says otherwise. 
Other interviewees stated clearly that women’s activism in Palestine does, indeed, rank to 
the level of an organized movement; perhaps it is still in its first steps. Nonetheless, it is there. 
For instance, Interviewee (C) claims that women’s activism in Palestine may be considered a 
movement basing her conclusion on the act of mobilization which is carried out by women’s 
organizations, especially the act of activism and political mobilization of Palestinian women that 
took place in the 1980s. Following is an excerpt from C’s interview:  
Is it a movement in the sense that there is mobilization115? There are different forms of women 
organizations that express different views and ideologies in Palestine. In the 1980s when there was 
                                                            
115 Rhetorically asking. 
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an overwhelming national burden, mobilization turned into a movement. Thousands of women 
went out to the streets with social and national demands. In the years 2005-2006 a new form of 
women’s movements started to materialize within the Palestinian scene. A deeper and more 
mature form of mobilization, which is still in its beginnings, appeared in Palestine. It focused on 
different issues, ideologies, perspectives. But there is still an aspiration to unite these priorities.116 
 
Despite acknowledging the presence of a movement in its primitive form, Interviewee 
(C) admits that there are many obstacles that hindered, and still do, the crystallization of 
women’s activism and its ability to transform into a solid movement. According to her, some of 
these obstacles can be attributed to the PNA itself. She comments, PWMs’ organizations 
expected that the establishment of the PNA in 1993 would lead to a reform of personal laws and 
the achievement of justice for women, especially in view of their fundamental role as partners in 
the struggle against the occupation. Unfortunately, the acknowledgement of women’s role in the 
struggle did not translate into substantial outcomes in reality:  
We, the Palestinian women, thought that now there is a Palestinian authority that would work for 
the demands of the national aspiration, negotiations, borders, water. The Palestinian authority 
should take care of all that, and we should focus on our [women’s] issues, but sadly we discovered 
that it was not the case. 
 
Nevertheless, she argues that it would be difficult to imagine the presence of women’s 
movement or a feminist movement within the context of a military occupation. The presence of a 
movement needs as a stable foundation, one in which the primary needs are satisfied. It is only 
then that the feminist’s concerns can be addressed. In the Palestinian context, she maintains, 
where the basic human rights of existence are being threatened, it would be difficult to imagine 
that women can mobilize to achieve equity and equality rights. Consider the following excerpt 





Many people say to us that the priority goes to resisting occupation, settlements, the segregation 
wall, etc… You want reconstruction of the family law, and we are still fighting occupation over 
water, land, livelihood, so the dominance is for the political issue. I think this is the obstacle and I 
think it is normal because first a person should guarantee their existence, land and presence. These 
things are threatened; what good is it if the relationship between me and my husband is based on 
equality if my husband and I are both threatened by occupation? So I need to protect myself, my 
husband, my kids, my home, my land. 
 
She further adds that the absence of a feminist movement goes beyond the Palestinian 
specificity as a nation still suffering from occupation. She attributes the absence of a movement 
to the heterogeneity of the Palestinian society in relation to social class, religious, and nationalist 
affiliation. In other words, she perceives the lack of a homogeneous Palestinian society to be an 
obstacle in the way of founding a unified Palestinian women’s movement. In this perspective she 
says:  
It is a deep and delicate question, I think it is a normal thing since we, as a Palestinian society, are 
incoherent; we are not unified in class; [there are] different classes, and different national and 
religious aspirations. This makes it hard for us to have a unified women’s movement, also the 
dominance of the political issues, which is creating vertical cracks and divisions in the hierarchy, 
and sometimes disperses women’s efforts [and prevents them] from unifying themselves into an 
entity. 
 
A clearer account of the nature of women’s activism in Palestine comes from Interviewee 
(E), who openly indicates that she cannot rank women’s activism in Palestine to the level of a 
movement. She claims that while women’s activism in Palestine actually takes on some 
organized form; such organization does not qualify to be considered a movement. She elaborates, 
women’s activism is, indeed, related to some events and reactions within the Palestinian society, 
but it definitely lacks sustainability. She concurs, however, what her colleague Interviewee (C)’s 
opinion about the difficulty of even imagining the existence of a movement within the context of 
occupation. Consider the following quote from Interviewee (E):  
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I cannot say or claim that there is a one unified PWM. Even at the global level, there is no one 
unified women’s or feminist movement. At the Palestinian level, I can say that there is women 
activism, within a specific vision towards certain concerns. The vision of some concerns may 
serve as a unifier. We do not have a feminist movement that has a clear hierarchy, structure and 
constitution that governs it. Our Palestinian reality and our Palestinian specificity are different 
from other nations around the world. It is a result of our situation as a nation under occupation in 
addition to our geographical location, and our Palestinian specificity. But even with our 
Palestinian specificity, and if you want to compare it to other neighboring countries, for example 
Jordan and Egypt, you can tell easily that they too do not have a unified feminist or women’s 
movement. There is women’s activism with agreement on a strategy, but not a unified movement. 
I would also say that these organizations carry out some sort of activism and they are not 
movements per se. 
 
Nevertheless, when asked to elaborate more on why she thought that women’s activism 
in Palestine does not rise to the level of a movement, she attributed the absence of a solid and 
well defined PWM to two major reasons: first, the presence of different PNM factions 
representing a wide spectrum of ideology, and their affiliated women’s organizations and second, 
the absence of a unified feminist agenda with clear goals, visions and objectives.  
First of all, from my point of view, this is the outcome of the presence of multiple political 
ideologies; mainly, the presence of different factions within the PNM with their satellite 
organizations. Each one of these factions and parties has its own organizations and facilities, and 
has its different ideologies. This fragmentation results in the absence of a unified PWM. 
A unified movement should have a clear structure, hierarchy, organization, philosophy, vision 
goals and objectives. We lack this level of sophistication in Palestine. However, we have activism 
that can find a common ground among the different players on the Palestinian scene. 
 
When I inquired about how one can distinguish between women’s activism and women’s 
organizations, she re-iterated her position claiming that what is present in Palestine was, and still 
is, a type of activism that is carried out by the women’s organizations. She explained that nothing 
comes out of the blue, and that mobilizing the grassroots requires trained people to carry it out. 
Following is an excerpt from E’s interview notes: 
As I mentioned before what we have in Palestine is activism, women’s activism; that is right. But 
let me pose this question: who leads this women’s activism? Are they people coming from outer 
space? Of course not! Women’s activism in the Palestinian society is led by these organizations - I 
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mean women’s organizations, women’s frames, the WATC, and the GUPW, all of these 
organizations. And women pioneers lead this women’s activism in Palestine. The movement is 
navigated by organizations; otherwise you cannot talk about women’s activism. No activism 
comes out of the blue. You need people to promote your philosophy, and mobilize the public and 
the grassroots towards the feminist agenda. In other words, it is women’s activism led by women’s 
organizations and the women frames.   
 
This excerpt clearly emphasizes that it was organizations and women’s frames affiliated 
with the various factions of the PNM rather than a movement that carried out women’s activism 
and mobilized the resources and the grassroots in Palestine. According to her, this is the case at 
present, and perhaps it is more the women’s organization than the women’s frames, specifically 
after the Oslo Accords and the retreat of leftist ideology in particular and political ideology in 
general. 
Interviewee (A) had a similar opinion to Interviewee E’s ideas quoted above. For her, one 
can only talk about women’s organizations in Palestine that carry out activism, but not a 
movement in the technical sense. She explains that this is a natural result of the fact that these 
organizations are, in fact, arms of the PNM’s factions. She further explains that women’s 
activism in Palestine is still directly affected by political ideology, namely the conservative, or 
Islamist ideology, and the leftist ideologies. I am quoting her words when she said: 
There are women’s movement(s) but there are also women’s organizations. Women’s 
movement(s) now follow political parties and the nationalist movement. Some fall on the religious 
spectrum with religious ideologies/Islamist ideology, and on the other side of the spectrum you 
find Leftist movements. There are movements that fall in between these two and are affiliated 
more with a patriotic ideology (discourse) rather than the women’s ideology; they are still, 
however, named women’s movement(s). 
 
She also argues that the absence of a feminist movement or a PNM is embedded in the 
fact that women’s activism in Palestine did not reach the level of maturity that allows them to set 
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clear goals and have an agenda that they all abide by, and as a consequence, qualify to be 
considered a movement. She claims that the PWMs’ leadership is following a coexistence policy 
with the patriarchal nature of the Palestinian society. She actually blames the women leadership 
in women’s organizations for this lack of awareness: 
The problem is that women themselves have not reached that level of awareness yet; they are still 
living under patriarchal dominance. There are no unified goals for women’s movement(s). There 
is a unity on some demands and some needs, but there is no clear shape for a unified vision for the 
demands of Palestinian women. 
 
Interviewee (A) further elaborates that despite the fact that the goals that were transferred 
to the women’s organizations from the women’s frames within the political parties were 
dynamic; these goals lacked the mechanisms that guarantee their implications in reality. In other 
words, even though women’s frames within the PNM factions were present for a while, they 
failed in fulfilling the primary need of Palestinian women. As a result, when the women’s 
activism organizations appeared on the Palestinian scene, they lacked the solid ground to launch 
from. Interviewee (A) also explains that a feminist movement in Palestine or even a feminist 
agenda should come as a response to the economic and political needs of the society, which is 
clearly not the case from her point of view. Consider this quotation from Interviewee (A):  
The goals of the women’s movement(s) which were then inherited by the women’s organizations 
were dynamic and evolving with time. I do not believe that this is correct because they did not 
secure their initial demands, then move to the next set of demands. They simply altered their 
agenda, without achieving anything in response to the governing political party and to follow the 
main stream ideology in the society at that point of time. The agenda of the women’s movement(s) 
should come as a response to the reality of economic and political situation of the country; it 
should be planning for the future not coexisting with the present. 
 
In addition, she argues that despite the obstacles she mentioned earlier, some activists and 
some women’s organizations tried to mobilize for a feminist agenda, and as a result established a 
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feminist movement in Palestine, indep3ndently of the PNM and the political parties. She stresses 
the fact that the PNM and its factions had negative consequences on the foundation of a PWM or 
a Palestinian feminist movement. She further believes that the attempts to institutionalize PWMs 
by the PNM have limited the achievements of the PWMs, giving as an example the GUPW, 
which is an institution of the PLO. The following quote represents her standpoint: 
There is activism by some of the feminist Palestinian women to shape a unified vision for 
feminism ideology, in isolation from political affiliation. There is a push for feminist activists to 
work together towards the greater good of the Palestinian women regardless of their organizations.  
There is no clear agenda for the women’s movement(s) in Palestine; even the General Union 
(GUPW), which is the umbrella that is supposed to reflect the needs of women does not have a 
clear agenda. Institutionalization of the women’s movement(s) does indeed limit their 
achievements; it divided, weakened, and created separate visions for each organization. If 
women’s movement(s) aim to reach a wide base of people, they need to go through service-
oriented organizations. 
 
Nonetheless, she re-emphasizes the fact that there was and still is a lack of clarity with 
regard to a unified agenda both among women’s frames and women’s organizations. She claims 
that there might be some portents indicators for a feminist movement or a feminist agenda in 
Palestine though these they are still depicted to be at basic levels of political participation, and 
perhaps some social security. The following is an excerpt from Interviewee (A): 
There is no clear agenda or goals for the women’s movement(s) and women’s organizations; 
instead, there are talks about political participation, social security and voting. Nonetheless, these 
are the basic goals and rights of a balanced civil society in general and not specific to women’s 
movement(s). Some of these goals were only achieved through the blessing of the political 
authority. For example, having a quota of 5 female ministers in the government was only done 
through the blessing of the PNA which came as a response to international donors’ pressure, even 
though women’s movements had been calling for it for years. Even then, I do not think that the 
right women were appointed in the right positions. 
 
However, these portents should be part of the constitutional rights of every citizen as Interviewee 
(H) explains when she gives her perspective of the current feminist agenda in Palestine:   
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I am against the Western ideology that influenced us as PWMs. A lot of PWMs are now 
influenced by Western powers based on the financial aid by donors for certain projects. I am 
against such influence and affiliation. As Palestinian women, we want to make a change; it 
shouldn’t be made according to a foreign agenda. Any change should not be in isolation of men’s 
participation. As a PWM, I am not against men, but I am a partner with men. Men and women will 
make the change and not anyone alone.  
This requires the presence of a state that includes civil society institutions, and incorporates social 
justice and treats all its citizens as equals. This is what we are working on, this is what we 
mobilize for, and this is what brings us together. This is our ambition. 
Another thing that brings us together is the unification of our efforts - the unification of the 
feminist movement. If you have unity and organization, you will be able to mobilize the 
grassroots. Without the things that I just have mentioned, we will not be the pressure group we 
desire to be, and we will not be able to make the change we want in the society. 
According to the PCBS, we as women are almost 50 percent of the Palestinian society. We will be 
the pressuring and influential group when we are able to unify our efforts, not in the view of the 
level of scattering we are living in …. 
 
To bring this point of whether women’s activism in Palestine is indeed a social 
movement to a conclusion, it is fair to say that a collective form of action, as defined earlier by 
Snow et al., (1991) that is carried out by women in Palestine does not rank to the level of a 
movement in its sociological sense. As the majority of my interviewees indicated, there is 
collective action carried out by women in Palestine. Moreover, one can easily identify aspects of 
women’s activism and recognize women’s organizations that carry out activities that target 
women in Palestine and aim at promoting the notion of equity and equality between males and 
females in the Palestinian society. 
 It is obvious that almost all of the participants agree that such collective action does not 
qualify to be called a movement. This, however, does not deny the fact that all my participants 
agree that there are serious attempts by women’s organizations which are active in Palestine to 
establish one solid feminist movement that can represent Palestinian women and address their 
concerns and achieve more concrete proof of equity and equality between men and women in the 
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Palestinian society. This theme will be the topic of the next segment of my analysis of the 
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The types and distribution of contemporary women’s activism in Palestine, the donor 
motivated comes on top of the hierarchy, while the ideology motivated goes to the bottom.     
The continuous arrow (       ) denotes the strength of the direction of the relationship. 
The dashed arrow (           ) denotes the weakness of the direction of the relationship.  
160 
 
V. d. 2. PWMs and Funding Resources 
Now that I have exhibited the different points of view about the nature of women 
activism in Palestine, I will discuss the funding dynamics of social movements and their 
affiliated organizations. More specifically, I will investigate the ability of women’s organizations 
to mobilize financial resources in light of the fact that they do not constitute a unified or a solid 
movement and the implications of the status-quo of PWMs and their ability to mobilize 
resources, especially, financial resources. I will try to find how the nature of PWMs affects their 
ability to acquire funding? Finally, I will look at how the ability to mobilize financial resources 
affects the ability of the PWMs and their organization to survive and sustain.  
This segment of my analysis will focus on the sources of funding of PWMs, how funding 
affects the legitimacy PWMs, and finally how funding affects the ability of PWMs to mobilize 
the grassroots. During my interviews with my participants, they all emphasized the importance 
of funding and how it directly affects the functionality of the PWMs especially in the aftermath 
of September 11, 2001, and what is now widely known among Palestinian women’s activists as 
“conditional funding” or “donor-driven funding” as some experts would prefer to call it. This 
refers to funding which is driven or oriented by the donor’s agenda, or as others preferred to call 
it, funding oriented by foreign agenda.      
Some of my participants agree that a good number of women’s organizations, especially 
those that appeared in the post Oslo era, are donor-driven. According to some of my 
interviewees, some of these organizations have implemented and are implementing suspicious 
and questionable agendas. Interviewee (H), for instance, considers donor-driven organizations to 
be an unconstructive phenomenon that has negatively affected women’s activism in Palestine. To 
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her, such organizations are a breach of the Palestinian society and culture, and a setback in 
regard to the PWMs’ achievements. She claims that donor-driven funding has actually 
diminished the ability of women’s organizations to frame and mobilize the grassroots. In this 
perspective:  
During the days of occupation117 we were more relaxed in working and mobilizing the grassroots. 
Since the establishment of the PA, a lot of internal issues became more organized. Whatever 
donor118 wants to fund you, you have to be licensed by the Ministry of Interior as a society. From 
my point of view this is a problem and a paradox, I would say that the donors have reduced and 
diminished our activism as institutional work regardless of the fact that women’s organizations 
work with the people and the grassroots, but we have to be licensed. This diminished our capacity 
to mobilize. I am against this issue. 
Interviewee (H) uses a metaphor to describe the reality of women’s activism and 
women’s organization in light of the presence of donors as rather “manipulators” of the 
Palestinian scene. She describes some of the current women’s organizations operating in 
Palestine to be “boutiques”, and accuses them of having a questionable agenda—one that is alien 
to the status-quo of Palestine and the Palestinian society:     
Not all of them, some of these organizations as I will call them are “boutiques”119 or stores [Arabic 
 Now] there came to be a lot of boutiques, and this was not in the best interest of the] .[دكاكين
organizations that were present and active launching from a grassroots and nationalist perspective; 
they were actually founded and funded by the donors120. This was some sort of incursion into our 
culture, customs, ideology and other aspects that people are accustomed to. Some people have 
become panhandlers and I feel sorry and oppressed when I say it, but in reality they have become 
panhandlers.”   
                                                            
117 She is referring to the period prior to the second Oslo Accords of 1994 between the PLO and the Israeli 
Government when all the WB, the GS and EJ were under full military occupation by the Israeli forces.  
118 She used the English term donor. 
119 Boutique is an expression borrowed from French and is metaphorically used in Arabic in political discourse to 
denote people or bodies who establish NGOs to seek foreign funding, but have no clear programs, no clear vision or 
goals; they also follow the agendas of the highest bidder. They actually perceive politics as a trade. In some 
scholarly work they are referred to as Interests groups” [ المصالح جماعة ] in Arabic. Or as portrayed in informal English 
as “suckers.” Are you sure about this?? I think suckers in English is rather different.       




Other participants, such as Interviewee (C), believe that donors’ money is being used as a 
pressure mechanism to manipulate the PWMs. Although she does not mention any specific 
names or entities, but it is obvious that she implies that the USAID is deeply involved.  As she 
explains, funding is used as a strategy to impose certain agendas and also believes that funding 
has a passive effect on the unity of the PWMs. In other words PWMs became dependent on those 
funds and stopped exploring the possibility of mobilizing other resources. 
Funding for us is a dilemma, an affecting factor and an obstacle that scatters our efforts as PWMs. 
You can almost sense that it is a tactic manipulated exploited by certain entities and is meant to 
keep us running round in a loop vicious circle [حلقة مفرغة]. As a result of the current funding 
policies especially by foreign donors, I think that women’s organizations and their social activism 
should never separate from the activism of the society as a whole. We as PWMs have to avoid 
submitting to the influences of funding.  
 
In this regard, Interviewee (A) maintains that foreign funding and donor-driven funding 
are a reality that the PWMs have to deal with. She illustrates this by citing her own organization, 
and admits that without external funding her organization will be unable to provide services and 
will cease to exist. She explains, nonetheless, that not all external funding is evil and that the 
PWMs can chose funding from donors that have common grounds with their own aspirations, or 
that comply with the PWMs own agenda. Consider this extract: 
The entire Palestinian society is donor-driven; Salam Fayyad121 is deceiving himself by thinking 
we can be financially independent through taxes.  Part of the taxes is from the employees, who use 
money obtained from donors, the other part comes from civil society organizations which are 
funded by foreign donors, and the third party is the private sector.  We Palestinians have no 
resources. This is the only country in the world where we are running out of lands to farm, either 
because of the confiscation of land by the Israelis or because of building of settlements. The 
international community will never cut off funding from Palestine because they want life to 
continue in Palestine, for the sake of the Israelis. No one is working in isolation from funding, 
even if indirectly.   
                                                            
121 Prime Minister of the PNA from 2007- till April 2013.  
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Let me take my organization as an example, as ….122, I cannot survive one day without a budget 
funded by the donors; as a private sector we cannot take funding from the PNA, even if we want 
and they are willing to finance some of our projects they, but the PNA lacks the financial 
resources. And as I mentioned earlier, even the PNA itself is sustained by donors’ money. I need 
to keep my agency running, so I need the donor’s money. To be able to pay my running costs, I 
need the donor’s money. To be able to sustain my services and keep my projects running, I need 
the donor’s money.  
  
Interviewee (A) reasserts that PWMs resources are limited, especially if we take into 
consideration that social enterprise is very primitive or even non-existent.  She admits that 
resources in Palestine are running short and becoming scarce, which she attributes to the 
practices of the occupation. Interviewee (M) seems to agree with Interview (A that funding is 
used in a manipulative way whether by the PNA or by the donors. She argues that women are 
being used by the authorities, by the funders and by some women’s organizations themselves as 
a strategy for survival and continuity: 
It has become an international condition that women should be involved in decision- making. 
Women should be at least 20% of your leadership and leading positions and maybe your 
workforce, otherwise you would not receive aids and funding, or as we call it the “Quota system”. 
If you have women representation you will receive funding. 
 
In contrast, Interviewee (H) gives a different account on the negative impact of funding 
and how it can affect the survival of some PWMs. She explains that the PWMs, as many other 
movements in Palestine, lack self-funding or social enterprise. As she puts it, in the good old 
days the cooperative model was viable; however, circumstances have changed and the model is 
no longer applicable especially in the absence of a good and viable marketing strategy. 
Following is an excerpt from Interviewee H:  
                                                            
122 Name of organization is kept confidential. 
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Let me be frank and say that we do not have social enterprise. Back in the old days, we used to 
have cooperatives and cooperative societies that initiated micro projects and used to find work 
opportunities for the public. We used to launch such co-ops to sponsor micro projects that hired 
women to prepare pastries and savories, for example Family Relief in Ramallah. Some of the 
women frames tried to launch such projects, and spread the idea of autonomy, hire women in 
micro projects and invest their workforce, and make a kind of development. But their attempts 
were challenged by financial constraints. They lacked effective marketing strategies and as a result 
they lacked sustainability. They were hit by the recession and they ended up broke. From my point 
of view these were entrepreneurial initiatives and at the beginning they were a success and were 
able to absorb a good number of workforces. For example, each project hired at least five women 
in different geographical areas, meaning that these projects used to aid and feed 20 mouths more 
or less. This was a transitional experience which did not last long, for instance, they lacked the 
market that can accommodate the production rate, and it was tied to public policy. If there was a 
government to monitor such production and put the plans for distribution and marketing women’s 
products, they could have succeeded and survived. But they had limited opportunities and they did 
not have access to external markets, meaning marketing on international or regional levels. And 
your market is relatively small and saturated.   
 
Thinking about the excerpt above, it becomes evident that Interviewee (H) touches on a 
serious dilemma that affects the PWMs and their ability to mobilize. She discusses the 
transformation of the Palestinian society from a production-oriented mode to a consuming-
oriented mode, or consumerism. The spread of consumerism as a culture in the Palestinian 
society constitutes a threat to all micro-projects, including the social enterprise. Interviewee (H) 
explains that political frames in general, including women’s frames, and women organizations in 
particular, lacked effective marketing strategies and brought micro-projects and their social 
enterprises to a dead-end, and hence, threatened the continuity and sustainability of some of 
these organizations. 
To sum up this segment of my analysis, it is fair to say that funding is a fundamental 
dimension for understanding the contemporary PWMs in Palestine. It is also quite reasonable to 
say that funding appears to be a major manipulator of the PWMs particularly that the ability to 
mobilize financial resources is fundamental for the survival and continuity of PWMs. 
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The participants in the present study stressed the role of funders, or “donors” as they 
prefer to call them borrowing the English word into Arabic, to emphasize how funders has 
become part of the equation, when studying the Palestinian civil society organizations in general 
and the PWMs in particular. In other words, it is not only the money but it is the agenda of the 
people controlling and providing that money. The participants referred to the turning points in 
the funding dynamics of the PWMs, some of which go back as early as 1993 and the 
establishment of the PA. Other important stages include the second Intifada (2000), the death of 
late President Arafat, and September 11, 2001. Since the second Intifada took a more military 
form, funders started to target the cognitive aspects in their programs. Donors started to focus on 
educational programs that Palestinians could benefit from, and in the meantime continued to 
focus on building the infrastructure of Palestine the Palestinian State. The new programs targeted 
the social and educational improvement of the society, including women empowerment.  
In a similar vein, and in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, donors, mostly the USAID, 
became more cautious about how they spent their money in order to ensure that none of the 
money went to support programs that could in any way be associated with terrorism or terrorist 
groups. Consequently, they started to scrutinize the programs of the recipient organizations and 
to follow them up more strictly. They even went as far as requesting that organizations to sign a 
form stating that they are in no way associated with any terrorist groups, or support terrorism in 
anyway. Some of the participants, who are PMW leaders, stated that they had refused to sign 
such statements. In their opinion, women activism against occupation is legitimate and should in 
no way be seen as an act of terrorism.  
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During the era of Chairman Arafat’s leadership, being the absolute leader of the PA, 
Arafat had full control over all the resources of the PNA and imposed censorship on the 
resources of the civil society. In an attempt to control the use of foreign funds, Arafat established 
a ministry for non-governmental organizations. This, however, made some donors to change 
their strategy of funding and started to impose very strict constraints on the recipients of their 






















































Distribution of funding by donors, it is obvious that the priority of funding goes to the 
organization rather than the movements   
The continuous arrow (         ) denotes the strength of the direction of the relationship. 



































The sources of PWMs funding, the majority of funding is external funding coming mainly from 
the USAID, the European Union and European governments, the funding from the Gulf States, 
like Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the U.A.E. 
Less funding comes from the PNA or from social enterprise or the mother movement “the 
PNM”.  
The continuous arrow (            ) denotes the strength of the direction of the relationship. 




In the section below, I will move to explain how funding affects the legitimacy of the 
PWMs. 
 
V. d. 3. Funding and PWMs Legitimacy: 
 
When asked about the effects of funding on legitimacy of social movements and their 
ability to mobilize the grassroots, my participants reacted in different ways.  Some agreed that 
funding can be perceived in a rational way, while others stressed that, although funding is 
important, legitimacy derives practically from the capacity of the PWMs to mobilize the 
grassroots. Others yet minimized the role of funding as a means of legitimacy and highlighted 
the size and quantity of collective action. 
 I will start with an interesting quote from Interviewee (M), who considers funding to be 
an instrument of manipulation:  
Some local municipalities have women representation, but it is ceremonial just to get funding. The 
donors have noticed that women are de facto present but de jure they have a ceremonial role. As a 
result, they stipulated funding with empowerment of these women and that their role and 
participation should be binding. So I would say that women are being abused to attract funding. 
 
The excerpt clearly indicates that women are being manipulated by both the public and 
private sectors to attract funding. The example she gives illustrates how women are sometimes 
used as a decoy to attract donor’s money.  
Other participants, on the other hand, do not deny the importance of funding but stress 
that the legitimacy of PWMs is caught in the dilemma of the quantity and quality. In the excerpt 
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below, Interviewee (C) explains that there are two major camps within the PNM and in turn the 
PWMs. The first was in favor of quantity and stressed the importance of size of representation 
(i.e. the quota system), while the other camp stresses the importance of quality. To achieve 
legitimacy, Interviewee (C) argues, there should be a balance between the two concepts of 
quantity and quality.  
We were always in a struggle between the two extremes, one that says that legitimacy is achieved 
by the number and the quantity of people following a certain movement, and one suggesting that 
the ability to mobilize resources and people is more important. The truth is that in the history of 
our Palestinian struggle we were victims of the quota system, or as I call them shares. These 
quotas came at the expense of quality and efficiency. The Palestinian system of quota inflicted 
injustice on the qualified and educated people in Palestine. However, currently they [the 
leadership of the PNM and the PNA] are giving more importance and priority to quality, but I do 
not know who will win the battle; can I say that quality and efficiency will win over quantity and 
numbers? I really cannot tell. 
Yet, we find other participants who partially agree with the previous point of view but 
give more weight to the quantity. Interviewee (H), for instance, emphasizes the importance of 
having a large base among the grassroots and considers it to be the primary source of legitimacy 
but she gives more weight to the ability to reach out to the grassroots and the capacity to 
mobilize them an advantage than funding. She further emphasizes that awareness is spread by 
ideology rather than through services or money. Nonetheless, she does not underestimate the role 
of quality completely: 
No, it is your ability to mobilize the masses, frame them ideologically and organize them. This 
gives you legitimacy; you can invent activities later and maybe provide them with services at a 
later stage and not the other way around.     
Some people refrain from adopting the ideology of some organizations if they are not 
accompanied with services. As I mentioned earlier, there was a takeover and incursion on the 
cultural and value levels which caused a deep damage to our ability to mobilize people. 
As long as you have active members who are ideologically framed, organized and polarized and 
have the sense of belonging; this gives you legitimacy as an organization. Moreover we as GUPW, 
we met with the president123 as grassroots and public, we were organized, we represented framed 
                                                            
123 She means Mahmud Abbas “Abu Mazen” the Chairmen of the PNA. 
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women who are conscious and aware of their rights, such mobilization gives the ability to impose 
pressure and become an active pressure group, moreover, it gives legitimacy to the organization 
that they belonged to. This gives the impression that they have an organized grassroots and as an 
organization you can mobilize these grassroots. 
When you have 70 – 80 thousand members who participate in conferences and general assemblies 
and they take active participation in elections which are observed by the authorities. As a GUPW 
we have a democratic stance, as for other PWMs and organizations that have also similar stance of 
democracy. They have general assembly, they host elections, so as PWMs our legitimacy stems 
from the democratic system that we have and from the transparent elections. And the democratic 
practices besides our active presence in the field.  
I have to say the quantity and the quality matters. For example, you cannot have 1000 members 
who are not active or are actually there doing nothing. Or maybe are unable to communicate the 
message of being able to mobilize and frame the grassroots ideologically or spread our vision or 
aspirations. If this is the case, then we do not want them. Now about the quality, if we really have 
high quality activists that enjoy advanced training, skills, charisma, and leadership skills, but if 
they have limited mobility I can say that they too are useless. We have to balance between the 
quantity and the quality. These are the soldiers that spread our message and spread the word about 
our goals and aspirations, and if I have 2000 that are useless, I think I do not want them to be in 
my organization.” 
 
However, other participants such as interviewee (A) indicated that, in the contemporary 
status-quo of the Palestinian situation, the legitimacy of any movement in general and the PWMs 
in particular is derived from the ability to provide services and, thus, from funding. She 
explained that ideology and framing alone cannot guarantee a wide base among the grassroots in 
the absence of a flow of services. She, indeed, corroborates what interviewee (H) mentioned 
above about the shift of the Palestinian society to consumerism.   
 
At the present time, the majority of framing is done through services and not through the 
feminist agenda. Women’s frames obtain their legitimacy through services. Previous frames 
were based more on the ideology and the nationalist agenda, and even when they offered 
services, they were not financial. The relationship became based on financial benefits from 
both sides; the organizations cannot maintain/survive without people and their involvement in 
their programs, and the people do not respond to these organizations unless they provide them 




She provides an example of a program imposed by a major funder in Palestine, the USAID, and 
criticizes the program for undermining people’s judgment in regard to how to spend their own 
money. 
An example is the Work for Food program which is carried out by the USAID124. In my opinion, it 
is one of the most repulsive programs that ever existed in Palestine.  The program denies the 
Palestinians receiving their sack of flour unless they have attended a workshop or done a certain 
job. It is true that people need motivation but it should not be mandatory. If people have been 
showing up and doing the work, then they should be given money in return and should be free to 
do whatever they wish with this money. Denying them monetary pay contradicts all human rights; 
the program does not have the right to impose on people what to eat or what to do with their 
earned pay. It could very well be that the U.S. had too much flour and so they sent it our way. 
Even women were turning against each other; they believe the USAID should be rewarding them 
in food not money so that women would not spend it on makeup. This eliminates their freedom. 
There is a contradiction, the USAID is preaching freedom and democracy and at the same time it 
is crippling these people.  
 
The program, while intending to help provide people with workshops that could build 
skills or educate them in other ways, is abusing peoples’ need for food and for money to survive. 
As long as people are doing their jobs, or providing services, they should receive a monetary 
return. People are the only ones that should have a say in how to spend their pay in their best 
interest and the best interest of their families. 
To bring the segment on funding and PWM’s legitimacy to a conclusion, it is fair to say 
that the participants emphasized three major factors in their perception of the effect of funding 
movement and legitimacy. These three factors can be summarized as follows. The first issue is 
quantity, i.e. the number of individuals that benefit from the organization. However, such a claim 
raises the dilemma of making the distinction between beneficiaries and actual members. As 
indicated by some of my participants, the legitimacy of any movement stems from the number of 
members affiliated with that movement. Yet, if we agree with opinion that what exist in Palestine 
                                                            
124 United States Agency for International Development  
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are organizations and not movements. This raises the question of whether one can consider 
beneficiaries as members or not. Consider the following excerpt from Interviewee (C):  
Clients are different from both sides, but we want to bet on the ones that are more interested in 
creating convictions, national, and social and women convictions; we will still have people who 
will only come for the services, but that is only because they need our services. If we had a 
structured society with strong organizations and well established governmental organizations that 
provide social insurance, medical insurance and sufficient education, then people would not need 
to come to women’s organizations for help. 
  The only logical conclusion that can be made here is to say that beneficiaries, indeed, 
cannot be considered as members. Nonetheless, there are opposing opinions claiming that having 
a large grassroots base represented by thousands of supporters does not necessarily guarantee a 
quality of collective action that a movement should reflect. There are also voices among my 
participants that maintain that having a few qualified activists who possess certain capacities and 
skills can form the nucleus of a movement better than hundreds of people who are inactive. This 
clearly confirms that quantity by itself does not guarantee legitimacy.  
The second issue is the opinion claiming that legitimacy is actually derived from the 
capacity to mobilize resources, namely, financial. This viewpoint stresses that the legitimacy of 
any movement stems from its ability to sustain itself. In order for a movement to maintain its 
existence, it needs to have the ability to mobilize financial resources and to ensure the 
sustainability of these resources. However, my participants admit that in the current status-quo of 
the Palestinian civil society in general, and the PWM’s in particular, the financial resources are 
controlled by the funders, and thereby by their agendas. They further admit that the lack of social 
enterprise poses a challenge in the face of the social movements, women’s movements included, 
to grow and prosper.  
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Finally, there was the opinion maintaining that legitimacy is derived from the ability to 
provide services rather than to frame people through ideology. In other words, as long as the 
organization provides the grassroots with the services they need, the organization will be 
perceived by the public as legitimate, as mentioned above by Interviewee (C). This opinion 
contradicts with the claim that legitimacy stems from the movements’ ability to frame people. 
According to the sociological definition of a movement, a movement is not supposed to provide 
services, but rather to frame people ideologically and inspire collective action to make social 
change (Snow et al., 1991). What makes the situation in Palestine complex is that these 
organizations are sometimes mistakenly perceived as movements, even though they provide 
services. As mentioned earlier, the majority of my participants agreed that what exist in Palestine 
are women’s organizations and not women’s movements.  
I will use this conclusion to be a transitional point for my next segment of my analysis in 
which I talk about the shortage of resources and how such a situation affects the organizations’ 
ability to mobilize the grassroots.  Furthermore, I will elaborate on the issue of resources and 
framing capacity. However, the effect of resources on the capacity of framing will be discussed 
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Scenario (A): funding, namely external, will enable organizations to provide services and as a 
result gain legitimacy.   
Scenario (B): grassroots mobilization, namely ideology, will enable the movement to attract 
people and enroll more members and as a result gain legitimacy.   
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V. e. Framing and Networking Issues 
Now that I have presented and discussed the theme of organizations and funding 
dynamics, I will investigate the theme of the framing capacity and networking dynamics of the 
PWMs, or women’s organizations as some of my interviewees would prefer to call them. Here 
also have my participants held different opinions about the nature of collective action in 
Palestine and how the majority perceived it as activism and organizations’ inspired activism. It is 
important to ascertain how the nature of collective action in Palestine, particularly the PWMs, 
affected the capacity of such activism to frame the grassroots. It is equally important to establish 
the other resources that the PWMS or women’s organization have the capacity to mobilize and to 
explore the relationship between the capacity to mobilize financial resources and the ability to 
frame and mobilize the public. 
In this segment of my analysis I will focus on the capacity of framing among the PWMs 
hoping to link my findings about the capacity of framing to my findings about the capacity of the 
PWMs to acquire funding and mobilize financial resource. I will also discuss the capacity of 
PWMs in networking and how this affected their ability to mobilize resources, their ability to 
survive, compete and continue, and their ability to implement a women-oriented agenda.    
To proceed in the point about PWMs and their capacity of framing the grassroots, in the 
previous segment, I showed that there were different opinions about how funding can affect the 
PWMs legitimacy. Here, I will focus on the issue of members’ magnitude and the issue of 




The following segment of my analysis will address the following points. I will start by 
talking about the PWMs and their capacity to frame and how one can understand the capacity of 
framing125 as a resource that the PWMs can aim to mobilize. Then I will investigate the PWMs 
and their ability and strategies to network with other social movements and among themselves as 
women’s movements. Next, I will examine Palestinian women’s motivation and aspiration to 
join the PWMs. Finally, I will explore the issue of the presence of a women’s or feminist agenda 
in Palestine. More specifically, I will try to establish whether such an agenda is present or not, 
and if so, whether or not it is one that has well-defined objectives and goals and, most 











125 Framing refers to concept of the ability of an organization/movement to convince the public of its broad lines of. 
It is borrowed from the PNM tactics to enroll more members and polarize them politically.     
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V. e. 1. PWMs and Framing Capacity  
As indicated previously by some of my interviewees, the legitimacy of the PWMs stems 
from their capacity to frame the grassroots. The golden age for the PWMs was when they were 
able to frame the public, namely women, ideologically and when they were able to emphasize 
their nationalist role in pursuit of freedom and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian State. 
According to Interviewee (Q), the origin of framing in Palestine, whether it was carried out by 
the PWMs or the PNM, focused on the human element126. She acknowledges, though, that with 
time there was a shift in the framing process, and it became more related to the capacity to 
mobilize financial resources:  
Historically mobilizing resources depended on mobilizing the grassroots. The human element was 
what we focused on. However, since then other elements have taken the same importance that the 
human element has had, if not more. For example, we should excel now in mobilizing financial 
resources, and in mobilizing the social element. I do not put down the importance of the financial 
aspect because implementing programs requires a budget. 
However, in the excerpt below, she argues that there should be a balance between the 
capacity to mobilize resources and the ability to frame people.127 There should also be a sense of 
stability between ideology and the PWMs’ organizations’ ability to provide services. She asserts 
that in addition to ideological enrichment, public needs services, particularly in view of the fact 
that Palestinians are still under occupation:  
Truthfully, historically there should have been a link between the two, but the Palestinian society 
is unique; our infrastructure is destroyed, and we, as PWMs, are not self-sufficient. We, as 
Palestinians, do not have well-established organizations with a strong foundation. So doing both 
always has a great effect, meaning presenting the service along with mobilizing. If women’s 
                                                            
126 The concept of human element denotes the targeting of the grassroots as a resource that can be mobilized by the 
PWMs and form a pressure group to achieve certain goals. 
127 Again, it is meant as a technique of convening the public by the movements’ ideologies, or convincing the public 
by the goals and objectives of certain organizations.   
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organizations were to be stopped from giving services to the public, they would lose a main 
channel of communication with the people, so they have to combine services with communication 
and mobilizing. 
Conversely, other participants maintained that framing and the capacity for framing are 
only done through ideology and the capacity to inspire collective action through a 
comprehensive political agenda. For instance, Interviewee (E) is very clear about stressing the 
importance of framing and mobilizing the grassroots through ideology, rather than through 
providing services. She recounts the roots of the PWMs and how they emerged from the PNM, 
thus, highlighting that it was ideology, namely the nationalist agenda, that gave momentum to 
the PWMs and made them what they came to be at present. Consider this excerpt from her 
interviewee:  
If we look closely at the women’s concerns and the formation of feminist/women’s frames128 from 
a historical point of view, we find that these frames129 in Palestine, came as a result of the presence 
of political parties and the presence of the various factions within the spectrum of the PNM and 
the need to have women representation within these factions of the PNM. Moreover, it stemmed 
from the necessity to have women in order to mobilize the grassroots. In other words, the PNM 
needed the presence of women among their cadre to mobilize the grassroots especially by reaching 
out to fellow women. The nationalist and political ideology took priority, and then came the trends 
towards a more women-oriented agenda. 
However, when I asked her about the motivation behind joining the PWMs in the 
meantime, she again stressed the fact that it is the capacity of these movements or in other words 
the capacity of these women’s organizations to frame people ideologically. She further added 
that women do not join because they are in need of services or financial aid but because they are 
convinced of the vision and philosophies of these organizations. Moreover, new members are 
                                                            
128 She means women’s entities in Palestine, which in turn are a reflection of the Palestinian political and nationalist 
spectrum.   
129 She means political frames and the process of political framing.  
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usually entrusted with preserving the achievements of the earlier generation. In relation to 
women’s aspirations to join the PWMs, she explained: 
I will take myself as an example, when I joined the PWMs, I had a political and ideological 
motivation; nowadays, young women get involved in the PWMs being motivated by the fact that 
they want to protect and preserve the achievements of the PWMs. They are dedicated to defending 
women’s achievements and pushing and pressuring towards changing the society. 
As women, why do we involve ourselves with the PWMs?  This stems from our belief in what we 
do and the necessity and the vitality of our work for a better future for Palestinian women, and 
moreover, to reassure and reemphasize our concerns and rights as women. In other words, we do 
not want to live or relive the recession that women witnessed in the Arab World. We, actually, try 
to avoid it and take precautions. 
Other interviewees corroborate this and stress the role of political framing within the 
PWMs and give it more weight than services that are provided by some women’s organization in 
Palestine. Interviewee (W) gives a chronological account of the development of women’s 
movements’ and their ability to frame and attract new members. 
The goals were dynamic and always changing. If we did not change, we would be alien in the 
society we are living in.  
We affected others and were affected by them; it is a give and take relationship. We were affected 
by certain experiences and visions, not to forget our experience in the 1920s; as you may know, 
the first women’s rally in Palestine was in the 1920s. It was when six of these women fell as 
martyrs. There was a rally by cars in Jerusalem; they went to the High Commissioner130 
headquarters in Jerusalem and presented him with a petition, and six women were shot dead 
during that demonstration.  
Since then and until the 1960s our vision was a nationalist one, helping detainees, the families of 
martyrs, and helping those on the run from the Israeli occupation.  
But in the 1970s our vision developed and went beyond the charitable nature and became more 
about mobilizing and framing women ideologically.  
Later on in the late 1980s, particularly 1989-1990, our vision developed even more to include the 
nationalist and social aspects of mobilization. 
 
 Interviewee (H) corroborates what her fellow activists said earlier but argues that 
women’s organizations that provide services have a diminished capacity for framing. She 
                                                            
130 The High Commissioner of the British Mandate in Palestine at the time, Sir Herbert Louis Samuel.  
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describes the work of such organizations as “seasonal” and as lacking continuity and also 
comments that they have a rather commercial nature especially in their effort to acquire external 
funding. Finally, she further depicts providing services by women’s organizations as a new form 
of feudalism. However, she does not deny the fact that there is some sort of cooperation among 
women’s organizations through referrals, especially, for those women who are in need for 
services. The following quote demonstrates Interviewee (H)’s key points: 
Their work was seasonal, and not sustainable or continuous. Until today, the societies,131 with all 
due respect to their achievements and their nationalist history and patriotic role and their struggle, 
they are still elitists who provide services, and this is what distinguishes us as feminist frames. We 
do not provide services, but we reach out to the grassroots and we mobilize the public and women. 
We actually direct and refer women to agencies, societies and organizations that provide services. 
We refer them to social welfare, to women’s unions’ societies. So they receive the service and 
leave. 
This builds on what I have told you earlier that there are elitists nowadays who have opened 
“boutiques” to provide services but they have weakened our role as ideologists. It was a cultural 
incursion into our heritage and customs. 
We want to organize and frame women, not necessarily politically only, but also founding a solid 
movement, and mobilizing and framing women and making them ready to be a pursuing group. I 
would say that the nucleus included the elitists, or as I call them “feudal ladies”. 
She further elaborates on the strategies of the PWMs in attracting new members, 
mobilizing the grassroots and framing them ideologically. She gives special emphasis to the 
independent grassroots, and explains that the Palestinian social movements in general, and the 
PWMs in particular, target the grassroots. She believes that the capacity of framing is closely 
related to trust and the way the PWMs convey their mission and communicate their message. 
Consider the quote below:  
Let me say this, the way you mobilize them132 is very important because you either gain their trust 
or you gain their enmity. Your capacity to frame is embedded in your programs and your 
perspectives and vision. It is important to know how to gain their trust, how to send the signal and 
                                                            
131 She means charitable societies.  
132 She means the grassroots, namely those who identify themselves as ideologically and politically independent.  
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try to frame them in your camp. If you conveyed the message in the right way, you can guarantee 
that you mobilized them on your side; otherwise, if you give the wrong signal, it means that you 
lose them forever. It needs a lot of effort to gain people’s trust.  
The most difficult sector of the society are the [politically] independent; they are a vital 
component of the action of change, the solidarity for change and the actual change. They work in 
favor of PWMs. 
On the other hand, certain participants gave more weight to the capacity to mobilize the 
grassroots, but did not fully dismiss the role of the elitists133 in the history of the PWMs, or the 
importance of funding to the PWMs. Interviewee (A) agrees with Interviewee (H) that the elitists 
and their satellite organizations have failed to mobilize the grassroots even though they provide 
services. Consider the following excerpt in which Interviewee (A) depicts a historical point of 
view:    
Elitist girls were able to give women’s movement(s) a more formal shape. They had financial 
means, and they were educated, so they were able to attend meetings, start health and educational 
institutions, organize and manage. However, they could not have started the nucleus of the 
women’s movements without the real grassroots, which were the women who worked in the field 
and in the city. For example, the elitists were able to organize for teachers to do alternative 
teaching during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, but they were unable to teach students themselves. 
Women from other more modest social classes did all the work and were able to reach to the 
people. There are two sides: one side took the leading role and overshadowed the other.  
She admits, though, that framing can also be achieved through services. According to her, 
it was the provision of services that gave women’s organizations the capacity to mobilize the 
grassroots. She further describes it as a win-win situation. In other words, it is a relationship of 
exchanged interests. Consider the following excerpt from Interviewee (A) (quoted previously):  
At the present time, the majority of framing is done through services and not through the feminist 
agenda. Women’s frames obtain their legitimacy through services. Previous frames were based 
more on ideology and the nationalist agenda, and even when they offered services, they were not 
financial. The relationship became based on financial benefits from both sides, the organizations 
cannot maintain themselves or survive without people and their involvement in their programs, 
and people do not respond to these organizations unless they provide them with financial benefits. 
                                                            
133 She is referring to heads of women’s organizations that descend from feudalist and wealthy families. 
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She claims, nonetheless, that contemporary PWMs are facing a dilemma, especially those 
PWMs and their satellite organizations which are affiliated with the PNM and its factions. She 
explains that the PNM-affiliated PWMs or their satellite organizations are still framing the 
grassroots politically. However, taking the contemporary Palestinian context in consideration, 
especially the financial crises in the PNA territories resulting from the Israeli control of the 
economic, natural and financial resources and the siege of Gaza, she questions the ability of 
words and ideas to frame the Palestinian grassroots: 
 The resources which the Palestinian women’s movement(s) are mobilizing are funds from donors, 
in addition to services and human resources. Other than that, the PWMs have no resources. 
Women’s organizations which are affiliated with political parties depend more on mobilizing 
human resources to determine to what extent they work to promote an idea, and to rally for it. The 
effect of framing on PWMs resulted in its inefficiency. The movement is crippled and is at a 
standstill. 
 
In addition, Interview (A) explains that the capacity of some women’s organizations to 
provide services gave them an advantage over other women’s organizations that lack such 
service. She ranks service-providing organizations on top of the hierarchy of women’s 
organizations in Palestine and claims that these organizations have better chances of mobilizing 
and reaching out to the public through their services. She goes further to claim that this strategy 
is also adopted by the PNM to mobilize resources, especially financial resources. The following 
quote from Interviewee (A) elaborates on this point:      
There 134is a hierarchy of the PWMs and their women’s organizations; the more services an 
agency can give, the more it is able reach people and also the politically stronger it is. 
Beneficiaries of the PWMs or the nationalist movement are the popular grassroots. The direction 
of each movement has a profound effect on the amount of people they are able to reach.  They are 






independent of the funding agendas, and donors have a great effect on determining who the 
beneficiaries of their programs are. For instance, the more marginalized the target groups in the 
society are, the better chances a movement has of getting its project funded. 
 
Finally, Interviewee (A) describes her vision of the contemporary Palestinian scene. 
From her point of view, it is a scenario in which the political parties and the PNM factions has 
lost their popularity, and thus, their grassroots support. She singles out the Leftists parties in 
Palestine as the biggest losers in such a scenario, especially in after the Islamist tide. She argues 
that affiliation to a political party has become a social stigma, especially in view of the fact that 
the Palestinian political spectrum has been reduced to two major political players: FATAH and 
HAMAS. Such an atmosphere offers the ideal climate for civil society agencies and NGOs, 
especially non-affiliated NGOs, to flourish and prosper, and consequently become major players 
and mediators in the Palestinian political arena. In such a scenario, the argument of political 
opportunity is quite valid. Consider the excerpt below from Interviewee (A):          
I do not feel that all the women’s movement(s) are affiliated with political parties. The Palestinian 
parties have lost their popular supporters; in other words, a great portion of these parties have lost 
their grassroots popularity. Palestinian leftist parties lost their grassroots popularity because 
women were afraid of the stigma affiliated with these parties as being communists and atheists, 
therefore leftist women turned into NGO’s. At this point, the question of independence is still 
valid, since there is a fear that these women might have avoided affiliation with certain parties 
which are internationally rejected by the funders, since it would have put them at a risk of losing 
their funding, therefore, the independence issue still presents a question mark, even to our 
organization [the interviewee’s agency].  
 
Interviewee (A)’s viewpoint questioning the ability of ideological framing in a scenario 
where the primary needs of the grassroots are fulfilled first, and the retreat of ideology was 
concurred by Interviewee (B). She agrees that some women refrain from affiliating themselves 
with PWMs or women’s organizations that are affiliated with a political party:  
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Nowadays women in Palestinian want to join organizations that are not related to a political party. 
Women need organizations that provide and empower women regardless of their political 
affiliations; others look for organizations that provide services. 
Other interviewees, such as Interviewee (W) has a different theory. Although she 
acknowledges that financial resources are important, she maintains that they are not the only 
resources that social movements in general and the PWMs in particular can operate. She 
provides a scenario where despite the limited financial resources, ideological framing is able to 
reach out to the grassroots and inspire their collective action. With regard to financial resources 
vis-à-vis human resources, she says:      
Financial resources135 are an important factor but they are not the main factor. Our Palestinian 
experience proves this because even though we started with very minimal financial resources, we 
were able to mobilize; finances are very important but the human dimension is a major one, the 
conviction of people in the importance of change has a great role. 
 
She further claims that funding is causing a serious dilemma and is threatening the very concept 
of contemporary Palestinian social movements including the PWMs. Funding is an obstacle that 
PWMs have to overcome and the best solution lies in redefining the mission of the PWMs on the 
basis of activism rather than services. She also warns against the hidden hands that manipulate 
the Palestinian scene, without mentioning a specific name or entity. According to Interview (W) 
such entities utilize funding as a pressure mechanism:        
Funding for us is a dilemma, an influencing factor and an obstacle that breaks us up. You can 
certainly feel that it is a tactic that is meant to keep us running round in circles. I think as a result 
women and their social activism should never be separate from activism of the society as a whole, 
to avoid having them, I men PWMs, submit to the influences of funding. Now that we are back 







Finally, Interviewee (H) states that the PWMs should put more emphasis on the human 
element and argues that the PWMs should concentrate more on the role of mobilizing human 
resources and the grassroots, and put less emphasis on financial resources, and gradually become 
resource-dependent: 
Clients are different from both sides, but we want to haggle on the ones that are more interested in 
creating convictions, national, and social and women convictions; we will still have people who 
will only come for services, but that is only because they need our services. If we had a structured 
society with strong organizations and well-established government organizations that provide 
social insurance, medical insurance and sufficient education, people would not need to come to 
women organizations for help.  
In line with the dialectic relationship between funding and the capacity of the PWMs to 
mobilize presented by Interviewee (W), Interviewee (C) lists the pros and cons of the 
contemporary PWMs and gives an account of how these pros and cons affect the PWMs’ 
capacity to mobilize the public and inspire collective action. She points out other resources that 
the PWMs should reconsider in order to regain their ability to mobilize, including good 
communication skills, and the ability to provide services that meet the needs of the targeted 
group. While having a charismatic personality is desirable, it seems to be losing its attraction in 
light of a more communicative type of leadership: 
Reaching out to the roots, staying in touch with them, communication and making sure that our 
programs meet the needs of people, the charisma started losing a lot of its influence. It does have 
an effect when someone has a strong leadership personality with strong communication skills, it is 
important to reach out to people, but this does not guarantee the sustainability of the organization.  
Humility, communication skills, and providing the right services are more important than having a 
strong leadership personality. As for organizational structure, we are still in the process of setting 
strong foundations for our work, and this affects the ability of the organization to communicate 
and continue. 
 
Yet another participant, Interviewee (M) re-asserts that the capacity to frame, and thereby 
legitimacy, is derived from the ability to attract the biggest members of the grassroots regardless 
of the outcomes. She indicates that the framing mechanisms adopted by the PWMs are focused 
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on quantity rather than quality. To illustrate, she cites GUPW as an example and explains that, 
while this union is able to attract big number of members, the quality of those members and 
whether they can really absorb the philosophy of the GUPW are rather questionable.  
I would say that framing mechanisms nowadays are centered on number and not on quality. For 
instance, the GUPW can easily enroll 500 members, but when I look at these members, I do not 
see the quality. I always look for members who can deliver the message of the GUPW. I always 
look for members who have charisma; I always look for members who can promote the mission 
and ideology of the GUPW; however, I do not find them they are nowhere to be found. If you ask 
me why, I will tell you why: it is because they are absorbed and motivated to enroll in women’s 
organization that promote a progressive feminist agenda.  These women are able to communicate 
and deliver the vision of a progressive feminist agenda. 
This excerpt clearly shows that Interviewee (M) stresses the concept of quality, though, 
she reflects negatively on the unpleasant reality of the PWMs that place more emphasis on 
quantity at the expense of quality. Her disagreement and dissatisfaction were quite apparent in 
her demeanor and tone of voice during the actual interview. What remains to be explored is the 
motivation behind women’s decision to join the PWMs. This in fact is the focus of the next 
segment of my analysis.    
To bring this theme to a conclusion, it is important to note the transformation or the 
transitional stages that the PWMs went through. As the majority of my participants have 
indicated, the PWMs are in a race for survival, and that is the main reason why they have 
modified their goals. My participants have emphasized that the capacity of the PWMs to 
mobilize resources stems from their ability to mobilize the grassroots and have acknowledged 
funding and financial resources as major factors of the PWMs’ capacity to mobilize. And due to 
the specificity of the Palestinian situation, the ability of the PWMs to mobilize financial 
resources is integrated with PWMs ability to mobilize other resources. 
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Financial Grassroots  Media Cultural 
The type of resources PWMs can mobilize: financial resources take priority while the capacity of 
grassroots mobilization especially through ideology is taking a secondary status, finally the PWMs have a 
diminished capacity to mobilize the media and at the bottom come cultural resources.  
The continuous arrow (              ) denotes the strength of the direction of the relationship. 
The dashed arrow (                 ) denotes the weakness of the direction of the relationship.  
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V. e. 2. Motivations for joining the PWMs 
In the previous segments I have discussed the different points of view of my participants 
in relation to the capacity PWMs to mobilize resources, especially non-financial resources. In 
this segment of my analysis I will focus on the motivation of Palestinian women to join the 
PWMs. The majority of my study participants emphasized ideology as a master frame that 
motivated the PWMs and the PNM to mobilize the grassroots. However, it is important to 
understand the perspective of the Palestinian women and what stimulates them to join the 
PWMs. 
Another time, we face difficulty due to the variety of opinions among my participants 
regarding what motivates Palestinian women to join the PWMs. These opinions cover a range of 
possibilities: personal motivation, financial necessity, national aspirations, the search for identity 
and a sense of belonging. For instance, Interviewee (Q) claims that the majority of women are 
motivated by their various needs and often by their need to identify with the aspirations of the 
various PWMs. These needs, as elaborated on by the participant, vary from one woman to 
another and from one PWM or one women’s organization to another. She illustrated with an 
example of motivating you women from Arab Al-Rashideh136   
Women join [PWMS) motivated by their needs, which might be social, financial and cultural. For 
example, a number of women may want to join the workforce, but they are faced with the 
dilemma of leaving their kids behind with their in-laws or other family members. If an 
organization were to find a kindergarten where women could leave their kids in and go out to 
work, then women would join this organization to benefit from its services. In this case, the 
organization would be answering a social and a personal need. 
                                                            




Another example comes from [Arab] Al-Rashaydeh, where we have established illiteracy 
alleviation classes, we have girls who join who are in their twenties and feel the need to be 
enrolled in such classes.  
Another participant, Interviewee (C), argues that although it might be true that different 
women have different motivations to join the PWMs, it is not unusual that the majority of these 
women have common denominators in their aspirations to join the PWMs. These aspirations 
center on self-fulfillment, searching for identity and fighting the occupation. Her point of view is 
illustrated by the following quote:   
If you drew a sample you would find some differences in the motivations of each woman to take 
part in civic engagement. But I think that our Palestinian women’s activism involves self-
fulfillment, emphasis on identity and the sense of belonging, and fulfilling ambitions. In addition 
to the most important goal which is performing a duty of fighting an occupation that is threatening 
our livelihood and our very being, our children, our future, and future generations. I think that is 
the greater goal in addition to the ones I just mentioned and, group dynamics. 
Other participants maintain that some women join the PWMs in search for personal 
freedom and as a means to overcome cultural customs and traditions.  For instance, Interviewee 
(A) indicates that different women took different paths to achieve their personal freedom. She 
claims that women’s rights were overshadowed by the nationalist agenda, which was a 
disappointment for some activists within the PWMs. She also indicates that contemporary 
Palestinian women are more aware of their rights; the fact that helps them to stay focused on 
their feminist aspirations and yet at the same time avoid any conflict with their nationalist 
aspirations. She highlights the disappointment that women suffered from the establishment of the 
PA, and how their role was diminished, and the lasting effects this had on them. Consider the 
quote below from Interviewee (A): 
What motivated Palestinian women to take part in the women’s movement(s) was a search for 
personal freedom, participation in the national struggle and in shaping a society which gives more 
freedom to people. Nowadays people are taking different paths: some are looking for their 
identity, whether feminist or nationalist; other people are still targeting the nationalist agenda 
exclusively.  Needless to say, that there are still some who are aiming at financial gains. 
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In the past, women’s rights were unrecognizable in the midst of national rights and general 
agenda. Women were under the false impression that their rights were recognized, and that any 
gain on the national level would reflect on them. After the arrival of the PA, women found that 
they had been used by the nationalist movement to reach certain goals, and that the true ideology 
of the nationalists was patriarchal and did not recognize women’s rights. As a result, women were 
left with nothing and this was the main reason behind the separation between the nationalist 
movement and the women’s movement(s). Nowadays, women have more awareness and are able 
to differentiate between their rights as women and their national rights. 
A very interesting account of women’s motivations to join the PWMs and embrace their 
aspirations comes from interviewee (H), who gives a colorful example of how the Palestinian 
specificity stimulated women to become active members of the PWMs. She also describes the 
programs offered and sponsored by the PWMs and their satellite organizations, which were 
supposed to address the needs of Palestinian women. She attributes some of the needs to the 
occupation and the absence of a state or an authority that takes care of the daily needs of the 
society, particularly women. It was such an atmosphere that gave momentum to the PWMs and 
their organizations to mobilize the public. In addition, it was such an environment that created 
mediums for the PWMs to promote their visions, aspirations, and programs, and thereby, 
creating incentives for the Palestinian women to join these movements. Look at the excerpt 
below that illustrates Interviewee (H)’s point of view regarding the motivation for women to join 
PWMs: 
I would say her [a Palestinian woman’s] needs; for example, in the 1970s we suffered illiteracy 
among women. And if you ask why was that? I would say it was a result of the occupation. You 
may have noticed from your research that when Israel occupied the WB, GS, & EJ, they did not 
establish schools in the villages or deserted areas. 
A lot of families in the countryside did not send their daughters to study in the city because of 
their cultural customs. For example, someone from Ta’amreh137 would not send his daughter to 
study in Beit Sahoor, or someone from Walajeh would not send his daughter to study in Beit Jala. 
So education was limited to males only, giving them freedom to move, from a cultural 
perspective. The absence of girls’ schools in the countryside led to the need to establish illiteracy 
                                                            
137 Ta’amreh, Beit Sahoor, Walajeh and Beit Jala are villages and towns within the district of Bethlehem, in the 
central WB, south of Jerusalem. See Appendix (A).  
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alleviation classes for young girls. This was a systematic plan form the Israelis to create an 
illiterate Palestinian society, to enable them as an occupying power to control our community. The 
lack of schools did in fact result in having illiterate women among the Palestinians. 
Another example is the unavailability of child and mother care centers. The lack of such centers in 
villages and deserted areas, forced women to come to the city for the services they needed. In light 
of the difficulty of movement for women, this led to the deterioration of the public health of 
women and children. So creating women and child care centers in deserted areas is among the 
necessities for Palestinian women. 
Moreover, early or even underage marriage among women resulted in lots of complications for 
women especially health-wise. There were no advocacy centers for such women. Women need to 
be aware and informed about such decisions, their implications and should receive counseling on 
how to deal with this cultural trend of underage marriage. 
Such necessities motivated women to get involved in the PWMs.  
That of course is in addition to the brutality and the injustice of the occupation, its discriminatory 
policies and inhumane practices. It stimulated the need among women to be part of the women’s 
frames and be part of the PWMs and learn skills of how to resist occupation. Furthermore, the 
increase in the number of detained male bread-winner in the family made women play roles of 
both the mother and father, to be the supporter and bread-winner in the family. Women assumed 
multiple roles, and so they were looking for advocacy on how to organize their multiple roles. 
This is when the women’s frames and the women’s organizations kicked in from the mid-1970s 
until the end of the 1988 – 1989, which I consider to be the end of the First Intifada. These frames 
and organizations directed women on how to organize their lives and initiate micro projects such 
as gardening, popular learning, getting enrolled in literacy classes and visiting public health 
clinics. All of this addressed some of the needs of Palestinian women. 
Interviewee (H)’s account of the political opportunity generated by the occupation is 
quite informative. She depicts the brutal nature of the occupation, and gives a detailed example 
of how the occupation forced many women to become the bread winners of their families. It was 
then that the PWMs took advantage of the political opportunity, which resulted from the absence 
of a national entity that satisfied the basic needs of the Palestinian family, namely women. 
However, as Interviewee (H) indicates, alongside the services provided by some PWMs and their 
satellite organizations, political and ideological framing was there functioning in the heart of the 
collective action sponsored by the PWMs.  
Whether the needs were basic or personal that inspired Palestinian women to join the 
PWMs, it is obvious from my participants’ accounts that different PWMs and their satellite 
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organizations responded differently to the needs of the Palestinian society in general, and the 
needs of the Palestinian women in particular.  It is hard to say that some PWMs had advantage 
over the others, or that some organizations had advantage over the other, or even a program over 
the other. It is important to mention, though, that the PWMs were successful in responding to the 
different needs of the Palestinian women, which translated into the motivation for these women 
to join the different PWMs. 
To bring this point to a conclusion, it is obvious that the Palestinian women’s aspirations 
to join the PWMs varied. It is perhaps also valid to say that it is hard if not impossible to 
undermine any PWM or its satellite organization, especially in relation to their role in meeting 
the diverse needs of Palestinian women. However, the interesting question that poses itself is: 
Could the PWMs have been more effective in responding to the needs of the Palestinian women? 
I will use the last question to introduce the next segment of my analysis which focuses on 
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The different motivations behind women’s enrolment in the PWMs or their satellite organizations. These 
motivations ranged from the personal to economic reasons.  
The continuous arrow (               ) denotes the strength of the direction of the relationship. 





V. e. 3. PWMs’ networking capacity. 
Having discussed the reasons that motivated Palestinian women to join the PWMs, I will 
now investigate the capacity of PWMs to network. I have previously in established in chapter 
five that there are multiple PWMs. I have also established that the presence of multiple PWMs or 
women’s organizations does not necessarily eliminate the possibility that common denominators 
might appear that bring these movements or organizations together, even in the absence of a 
unified and clear women’s agenda. This point is the theme of the segment of my analysis. 
During my interviews with my study participants, some of them stressed the fact that 
there are common denominators among the PWMs themselves and the PNM that can bring them 
all close to each other, no matter how far they shift from each other. Some also claimed that 
PWMs networking went beyond the geographical boundaries of Palestine to include regional and 
global movements.  
In the following excerpt, Interviewee (A) explains that the PWMs should be more active, 
especially in networking with Arab and other regional women’s movements. She argues that the 
PWMs should take the initiative and refrain from being on the receiving end only:  
Palestinian women’s movements should be active and Palestinian women should work to present 
action plans, suggestions, and to form a Palestinian feminist vision. It is worth noting that we 
share a great deal of our vision with other Arab women; however, we cannot always be on the 
receiving end.  The problem is that whenever we receive something from the West, we want to 
adopt it and merge it into our agendas in order to get funding. We have to form our own vision as 
Palestinian feminists. 
However, when raising the question about the presence of a unifying entity for the 
PWMs, Interviewee (C) explains that the dispersed nature of the PWMs worked against their 
desire to have effective networking in an attempt to unify the PWMs. She explains that even the 
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General Union for Palestinian Women cannot claim that it is the sole representative of 
Palestinian women. Although it is true that the GUPW was founded by the PLO in 1965 as an 
umbrella for Palestinian women and as the representative organ for Palestinian women, a close 
look at it shows that it lacks the capacity to mobilize the grassroots. According Interviewee (C), 
the GUPW does not have comprehensive programs that address the needs of every Palestinian 
woman, and lack the capacity to mobilize women regardless of their backgrounds. These 
weaknesses diminish GUPW’s capacity to be a true umbrella for all women in Palestine.  
I can say that the GUPW is only part of the PWMs and is contained by the PWMs and not the 
other way around. As I said, it is part of women’s activism and/or the PWMs in the Palestinian 
society. I cannot say that it represents all Palestinian women. To be able to promote themselves as 
representatives of Palestinian women, they have to reach women wherever they are, and work with 
them, mobilize them and frame them ideologically. No one can claim that they are the sole 
representative of women in Palestine, whether the GUPW or the WATC or whatever organization 
that mobilizes and frames women ideologically in Palestine. They cannot say they represent 
everyone; each one of them represents a part of the spectrum and not everybody.  
On the other hand, Interviewee (J), among some other participants, believes that there is a 
safety net for the PWMs and it always brings them together: the nationalist agenda that the 
PWMs share with the PNM. For her, Palestinian nationalism functions as a master frame that 
brings and has always brought all the PWMs together. According to her, this safety net, 
comprises the following aspects: ending the occupation, and unifying efforts to establish the 
Palestinian state and reforming the personal laws. She actually stratified them based on their 
priority. While these three aspects may sound as an agenda, Interviewee (J) perceived them 
simply as means of cooperation. 
First, getting rid of occupation; second, declaring the State of Palestine; third passing binding laws 




In contrast, Interviewee (H) believes that effective networking is an outcome of close 
collaboration among the PWMs or their organizations. She also maintains that effective 
networking strategies should not alienate the role of the public sector or the authorities. In 
addition, it should include the different ministries of the PA, especially those ministries that 
provide services that enhance women’s daily living circumstances.  She further argues that the 
PWMs’ roles, as NGOs, should be integral to the role of the government and the public sector: 
Our belief is that to achieve suitable development, we need to coordinate our work as NGOs and 
as the public sector with the government, because we believe that we complement each other. For 
instance, the Ministry of Local Governance has a complementary role with the GUPW and is 
complementary to any other organization. So as women or as a women’s organization, we need 
infrastructure such as roads, clean water, and sewage, etc. Therefore, there should be 
coordination between us as PWMs organizations and the different ministries.  
Let us take the Ministry of Health as an example; as PWM organizations we need to have centers 
for child and mother care in deserted areas; we need vaccinations for young children, fertility and 
maternal health. So we need close coordination and open communication channels with the 
Ministry of Health. 
If the coordination between the ministries and the PWMs organizations is absent, we will not be 
able to achieve change for women. So, I say there is coordination, and it is a necessity. It’s not 
only narrowed down to the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA), but other vital ministries, 
namely the Ministry of Health, especially when it relates to issues like fertility, maternal health, 
premature delivery prenatal care, and under-age marriages. For instance, with Ministry of Local 
Governance we have departments for women in the Ministry and in the districts we coordinate on 
all these aspects, and have active network with other ministries. 
 
On the other hand, for other participants, effective networking among the PWMs should 
come through initiatives, even if they are individual initiatives. Interviewee (E), for instance, 
gives an example about a league that women’s organization and district offices of the PWMs 
established in Bethlehem area in 1998. The goal of the league was to coordinate the efforts of all 
NGOs and organizations that target women in Bethlehem district, and present them as a 
pressuring group advocating women’s rights at the local and national levels. She further 
elaborates that the league was open to collaboration among all the PWMs and their umbrellas, 
namely the GUPW, to achieve their goals.  
198 
 
The GUPW in conjunction with the PWMs and women’s organizations is more capable of 
mobilizing the public and the grassroots. One example is Bethlehem area: we established a body 
that represents all women’s organization that are working in Bethlehem in 1998 and it included 17 
different women’s activism organizations that work in the area, and we called it the Women’s 
League. The main goal for this body is for the 17 organizations to work closely with each other to 
address the common concerns of Palestinian women since 1998.  We consider ourselves pioneers, 
other organizations in other districts are taking us as a model because of our success. This 
initiative brought everyone working in the field of PWMs, women’s activism and feminism closer 
and unified their efforts to serve Palestinian women in more effective ways. We are working to 
address the public and major concerns of Palestinian women. This league is more capable of 
mobilizing the public and the grassroots, in comparison to MOWA and the PNA in general” 
She further elaborates on the goals and objectives of the league, and gives indicators for 
the successes from her point of view. She believes that mobilizing the grassroots around 
concerns that are considered taboo, such as addressing issues of incest, sexual abuse, and 
domestic violence, in a conservative society such as the Palestinian society is vital.  
Moreover, I can tell that because while working in the league, we worked on the issue of child 
molestation and adopted a couple of cases and mobilized the public. Such a case is considered a 
taboo in our society and perhaps you know about these things138. We mobilized the public to end 
child molestation and incest139, especially with young girls. The first rally had a relatively high 
rate of participation which was 1000 participants, both men and women. People were surprised at 
our ability to mobilize the public. 
 
Interviewee (E) actually confirms s what her fellow Interviewee (H) said in relation to 
mobilizing the grassroots, raising their awareness, and widening their horizon about social 
matters that are considered taboos in a conservative society. 
To bring this subsection to a conclusion, it is fair to say that the PWMs capacity to 
network is likely to face challenges and constraints, some of which are enforced by the 
patriarchal and conservative nature of the Palestinian society. However, the major challenges are 
                                                            
138 She means, me, the researcher.  
139 Meaning, sexual activity between an adult family member and a minor from the same family. The Webster’s 
dictionary define “sexual intercourse between persons so closely related that they are forbidden by law to marry; 




posed by the PWMs themselves; given the fact that the majority of these women movements 
and/or their organizations are affiliated with different factions of the PNM. Being affiliated limits 
PWMs ability to network with each other, especially in view of the different backgrounds and 
ideologies of the PNM factions. Nevertheless, as several of my participants have indicated, the 
nationalist fundamentals, namely, freedom and a sovereign state will always function as unifiers 
and momentums for networking.  
It could also be said that networking among the PWMs is inspired by individual events 
that occur locally or regionally rather than by unified goals, visions, or agenda (assuming the 
existence of an agenda) as admitted by the majority of my participants. Nonetheless, the absence 
of a unified goal or vision does not necessarily preclude the fact that there are initiatives to 
network among some PWMs or women’s organizations. Initiatives of this sort are quite likely a 
step in the right direction.  
A very good example of an initiative taken to propose a model of effective networking is 
the League of Women that was established in Bethlehem area in 1988. The success of the league 
inspired other women’s organizations in different areas of Palestine to adopt the same model. 
What remains to be seen is whether effective networking is viable in the absence of a unified 







V. e. 4. Women-oriented Agenda: 
In the previous segment I presented the different points of view in relation to the PWMs’ 
capacity of networking. In this sub-segment, I will focus on the presence of a women-oriented 
agenda for the PWMS. If we can show that there are common denominators between the PWMs 
and the different women’s organizations that bring that bring all of them together, can it be 
presumed that there is a women-oriented agenda that the PWMs advocate and disseminate? 
Similarly, assuming that we accept the argument that women’s activism in Palestine does not 
rank to the level of a movement, can it be said that the presumed women’s agenda is valid? In the 
absence of one unified movement, and in the absence of an entity that can serve as a unifying 
body for women’s activism in Palestine, can a women-oriented agenda be assumed to exist?   
In this section I will attempt to ascertain the capacity of women’s organization in 
Palestine, assuming they are movements, to deliver a women-oriented agenda. Looking back at 
the responses of my participants in this regard, some were cautious about talking about the 
PWMs being a movement in the sociological sense, but did not deny the existence of some 
initiatives by some women’s organizations to formulate a women-oriented agenda. Such 
initiatives, according to some participants, are likely to be successful and can possibly lead to an 
agenda that can unify women’s activism in Palestine.  
In this regard, Interviewee (Q) claims that there have been some attempts by some 
women activists to push towards the foundation of a unified feminist ideology. According to her, 
the key for success for such an initiative is achieved independently of a nationalist perspective. 
However, she shows some skepticism that such an attempt can be fruitful and lead to a solid 
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feminist agenda, especially in the light of the absence of a unifying body for women’s activism. 
The following excerpt illustrates her position: 
There are attempts and mobilizations by some of the feminist Palestinian women to shape a 
unified vision for the feminism ideology, in isolation from the political affiliation. There is a push 
for feminist activists to work together towards the greater good of Palestinian women regardless 
of their organizations. There is no clear agenda for the women’s movements in Palestine; even 
the General Union “GUPW” which is the umbrella that is supposed to address the needs of 
women, did not have a clear agenda.  Institutionalization of the women’s movements does indeed 
limit their achievements; it divided, weakened, and created separate visions for each 
organization. If women’s movements want to reach a wide base of people, they need to go 
through service oriented organizations. 
Such a claim is confirmed by other participants. Interviewee (M) claims that Palestinian 
women have not reached the level of maturity to reject the patriarchal dominance to give their 
rights and aspirations preference over other issues and perspectives. She agrees that there might 
be a unified vision on certain demands, even if such visions lack the mechanism that can turn 
them into reality:  
The problem is that women themselves have not reached that level of awareness yet; they are still 
living under patriarchal dominance. There are no unified goals for PWMs; there is unity on some 
demands, or some needs, but there is no clear shape for a unified vision for the demands of 
Palestinian women.  
Interviewee (A) is in agreement with Interviewee (M)’s position that there are no clear 
goals that can constitute a solid feminist agenda among the PWMs. She believes that there is an 
absence of a political will by the authorities, namely the PA, to push a feminist or a women’s 
oriented agenda forward. She raises a question about resource-dependence and claims that the 
political will in Palestine is controlled by the donors’ will. She further indicates that some 
women’s achievements were the result of the pressure imposed by external powers, namely, the 
donors, and not because the Palestinian society has reached the maturity level needed to support 
a women’s agenda. She even goes further to explain that, even the imposed (women’s) quota 
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system140 is a result of donors’ pressure. She does not feel that qualified women were placed in 
the appropriate position. The following quote (used previously)141 illustrates Interviewee (A)’s 
position:             
There is no clear agenda or goals for the women’s movement(s) and women’s organizations; 
instead, there are talks about political participation, social security and voting. Nonetheless, these 
are the basic goals and rights of a balanced civil society in general and not specific to women’s 
movement(s). Some of these goals were only achieved through the blessing of the political 
authority. For example, having a women quota of five female ministers in the government was 
only done through the blessing of the PNA and which in fact came as a response to the 
international donors’ pressure.  Even though women’s movements have been calling for this for 
years, even then, I do not think that the right women were appointed in the right positions.  
On the other hand, Interviewee (C), as well as other participants, argues that if we 
presume that there is no women’s agenda, it will be is inevitable not to recognize the efforts that 
have been invested in identifying the broad lines for a women’s agenda. She indicates that the 
period from 2008-2012 witnessed intensive cooperation among activists representing the whole 
spectrum of Palestinian political factions and their efforts resulted in identifying the milestones 
of a future agenda. She provides an example of the broad lines delineating such an agenda which 
gave much emphasis to women’s dignity, equal opportunity and the reform of the political and 
personal laws and legislations. Consider the excerpt below by Interviewee (C): 
I think that in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, we formed clear demands and specific priorities 
that the women -whether from FATAH, DFLP, PFLP, or the PPP or even enlighten women 
activists within HAMAS and the Islamic Jihad, and religious factions agreed upon. They 
demanded their dignity and justice, the elimination of discrimination in policies in legislative laws, 
and to try and reduce the negative image towards the Palestinian women.  The women leaders of 
HAMAS, the Islamic Jihad, FATAH, the DFLP, and the PPP all took part in this. When we meet 
in coordination committees, these are our demands and priorities. And if you do a survey on the 
heads of organizations or women societies asking for their priorities, they would list the priorities I 
just mentioned, accompanied by the need to support women in harmed places in occupied lands, 
education for poor students, bettering the condition of women prisoners and re-admitting them to 
the society, supporting college girls in continuing their studies, bettering the conditions of the 
working women, and ensuring at least the minimum wage. All in all there are around 8 priorities, 
                                                            
140 The quota system was adopted by the PNA to ensure the representation of minorities, among which women are 
141 Used previously on page 166. 
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which is what our agenda consists of. A survey of 100 women would show that they agree on the 
8 priorities I mentioned to you. 
I will end this section with a quote from Interviewee (H), who claims that against all 
odds, the PWMs do in fact have a nucleus, and a fertile seed for a women’s agenda. She 
maintains that the milestones of such an agenda are already set and that they stem from the 
nationalist aspiration to eliminate occupation and the declaration of a sovereign Palestinian state. 
According to Interviewee (H), the nationalist component of the women’s agenda serves as a 
unifier among all PWMs aspirations, and is a common denominator between the PWMs and the 
PNM, and serves as a unifier for all Palestinian factions.  
Interviewee (H) further explains that the agenda of the women’s frames142 is rather the 
dominant women’s agenda in Palestine, and not that of the women’s organization that provide 
service. She believes that the ideological segment of the agenda promoted by the women’s 
frames or women’s organizations which are satellites of nationalist factions makes such an 
agenda more popular among the grassroots. She also maintains that such an agenda is enduring 
and sustainable in comparison with an agenda that centers on addressing transitory needs. 
Finally, she emphasizes the fact that women’s agenda in Palestine does not mirror the feminist 
agenda in the West. Consider the excerpt below: 
On the contrary, I consider that we as PWMs have our own agenda, our Palestinian agenda and we 
have priorities, and as I mentioned earlier, we are the last nation in the world that is still suffering 
from occupation. Our own agenda is already set; it has its own dimensions and goals and clear 
message and vision. This agenda is clear, and its priorities are clear; as Palestinians we have a 
clear agenda ending the occupation, declaring the Palestinian state (repeated), establishing a 
society that enjoys social justice and establishing a society that is embedded in civil society, 
equality and equity between males and females, a sovereign state that has a binding law and 
promote social justice. So we have a clear agenda. 
                                                            
142 Women frames are organizations or committees within the PNM that specialize in mobilizing women and 
framing them ideologically.  
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Maybe the other Women’s movements that have different circumstances and aspirations, they 
might have a different agenda compared to ours, and does not have a clear vision, we have clear 
vision but they do not have one, or they might have a vague one. Each day they promote and 
mobilize for different aspects, one day they might be concerned with work force, the next day they 
promote technology, the following day they discuss globalization. They are disoriented. It is based 
on their necessities. 
It is not a gender agenda, we are not feminist143. We are accused of being feminist and that we are 
out of line. All of these are attempts to twist reality and give an unpleasant idea about our visions 
and aspirations as PWMs, and a method of denying our participation and sacrifices and 
achievements. It’s actually a distortion of our aspiration. 
Our agenda is clear and embedded in resisting occupation and establishing the sovereign state. It is 
relatively a clear agenda, but we always face accusation. I am sorry to say, these accusations are 
spread by ‘boutique’ owners that were established in the [post Oslo period] and that actually 
institutionalized this concept.144. They actually institutionalized the idea that the PWMs are out of 
line. They call for the disintegration of the culture and social customs.       
To sum up the key points in this segment, there was agreement among my participants 
that the nature of women’s activism in Palestine posed a challenge to PWMs and the women’s 
organizations and their ability to mobilize resources. But, there were varied opinions about the 
capacity of PWMs and their satellite women’s organizations to mobilize resources; in fact there 
some who rejected that such capacity even exists. In addition, the participants re-emphasized the 
centrality of funding and how it directly affected PWMs capacity to mobilize other resources. In 
some cases, funding was an obstacle to some women’s organizations’ ability to survive. 
Furthermore, Palestinian women varied in their aspirations motivations to enroll PWMs or in 
women’s organizations. Their aspirations and motivations ranged from satisfying primary needs 
such as health, education, and generating income, being convinced by the movement goals or 
program, to a means of self-fulfillment and being. In contrast, the political background of certain 
PWMs or their affiliation with PNM factions had an effect on the decision of some women to 
join or opt out of a PWM or affiliated organization. 
                                                            
143 It is important here to mention that she used the English term FEMINIST, meaning its conceptual and operational 
definition in the West.  
144 In other words, the misconception that the PWMs are “Gender Movements”. 
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As regards PWMs and their capacity to network, it was obvious that a frame that governs 
such cooperation is missing, except for individual initiatives by some organizations to organize 
their mobilization efforts and avoid overlapping. A good example of such efforts is the League of 
Women that was formed in Bethlehem area. The league aimed at organizing efforts and gave 
momentum to the women’s organization involved and enhanced their mobilizing and networking 
abilities.  
Finally, it is fair to say that the PWMs, or women’s activism, as some participants 
characterized it, lacked a well-defined agenda that has clear goals. The absence of a women’s 
agenda can be attributed to the very inexistence of a women’s movement in the first place. 
Women’s activism in Palestine is inspired by individual events that give momentum to women’s 
activism from time to time; however, the effect of such events wears out relatively quickly. One 
good example is the rallies that are organized after some criminal acts are done against women, 
such as child molestation, rape, and incest. As regards, the feminist doctrine, some participants 
questioned that such a doctrine rank to the level of an agenda. Looking closely at the doctrine 
and examining its background, objectives and goals, one can consider it as a seed for an agenda; 
nonetheless, since its declaration in Jerusalem almost 20 years ago, none of its goals have been 
attained. As indicated by one of the participants, the doctrine constitutes the foundation of any 


































In the making Obstructed 
 
Women’s Oriented 
Agenda as a Master 
Frame 
YES NO 
The continuous arrow (                   ) denotes the strength of the direction of the relationship. 
The dashed arrow (                ) denotes the weakness of the direction of the relationship.  
207 
 
V. F. Leadership Features  
In the last segment of the present chapter, I will focus on issues of leadership within the 
PWMs. The chapter started with a background note about the general climate and circumstances 
within which the PWMs were conceived, putting emphasis on the relationship between the 
PWMs and the PNM. Then I investigated the roots of that relationship, how it developed and 
where it stands now and what the predictions for the future are. Next I explored the nature of 
women’s activism and how it is perceived by women’s activists, women’s organizations’ CEOs 
and people in academia; thereby, paving the way to understanding the capacity of women’s 
activism to mobilize resources and linking that to the capacity of framing and mobilizing other 
resources. Finally, I examined women’s motivations to join the PWMs, the capacity of the 
PWMs and women’s organization to mobilize and network, and finally whether a women agenda 
exists.  
Having explored the previous themes and subthemes, it is important now to explore the 
role of leadership in PWMs. More specifically, it is important to examine the characteristics of 
the PWMs leadership and how that leadership affected the progress of women’s activism in 
Palestine. Moreover, several questions need to be answered in light of my participants’ opinions. 
How is the role of leadership within the PWMs and or their affiliate organization perceived? Can 
leadership function as a unifier of the efforts of the PWMs? A quick review of my participants’ 
stance in relation to this topic reveals that, indeed, there were pioneer leaders throughout the 
history of the PWMs and/or women’s organization. They further indicated that charisma played a 
major role; however, the question remains whether there was one specific character or a group of 
women that one can identify as the feminist leadership in Palestine.  
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It is important to point out that my participants were in agreement about certain 
individual women whom they thought could be the true leadership of the PWMs throughout its 
history. They asserted that these leader women enjoyed charisma and that it was this feature that 
distinguished them more than any other factor. According to them, charisma was the major factor 
in the perception of leadership rather than any factor that women activists in Palestine might 
have had over a certain leader. Throughout the history of the PWMs no woman was ever elected 
to represent Palestinian women even within the PNM factions; instead it was rather their 
experience and personal character that qualified them to the leadership of the PWMs or women 
activism organizations. 
For instance, Interviewee (B) asserted that, indeed, contemporary women’s movements in 
Palestine have qualified members whom she perceives to be the best candidates to assume the 
leadership of the PWMs. However, she stressed the importance and the centrality of charisma as 
a criterion for basing her decision on, in contrast with academic qualifications among other 
factors. She confirms that women pioneers are always present in the PWMs, even if they are not 
on top of the hierarchy.  
Leaders in women’s movements deserve to assume leadership, like Hanan Ashrawi. Amal 
Khreish and Zaheera Kamal. They have the capacity to represent Palestinian women. Some 
women leaders do not possess the capacity to lead but because of their academic degrees, they 
hold important positions within their organizations.  
 
Palestinian women’s charisma is derived from their resistance, their honesty and transparency in 
the Palestinian arena.  
 
We have women pioneers in Palestine in the women’s movements such as Samar Hawash of 
Nablus, Ahlam Alwahsh, Khawla al Azraq, Wijdan al Azzeh, and Nadia Harb, and many other 
women who have a long record in activism. 
Interviewee (C), among other participants, indicates that the early days of women 
activism in Palestine lacked true leadership. However, a true women’s leadership emerged with 
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the establishment of the PLO and the GUPW in the 1960s. She further explains that the women’s 
organizations affiliated with the PNM were more organized and had a clear structure that enabled 
them to have a clear hierarchy, and thus, a leadership. On the other hand, the charitable 
organizations were less organized and had no affiliation with the PNM, and their leaders came 
mostly from the elitist local families. Consider the quotation below:  
In the beginnings--it was a spontaneous, unorganized beginning in the general frame, maybe the 
structure did exist in the form of a structured organization with a good leadership, but in the 
general sense, it was spontaneous.  It started getting organized with the establishment of the PLO 
and the General Union for Palestinian Women. Political factions were organized by the PLO but 
the charitable organizations were organized through the General Union for Charitable 
Organizations, which gave women charitable organizations a structured form in the 1970s and 
1980s. 
This excerpt corroborates what Interviewee (B) explained earlier about the importance of 
charisma. However, she admitted that charisma has perhaps lost its importance in the 
contemporary PWM. For her, charisma is only one of the distinguishing characteristics of a 
leader, the others including effective leadership skills, communication skills and humility. She 
believes that the ability to communicate with people and mobilize them, as well as strong 
leadership skills, is more effective than having strong leadership skills only. She actually 
considers ability to communicate with people and mobilize them, as well as strong leadership 
skills, as an asset that enables organizations to mobilize and frame the grassroots, and thus, 
survive. Consider the quote below:    
[Characteristics of a leader include] reaching out to the roots, staying in touch with them, 
communicating and making sure that our programs answer to the needs of the people. Charisma 
started losing a lot of its appeal. It does have an effect when someone has a strong leadership 
personality with strong communication skills, it is important to reach out to people, but this does 
not guarantee the sustainability of an organization. Humility, interaction skills, providing the right 
services are more important than having a strong leadership personality solely. 
 
Yet another participant singles out the absence of true leadership among the 
contemporary PWMs. Interviewee (Q) explains that women’s organizations and women activists 
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in Palestine are aware of the gap in women’s activism leadership. Although she does not say that 
it directly, she indicates that women’s organizations are aware of the importance of leadership to 
the women’s activism organizations, and that is why some women’s organizations collaborated 
to launch empowerment programs. She illustrates this with an example of the collaboration of 
some technical women’s organizations with the GUPW to work on women empowerment and 
leadership.  
We were working on the concept of empowerment, through a lot of women’s organizations; for 
example The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy 
(MIFTAH)145, which is chaired by Hanan Ashrawi146. Women’s Technical Affairs Committee 
(WATC) and GUPW and other women organizations worked on preparing and empowering 
women, promoting the idea of women representatives. They promote women that have the 
capacity and skills to lead; moreover, this organization promotes these ideas among men as well as 
women. 
On the other hand, Interviewee (M) criticizes the leadership of the PWMs and is 
uncertain whether the current leadership of the PWMs is a true leadership that came about on the 
basis of merit or democratic elections. While she does not deny the importance of qualification, 
she stresses the importance of democratic elections in the choice of a leader. She also expresses 
her skepticism about the credibility of the quota system. She argues that it is important for the 
PWMs leadership to be the outcome of free elections and by acclamation as a result of the quota 
system: 
                                                            
145 MIFTAH, Arabic acronym which means ‘key’, stands for The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global 
Dialogue and Democracy. It was founded by Hanan Ashrawi in 1998. Its mission is to promote: “An independent, 
democratic and sovereign Palestinian state, which grants Palestinians their basic rights, preserves their dignity, and 
enjoys international recognition and respect.” (www.miftah.org, 2013). 
146 Hanan Ashrawi: eminent Palestinian politician, and former professor of English literature at Birzeit University 
(BZU). She was a member of the Palestinian delegation to the peace conference in Madrid in 1991. She was elected 
twice to the PLC in 1996, and 2006. She assumed the position of the Minister of Higher Education and Minister of 
Tourism in the first and the second Palestinian governments respectively. She is now CEO of The Palestinian 
Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, known by the acronym MIFTAH. 
(www.miftah.org, 2013; www.pal-plc.org, 2013, www.plc.gov.ps, 2013; www.PASSIA.org, 2013).       
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Women are assigned leadership position because this is mandated by the donors. There 
are examples of women assuming positions, not because they are qualified, but because it 
is a condition for receiving funding from the donor. Let me pose this question: What is 
the percentage of women activists in the PWMs and within the Palestinian workforce? 
Less than 14%. This number includes women in the service industry, education and 
health, in addition to a few in leadership positions … Women are engaged in the 
Palestinian workforce not because the society is convinced of their capacity, but rather 
because of the financial needs of the family… Let me say this: I see women in leadership 
position and sensitive positions as a contentment policy by the government and the PNM; 
that is to give a good impression about myself as a government or as a PNM faction, I 
will assign you, as women, in some leading position; however, these positions are not the 
most sensitive ones. For example, the PNA assigned a woman as a Minister of Education, 
maybe as a Minister of Health, these are service miseries in their nature, but you would 
not find a woman as the Minister of Defense or as the Minister of Planning. Yes, she is 
the Minister of Tourism, and this way the PNA knocked two birds with one stone; she is 
part of the women’s quota and from the Christian quota. Let me elaborate more, I would 
respect Hanan Ashrawi as a senator more if she was elected for the person she is. But I 
know she was elected because she fulfills the women’s quota; she was also elected as part 
of the Christian quota. With all due respect to her and her long history as a nationalist and 
feminist, but she did not get to this position because people are convinced with her 
activism and her mission, vision and philosophy, but rather because she is a figure in a 
political monopoly. 
This excerpt from Interviewee (M) could be interpreted as a criticism of the lack of 
leadership in the PWMs, and that it is not as binding as it should be. She also makes reference to 
the balance of power between the PWMs and the PNM. However, she maintains that if there 
were an effective leadership among the PWMs or their organization, women’ status in Palestine 
would be different and indeed the whole scene would be different. 
To sum-up this segment, it would not be unfounded to conclude that in the contemporary 
PWMs there is a real gap in their leadership. Yet, despite the existence of a handful of women 
pioneers in the PWMs, be they activists or CEOs of women’s activism organizations, and even 
though they may enjoy charismatic personalities, my participants claimed that none of them 
could be perceived as the true leader of the contemporary PWMs. Some participants even went 
to the extreme to say that women are in leading position, whether in the PWMs, the PNM or in 
the PNA government, just because it was mandated by an external force, namely, the donors.  
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V. g. Chapter Conclusion  
In this chapter I attempted to assess the participants’ perspectives about the themes 
prescribed in my interview questions. Throughout this chapter, I was able to capture the variety 
of opinions proposed by my participants about PWMs concerns, insights and perspectives. I was 
able to capture and analyze my participants’ standpoints about the thematic relationship between 
the PWMs and the PNM which constitutes the core goal of my study. Moreover, I was able to 
investigate their different stances about the roots of the relationship between the two movements. 
Furthermore, I was able to assess the participants’ diverse insights about the contemporary 
relationship between the two movements and how they can be used to predict the future of this 
relationship. 
Moreover, my study focused on the perceptions of Palestinian women’s activists and 
CEOs of Palestinian women’s organization, as well as people in academia, regarding the nature 
of women’s activism in Palestine and whether or not they considered it as a movement. The 
activists and the CEOs’ answers were worthy of further deliberations regarding the nature of 
women’s activism in Palestine, and opened the floor to the debate regarding the capacity of 
women’s activism to mobilize the various resources and gain legitimacy.   
In this chapter, I was able to deliberate on the ability of the PWMs and their satellite 
organization to network among themselves as well as with other social movements. I also tried to 
investigate whether the PWMs and their satellite organization were able to devise a Master frame 
for women’s concern in comparison with the nationalist frame as an existing master frame 
whether for the PWMs or the PNM.   
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Finally, my chapter tried to investigate the leadership features and assess the effect of 
such features, if present, on the ability of women activism to mobilize the available resources. 
That being said, it is important to bear in mind that this chapter does not intend to re-define the 
history of the Palestinian struggle, or the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflict, nor does it 
intend to delve into the perspectives of the Palestinian nationalist movement or provide 
documentation for them, their aspirations, or their achievements. Moreover, it is important to 
understand that the research in this study does not take a stance of a specific Palestinian political 
faction. What also is worthy to point out is that my study is in no way proposing a model for the 
women’s movements in Palestine, nor is it suggesting a miraculous remedy for the issues, 
obstacles, challenges, and concerns of Palestinian women. 
In addition, my study does not attempt to propose any form of comparison between the 
social movements and women’s movements in the East and the West. Moreover, throughout this 
study, I avoided engaging in any comparison between the perspective of the PNM towards the 
status of women in Palestine and the perspective of the women’s movement(s) towards 
themselves.  My study aimed at presenting the different points of views of my targeted 
population equally, without attempting to eliminate or exclude any particular perspective. I 
Essentially, I intended to emphasize the nature of the relationship between PWMs and PNM.  
It is quite important for me to clarify that my study did not discuss or plan to discuss 
feminism in Palestine. For women in Palestine the concept of feminism, known in Arabic as Al-
Harakah Al-Nisa’iyah Al-Harakat Al-Nisa’ieh]147 takes on a different meaning from what it 
denotes globally or particularly in the West. Consequently, I did not attempt in this chapter or 
                                                            
147 Arabic:  (الحركات النسوية) other form in Arabic is ( ئيةالحركات النسا )  
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throughout this dissertation to provide a definition of the concept of feminism, nor to attempt to 
criticize Western feminism, or propose a new definition based on participants’ points of view. 
Moreover, this chapter does not intend to provide a definition of feminism as it is perceived in 
the East, nor to engage in a comparison of what is meant by feminism in the East and the West. 
In certain instances, the term Palestinian feminist movement is used interchangeably with 
the term Palestinian women’s movement(s), as it was done by the informants in this study.  The 
researcher’s understanding of their use of the term Palestinian feminist movement is that it 
denotes women’s activism, or a type of social activism that is dedicated to Palestinian women 
and is carried out mostly by Palestinian women seeking the advancement of their fellow women 
citizens. Thus, the phrase Palestinian feminist movement as used by the study participants may 
be different from how that phrase is used by others, especially outside of Palestine.  When 
referring to Western feminist movements, the study participants often used the phrase gender 
movements. I noticed through my interviews that the concept gender148 movement(s) [Al-
Harakat Al-Jandarieh]149 is used to denote feminism in its Western perspective. My interviewees 
were referring to feminism and feminist movements in the West by using the term [Gender], and 
[Gender Movements]150.   
                       
 
                                                            
148 It is important to note that the concept gender in academic Arabic is used to denote the concept of social kind or 
in other definitions the social role associated with the biological sex. 
149 Arabic : (الحركات الجندرية) 
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VI. a. Discussion:  
This section will incorporate the major findings from the previous chapters and relate 
them to the theoretical framework included in my literature review.  
As mentioned earlier, the present study aimed to explore the thematic relationship 
between the PWMs and the PNM. It also aimed to explore the funding dynamics of the PWMs 
and investigated how funding relates to legitimacy in the Palestinian context. In addition, my 
study examined the nature of framing as carried out by the PWMs and determined their capacity 
to mobilize the grassroots. Finally my study analyzed the leadership characteristics among 
PWMs and explored how leadership relates to the women’s organizations’ capacity as 
movements to mobilize intangible151 resources, namely the grassroots. However, to get a better 
appreciation of the major study findings as presented in chapter (V), it is important to relate these 
findings to a theoretical framework.  
My study participants emphasized the fact that women’s activism in Palestine was 
disunited. Nonetheless, different people perceived this lack of unity in different ways. On the one 
hand, there were people who considered the status quo of the PWMs to be a healthy indication 
and a sign of variation; especially that they confirmed that there are common denominators that 
bring these movements, or organizations, together. On the other hand, other participants 
perceived this to be among the core obstacles that the PWMs have always encountered and still 
do. The PWMs were unorganized in the way they framed people, while their satellite 
organizations were lacked unity in the mobilizing resources. In other words, the lack of unity of 
                                                            




the women’s efforts was the reason of their weakness and their incapacity to mobilize the 
grassroots. Their capacity to network and communicate was diminished and the organizations’ 
methods to frame overlapped and resulted in a waste of resources and were perceived as an 
obstacle to forming a solid women’s movement in Palestine.  
However a related question can also be posed: can the diversity in the PWMs be 
presumed to be a healthy sign in the life of a movement? A quick look at the history of the 
PWMs reveals that the diversity in PWMs did not entail successful examples of a movement or a 
counter-movement, especially that the PWMs or the women’s organization in Palestine adopted 
nationalism as a master frame. The majority of these movement and their satellite organizations 
are in fact arms to the PNM. Nonetheless, is it possible to find an example of women’s activism 
that does not entail nationalism as a master frame? The answer is: yes, however, these activists 
and their women’s organizations were unable to push their master frame, i.e. a women’s frame, 
forward. Of course, resource mobilization theory explains that it is not unlikely that movements 
always create counter movements. In fact they do, and there are examples in the Palestinian 
scene of women’s organizations that promote themselves as rivals to nationalism as a master 
frame. Nonetheless, they were not able to extend their master frame.  
Based on the finding of my study, the construction of a women’s frame might be more 
viable in the presence of a sovereign state. That is, Palestinian women’s activism will prove 
more effective under a sovereign state with a ratified constitution in which women can mobilize 
to achieve more rights. Although the Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine 
pledged women’s equity and equality in the future state, one can anticipate that the future state 
will not function in alienation from its Arab conservative context. Such a projection can be 
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supported by the outcomes of two Palestinian legislative elections of 1996 and 2006 respectively, 
in which women failed to secure a fair representation.   
Another way to explain such an argument is from a disruptive innovation point of view; that is, 
the declaration of the State of Palestine any time in the future will mandate a new status quo. In 
other words, nationalism will cease to exist as the master frame under which the PWMs and 
other social movements mobilize, and thus the PWMs will have to look for a new master frame 
to mobilize and focus their activism.  Moreover, it is important to consider what other alliances 
will the PWMs be able to form, how would they mobilize around the new master frame, and how 
would they share or compete for resources. 
The indicators from my interviewees’ experiences actually give the sense of a co-
evolving nature of the relationship between the PNM and the PWMs. Put differently, the 
feminist identity of the majority of feminist and women’s activists emerged from, developed on, 
and evolved from the fact that they were active members of the PNM. However, a 
comprehensive look reveals that PNM and PWMs have a hierarchal type of relationship. It is 
rather obvious that the PNM, until only recently, has had the upper hand in this relationship. The 
PNM imposed the master frame on the PWMs, i.e. nationalism, and manipulated the resources in 
their favor, thus making the PWMs subordinate in this relationship. 
In some sense, both movements benefited from the master frame of nationalism. On the 
one hand, the PNM needed the women’s participation to gain legitimacy and push their 
nationalist framing forward. On the other, the PWMs utilized nationalism as a repertoire to 
promote their aspirations. Nonetheless, one can infer that since the relationship, or the 
220 
 
partnership, was hierarchal rather than equal, one movement benefitted from nationalism as a 
master frame more than the other. In this case, it was the PNM that got the most benefit.       
Now, how can one understand the future of the relationship between the PNM and the 
PWMs from a population ecology perspective? Can one predict that the PWMs would ascend to 
the top of the hierarchy of the relationship, thus replacing the PNM at the bottom or push the 
PNM down to the bottom? From my point of view, the PNM factions are in a transitional period 
of becoming political parties, and so, it is anticipated that they will lose their status as 
movements and will become political entities and potential recruits for the authority the PNA. 
The transformation of the PNM factions into political parties could clear the scene for the PWMs 
to be major players competing with the newly emerging movements. In other words, can one 
foresee the future of the PWMs and the PNM from a population ecology perspective in which the 
PNM will fade away and disappear in the background and the PWMs will rise?  
In such a scenario as envisioned above, how many women’s organizations can the 
Palestinian society support, and from a rather different but related perspective, how many 
women’s movements can Palestine and the Palestinian economy support? This is what can be 
explained as carrying capacity in population ecology. In other words, what is the level of support 
in the Palestinian society for having women’s organizations? As indicated in the previous 
chapter, there is a big need for women’s organizations. For instance, some indicators from my 
findings reveal that some women favor women’s organizations over nationalist organizations for 
reasons related to the local culture and traditions and customs. Others favor women’s 
organizations, and lean more towards joining them and embrace their philosophy and vision 
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because they believe that these organizations are getting funding and have flow of cash, 
especially from foreign donors.  
On the other hand, my data provides good indicators that the donors play a crucial role in 
determining the type of projects they want to support, with women’s organizations maintaining 
addressing women’s concerns as a priority; and thereby, giving women’s organizations and the 
PWMs (if we want to be less conservative) the capacity and the ability to have better chances to 
mobilize resources. That is, the legitimacy created by the donors152 provided the ideal climate for 
the Palestinian economy to sustain more of a certain type of movements, in the present case, the 
PWMs and their satellite organizations.  
To build upon, I will make use of the population ecology theory of rising and fading 
movements, I have to shed light on the nature of women’s activism in Palestine. In order to 
utilize population ecology theory to analyze the Palestinian example, I will use the concept of 
niche153. For instance, there are the master frames of occupation and nationalism. The question 
is, can one think of these two master frames as separate frames? Briefly, they are not; the two are 
actually intertwined, which in a way constitutes a big master frame creating a spectrum of 
opportunities for the different social movements.  
The other vital question that any organization should pose is: Can I as an organization 
carve a niche, or in other words position myself in that scenario of the big master frame? From a 
population ecology perspective, it would be the ability of these organizations to position 
themselves in the spectrum, carve their niche and mobilize resources accordingly. For instance, 
                                                            
152 Namely the USAID, and more recently the Europeans, but definitely not the Gulf States.  
153 An environment that has all the things that a particular plant or animal needs in order to live (Webster’s, 2013). 
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how can one understand the rise of these women’s organization which prompted themselves 
outside the master frame of nationalism? One can argue from a population ecology perspective 
that it is their ability to carve a niche within the big master frame of occupation and nationalism, 
in addition to their niche in the broader Palestinian society.  
On several occasions in my study I have visited the issue of whether women’s activism in 
Palestine is a movement. Now, from a definitional perspective, at what point does mobilization 
become a movement? At what stage in the development of an organization can it be considered a 
movement? Based on my findings and the indicators of my study, I am afraid that I would be 
posing the question rather than answering it.  
To answer whether women’s activism in Palestine is a movement, one should consider 
the component that the specific movement is focused on. Scholarships focus on different aspects 
of movements. For instance, Clemens (1993), (1996), (1997) focused on social movements as 
agents of change. On the other hand, Tilly (1993), (2004) focused on the contentious politics of 
social movements. He perceived social movements as modern means of social change. Tilly also 
acknowledged that such contentious politics can overlap with someone else’s interests, 
governments in most cases. Finally, Snow et al. (1991), focused in collectivities, grievances and 
collective actions in recognizing a social movement (Snow et al., 1991; Tilly, 2004; Clemens, 
1993).   
If we want to defragment the previous characteristics, we find that each one of these 
characteristics by itself is indeed applicable to the PWMs. Nevertheless, it is important to explore 
whether all these characteristics and criteria of a social movement can be aligned at the same 
time, and if so, are they able to rise women’s activism in Palestine to the rank of a movement or 
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not. Briefly, the grievances of the PWMs are actually about those of social change. On the one 
hand, PWMs mobilize nationalist grievances; on the other hand, women’s organizations in 
Palestine mobilize social-oriented grievances. Furthermore, the PWMs possess the contentious 
politics, as described by Tilly (2004).  
In addition, the PWMs mobilize on two scales. The PWM are challenging the occupation, 
through their nationalist agenda whilst mobilizing for their social agenda by challenging the 
PNA. In other words, the argument for the presence of political opportunities as described by 
Zald, Benford and Snow, Clemens and others is valid. However, the question is whether the 
PWMs are effectively taking advantage of these political opportunities or not. That is, PWMs 
may constitute an actual social movement based on their long standing history of activism and 
mobilization, but still it may be deemed an ineffective one.   
The availability of the political opportunities for the PWMs and women’s organizations 
enables them access to a variety of resources that they can potentially mobilize for their goals, 
among which are moral, cultural, social-organizational, human, and material resources. For 
example, PWMs affiliated with the PLO leftist factions embrace the cultural heritage of the 
Palestinian society, including celebrating religious occasions, both Islamic and Christian. 
Moreover, the PNM viewed religion as a repertoire to channel their framing ideology to the 
grassroots.  
The allocation and control of resources among PWMs plays a great role in the 
distribution of power among some of their satellite organizations and according to the patterns of 
conflict with each other. For example, women’s organizations affiliated with FATAH benefited 
from the resources that FATAH had access to as the dominant faction. Similarly, Social 
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Movement Organizations SMOs and women’s frames affiliated with HAMAS anticipated 
receiving the same benefits when HAMAS won the legislative elections of 2006 and formed the 
new government.  
Finally, as mentioned previously, the PWMs and the PNM had close ties and shared the 
same milestones and aspirations in their history, especially the nationalist aspiration. However, 
how can one predict the future of the PWMs in light of the possible transformation of the PNM 
from a movement to a political party? In other words, is it possible that a relationship that was 
based on competition over resources and even viewed as partnership will disappear in favor of a 
relationship that is based on a struggle between one entity mobilizing for its grievances, which is 
the PWMs and another entity that possesses the authority to withhold granting these grievances 
which is the PNM. An example from the present that would assist in analyzing this inference 
would be FATAH’s refusal to grant the PWMs, together with their different political affiliations, 
their demands. This refusal came at a time when FATAH had its affiliate organs that were 
mobilizing for women’s rights within a nationalist agenda.  
In this study I have explored the close relationship between the PWMs and the PNM and 
showed that the two movements are at a crossroads. Such a situation requires the PWMs to 
reconsider their alliances and partnerships, most particularly their longstanding relationship with the 
PNM. It would, therefore, be important to explore the options and limitations underlining any 
potential new alliances. In this instance, it would be necessary to consider occupation as a master 
frame in addition to its associated grievances, and how such a master frame would be able to secure 
the proper environment for new coalitions to emerge.  
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The question which remains to be answered is: What other social movements are PWMs 
able to join forces with, aside from nationalism, and within the Master Framework of 
occupation? As one of my participants explained, it is time for PWMs to explore other alliances, 
such as the youth, especially in light of the Arab Spring in the neighboring countries, and in the 
wake of the conflict between generations.  Although it is time to explore other Master Frames, 
occupation continues to be quite a viable option in this argument which can bring women and 
youth together as marginalized entities within the Palestinian society and the Arab World in 
general. In other words, when movements are stuck within a specific master frame, the issue then 
becomes who controls it.  The master frame of nationalism in Palestine has been dominated by 
(patriarchal/ male dominated) liberation movements, but since the understanding of the frame 
leads to strategies and tactics, there might be some sort of frame dispute. In the Palestinian 
example, it would seem to be between the PLO, mainly FATAH, the Leftist factions, and the 
conservative Islamist movements.  Accordingly, the issue that arises is, can women, and perhaps 









VI. b. Conclusion  
I will conclude my study with the following remarks about the PWMs: the relationship 
between the PWMs and the PNM, the capacity to mobilize resources and the argument about the 
presence of a women’s agenda as a master frame among the PWMs. After examining the 
relationship between the PWMs and the PNM, there appears to be significant evidence that the 
two movements have strong ties with each other. From a chronological perspective, the two 
movements have been going hand-in-hand for the past few decades. Nonetheless, can one 
anticipate that the future of the relationship will go in the same direction as it has been in the 
past?  
In spite of the assertion of the women activists that I interviewed on the equal affiliation 
that forms the relationship between the PNM and the PWMs, and that the relationship in fact 
ranks to the level of partnership, one can only question the authenticity of these convictions. It is 
obvious that the PNM holds the upper hand in the relationship. As indicated in my findings, the 
partnership took a hierarchal structure in which one was main, namely the PNM, and the other 
was subordinate, the PWMs, rather than an equal co-evolving notion. Despite the ups and downs 
that characterized the relationship between the PWMs and PNM together, the PWMs hang on to 
the PNM as a last resort to hopefully one day be able to achieve their demands.  
The question that begs itself is, when and if a solution to the Palestinian conflict is found 
and a Palestinian state is established with one governing authority, what would the fate of the 
PNM and PWMs partnership be? One of the conclusions of this study is that the national concern 
is the unifying factor between the PNM and PWMs. The national issue is the one factor that is 
able to fuse the two sides together, if everything else fails to. So with the assumption that this 
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concern is alleviated at some point in the future, what would the fate of the PNM be, what would 
the fate of the PWMs be, and what would the relationship between the PWMs and the governing 
authority be. PWMs have set the occupation as the barrier that needs to be overcome in order for 
them to regain the rights they are calling for. The PNM’s acceptance of the existence and the 
work of the PWMs is greatly related to the services and active work that PWMs perform in 
service of the national concern.  
Moreover, it would be an interesting area to explore as to what the standpoint of the 
PWMs would be if sovereignty for Palestinians is achieved. What would the launching point for 
their demands be, what would their priorities be, and what would the acceptance of the society be 
to them. Would the newly established state be able to address some or any of their demands 
through their laws, legislations and regulations, or would the PWMs have to start another 
struggle against the new authority, now that the issue that provided them legitimacy has 
vanished. 
It would be an appealing area of study to explore the readiness of the Palestinian 
community, with all its patriarchy and strong commitment to traditions and customs, to accept 
the new status quo that women are eagerly yearning for. Furthermore, is the PNM with its 
current position preparing the society for this change? Is it equipped with the needed personnel 
that are aware of the importance of change and of the concerns of women?  Most importantly, 
what efforts are the PNM and PWMs putting towards the investment in the youth of the 
Palestinian community, to instill within them the convictions of equality and partnership between 
men and women? These are the people who will be the nucleus of change and of a brighter future 
for the Palestinian women.  
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Moreover, how can one understand the relationship between the PWMs and the PNM 
from a resource dependence perspective? It is true that some of my participants viewed the 
relationship as a partnership, but the question that is important to answer is; does this partnership 
go beyond the nationalist burden? In other words, does this partnership extend to the ability to 
maintain resources and share them? I will argue that the partnership does not go beyond the 
nationalist burden, especially in an environment that is depicted by the scarcity of resources, 
namely financial. Although, few of my participants agreed that the PWMs and the PNM are, 
indeed, in a competitive relationship, it is important to understand how such competition affects 
the future of their relationship, if we agreed to call it a partnership. The argument that the ability 
to mobilize resources whether financial, cultural, media or grassroots, would lead both entities to 
a collision course is indeed still a valid one.  It is important to understand how the capacity of 
each movement to mobilize resources affects its chances to survive and continue.      
Since the signing of the Oslo Accords, the flow of cash and funding to the Palestinians 
has been transformed radically. As mentioned earlier, a study by the Palestine Economy Policy 
Research Institute (2008) revealed that the funding to the PNGOs has swollen in size and 
transformed in nature. Nationalist factions, and in turn their satellites, have lost their core 
funding in favor of a rising civil society and an organization emerging economy. That is, the 
private sector is being centered on NGOs that are able to attract funding, provide services to the 
public, and thereby are gaining more legitimacy and as result are gaining the ability to mobilize 
the grassroots. 
It is worth mentioning, although, that in the aftermath of the peace process, the majority 
of funding for the PA, the Civil Society in general, and the PWMs and their women’s 
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organization came from three major sources. First, the United States government through the 
USAID and its affiliate agencies and the Europeans through the European Union and its affiliate 
organizations. Second, the European Commission, the Euro-Med among other organizations, in 
addition to European governments on an individual basis. Finally, the third most important 
funding comes from the oil-wealthy states in the Gulf, namely, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the U.A.E 
and Kuwait154. However, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, US federal funds have become 
subject to very stringent conditions, including requesting recipients of US funds to sign the 
Terror Renouncement doctrine155. 
Moreover, the capacity of the PNM and their mirror PWMs to mobilize the grassroots has 
to be brought under question. For instance, the PNM has been mobilizing the Palestinian public 
politically and ideologically. However, the Arab-Israeli, and to be more specific, the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict has been going on for more than 50 years now and as yet is still waiting to be 
resolved. The peace negotiations have been going on for more than 20 years and as of this 
writing have not resulted in a peace treaty with the Palestinians. In view of these facts, one can 
only pose the question as to whether the slogans and the promises of a better tomorrow will still 
able to stimulate and attract the grassroots, or whether these same these slogans have already lost 
their potential  in the middle of an unending and bumpy political process.   
One of the conclusions of my study is that the nature of women’s activism in Palestine 
has never risen to the level of a movement. My study has raised the issue of when collective 
                                                            
154 The Gulf States’ money usually goes as direct deposits to the PNA.      
155 Also known as, AMENDED AND RESTATED MISSION ORDER NO. 21: Anti-Terrorism Procedures. 
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action becomes a movement. Unfortunately, I cannot provide a rational answer for that because it 
seems that this issue raises more questions than it provides answers.  
It is important that one poses the question regarding when the collective action carried 
out by a group of people, in this case Palestinian women, is mature enough to be considered a 
movement. A quick look at the history of the PWMs reveals that throughout their history, the 
PWMs have not reached that critical point at which one can consider their activism as a social 
movement. Their collective action was not structured in a master frame of a movement. In other 
words, they did not exert pressure enough to transfer their vision and goals to a master frame that 
would rank them as a movement.  
As a matter of fact, Palestine proves to be a unique example in which the master frame 
provides the fertile atmosphere for social movements to emerge. For instance the master frame of 
nationalism, which is a result of the occupation, has secured the necessary repertoires for 
different movements to emerge within the Palestinian scene, among which are the PWMs. In 
other words, it is the master frame of nationalism that potentiated the PWMs and other 
movements in Palestine, and not the various social movement that potentiated the master frame 
of nationalism. Such a claim can be supported by the presence of the different PLO factions, the 
conservative and Islamist movements which all have their affiliated PWMs and SMOs.             
As indicated in Chapter Five, women’s activism in Palestine has never moved beyond 
reacting to random events that surface up every now and then. According to Snow et al. (1991), 
social movements are: “one of the principal social forms through which collectivities give voice 
to their grievances and concerns about the rights, welfare, and well-being of themselves and 
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others by engaging in various types of collective action, such as protesting in the streets, that 
dramatize those grievances and concerns and demand that something be done about them” (p.1).   
An attempt to analyze the PWMs in the light of Snow and colleagues’ definition reveals 
that the components needed to establish a movement were available in the Palestinian context. 
For instance, the PWMs are defined groups; that is, they are a group of women and in some cases 
men who mobilize for certain grievances. The other component is about grievances and 
concerns, which, in the Palestinian case, are reflected in the demands for equity and equality of 
women’s rights. In addition, there have been incidents in the Palestinian history where the third 
component was in existence, namely collective action. A cursory look at the contemporary 
Palestinian history indicates that women have always been active in participating and organizing 
demonstrations and rallies in an effort to raise the public awareness about their rights and to 
challenge the authorities for the purpose of achieving their rights. Nevertheless, all these 
components, though theoretically sufficient to start a movement, did not come together to 
conceive a movement. So, again, one may consider the PWMs to be a movements, but they 
prove to be ineffective ones.   
It is important to bear in mind that the origin of resource mobilization raises the question 
of why some grievances result in a movement and some do not. It is the essential question of 
resource mobilization. While there are lots of grievances out there, only some of them result in a 
movement. In other words, there are more movements than there are successful ones within the 
Palestinian context. Zald and McCarthy’s (1978)’s deliberations centered on the capacity of 
these movements or organizations to mobilize resources. According to these researchers, the 
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grievances that do NOT succeed or NEVER mobilize enough resources, and the grievances that 
DO succeed, DO mobilize resources.  
It seems that everything flows from the answer to the core founding question of resource 
mobilization. I would argue that nationalism as a master frame has outstripped women’s issues 
from their capacity to mobilize resources. That is, women’s issues never grabbed the public 
attention sufficiently enough to allow it to become a frame. As I explained earlier, women’s 
activism in Palestine did not rise to the level of a master frame. It can be inferred as a frame 
dispute issue, meaning that one could conclude that PWMs were not able to frame women’s 
issues within the master frame of nationalism sufficiently enough. As Zald and McCarthy (2004) 
explained, the main reason for a movement to frame something is to get resources, because it is 
only with resources that they can be a movement. 
Building on the previous argument claiming the absence of a master frame, I will argue 
that women’s activism in Palestine lacks an agenda, or a master frame, that has a clear vision, 
philosophy and goals. Moreover, women’s activism in Palestine suffers from the absence of 
viable mechanisms and repertoires to turn this activism into an impactful force that is capable of 
achieving change. Based on my findings, what is present in Palestine are individual initiatives by 
organizations and charismatic women figures to stimulate an agenda. Organizational attempts are 
mostly mission statements of different organizations that might from time to time intersect with 
others on an institutional level. As for charismatic women’s initiatives, the evidence reveals that 
these figures are losing their influence, and therefore their initiatives are losing momentum to 
initiate change. Finally, these initiatives, whether by organizations or by charismatic figures, 
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have not been devised into a solid agenda that will serve as a master frame for a social 
movement.  
Finally, in the present study I have explicitly utilized literature and theories that focus on 
framing and framing theories, e.g., frame extension, frame amplification, frame transformation, 
and social enterprise. These theories were fundamental to my study. They provided my research 
with the theoretical and analytical framework that made my study viable. In the context of 
globalization and post globalization, utilizing these Western theories, will at a certain point lay 
the foundation to any future research.   
However, a critical perspective of my actual data analysis, which I conducted at a later 
stage of my study, reveals an interesting fact: The western theories are inapplicable to the 
Palestine context. This conclusion seems to be reasonable taking into consideration that these 
theories were developed in the West to account for phenomena existing in the West. Such an 










VI. c. Implications for Social Work Education and Future Research: 
Now, after presenting the major findings and conclusions of my study, it is important to 
demonstrate the implications of these finding and conclusions to social work and social work 
education. It is quite apparent from the results of my study, the methods and the general climate 
in Palestine that there have implications for social work and social welfare.  
There is a lack of studies dedicated to issues related to social movements in general and 
women’s movements in particular. Moreover, the higher education sector is not giving sufficient 
attention to social movements. A quick review of the curriculum of the social sciences 
departments at the various universities in Palestine reveals that courses that relate to social 
movements, social organization and social enterprise do not go beyond the introductory level.  In 
addition, even though there have been several attempts by the PWMs to cooperate with the 
public sector, these attempts have not gone beyond offering certain programs to social problems 
that surface up sporadically. 
A needs assessment should be conducted to explore the shortcomings of communication 
and cooperation between the PWMs and the related PNA ministries. Such an assessment can 
serve as a repertoire to explore means of cooperation between the two sides, and thus guarantee a 
more effective and sustainable development change in Palestine. Obviously, there is a great need 
for future research that would inspect and investigate the role of social movements, the PWMs, 
and civil society organizations in general, especially in light of the ambiguity that overshadows 
the role of these sectors and the lack of defined responsibilities and accountability that has 
become the norm in this field. Furthermore, process monitoring and outcome evaluation should 
be conducted with the current PWMs and their satellite organizations. These evaluations should 
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focus on redefining the role of the PWMs, as social movements, and their affiliate organizations 
in mobilizing the Palestinian grassroots, namely women.  
In addition, a plan should be devised in cooperation with the relevant authorities to 
stimulate social enterprise, especially in view of the economic crises that the PNA is passing 
through and the scarcity of resources. In order for the PWMs to develop and ascend to the level 
of a social movement, they should review their strategies for resource mobilization and give 
more focused attention to social enterprise. Another plan should aim to enhance the level of 
cooperation and to promote effective networking between the PWMs and their satellite 
organizations, among each other as well as with the concerned authorities. A needs assessment 
should explore the needs of the grassroots and respond to them and design programs to address 
them. An outcome evaluation should also be conducted to assess the efficiency of women’s 
organizations’ sponsored programs and test their viability in addressing the grassroots needs.  
Such cooperation should be seen as a step in the right direction to formulate a women- 
oriented agenda that has clear objectives, goals and vision. Furthermore, effective networking 
and the overcoming of the pitfalls of overlap in the current PWMs operation strategies will create 
new opportunities for further cooperation which would result in the creation of a women’s 
agenda. A women’s oriented agenda should be adopted as a master frame for all women’s 
organizations in Palestine. 
In their current status quo, PWMs are heavily dependent on external funding. An 
inevitable argument here is: What would the future of funding for these organizations look like, 
when the Palestinian state is established? Is it imaginable that that the new state would take it on 
itself to satisfy the needs of women, as part of their attempt to answer the needs of the society as 
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a whole? If this were to happen, PWMs would be completely bureaucratized and would become 
completely dependent on the Palestinian state for their sustainability; thus, eliminating any 
chance that the PWMs, would have of turning into a movement. Or perhaps become NGOs, and 
thus convert from social movements to service providers.  
Under the newly funded founded state, PWMs might still seek external funding as a 
means to escape their dependency on the state. However, there is no guarantee that external 
funders will continue to directly fund the civil society. They may wish to direct their funds 
towards the formation of the Palestinian state, and therefore will channel their funds to the civil 
society, including the PWMs and the women’s organization through the state.  
The PWMs need to be cautious that this scenario might turn into reality. The dependence 
of the PWMs on the future state will only end up in a dependency relationship that currently 
resembles their relationship with the PNM.  Previous research in this field indicates that the 
sustainability of an organization depends on its ability to mobilize its resources. Therefore, 
PWMs need to be able to mobilize their resources in a manner that serves their goals.  
My study shows that there is an obvious case of over-dependence on external resources, 
by women’s activism organizations which in part constitutes legitimacy among these 
organizations.  However, there is an urgent need to focus on internal resources. The PWMs 
should explore social innovative methods in the way of the substitution of resources. For 
instance, women’s organizations can consider examples of social enterprise, can invest more in 
entrepreneurial initiatives, or perhaps restructure themselves to augment their legitimacy and 
consequently attract more resources.      
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Furthermore, the PWMs and their satellite women’s organizations need to formulate a 
code of conduct and agree on a method of democratic leadership selection. It is obvious that the 
current PWMs are heavily reliant on the charismatic leadership of some women figures in 
Palestine. However, for the PWMs to select a more progressive leadership for their movements, 
it is important that they explore alternative criteria, including charisma. More emphasis, for 
instance, could be given to education, experience and demonstrated skills. Although some would 
argue that movements need charismatic leaders, however, once they become democratized, they 
often lose momentum.  
It might be equally important for the PWMs to be exposed to the experiences of other 
women’s movements around the globe, and expand on opportunities of cooperation with these 
movements. It is true that Palestine is disadvantaged as a nation still under occupation. However, 
in the midst of globalization, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the PWMs to develop in 
isolation from global experiences. Exposure to other women’s movements around the globe can 
be executed through increased participation in conferences and workshops. It is also essential for 
members of women’s organizations to enroll in graduate programs that focus on social 
movements, civic engagement, gender studies and social work.   
Finally, the Palestinian society is an ideal medium for conducting research, especially in 
that Palestine is taking serious steps towards becoming a nation state, thus necessitating 
considerable amount of ongoing research and planning. More research should be conducted to 
explore and analyze any potential obstacles and risk factors that could hinder the progress of 
women’s activism in Palestine. More attention should also be paid to other issues of activism in 
Palestine, such as environment and youth activism, and explore means of cooperation between 
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the organization of women’s activism and such emerging activism. In addition, it is worthwhile 
to examine how new emerging activism, social movements and mobilizing forces can benefit 
from the expertise and the long history of women activism in Palestine that has been taking place 
for almost a full century. More important is to explore means of collaboration to implement 




















VI. d. Study challenges: 
The present study faced several challenges including those challenges related to the 
research design and those that were related to the time constraints. I adopted a qualitative design 
to tackle the subject matter of Palestinian Women’s Movement(s) organizations. And, 
accordingly, I utilized a purposive sampling approach that inherently involves threats to external 
validity, in particular the issue of generalizability. Although qualitative designs are known to 
have low external validity based on their sample size, it is the quality and thoroughness of the 
information and the shared experiences of the participants that overcome this challenge 
(Sterauss, 1995; Barroso & Sandelowski, 2007; Gomm, 2004).  
As for the challenges relating to time constraints, utilizing interviews as the principle 
instrument to collect data is known to have certain pitfalls and limitations, especially the 
difficulties that have to do with scheduling and rescheduling interviews, in addition to finding 
the time and location that are suitable for both parties. Moreover, the process of conducting 
individual interviews, transcribing them, and analyzing the data and finally reporting is known to 
be a very time-consuming procedure, considering the time limit for this study as prescribed in the 
research time outline section. The need to translate the interviews meant an extra burden. Each 
actual hour of tape recording required three hours of note taking, making the average interview 
transcription time (7.5±) hours. Added to those 7.5 hours is another five hours of translating the 
interview’s major findings. The total estimated average time required for interviewing, 
transcribing and translation procedure took an average of (576 ± hours), which is equal to 72 




VI. e. Study limitations:  
Limitations usually relate to subjects/participants, time and space/place 
The present study has the following limitations. The first limitation relates to the study 
population. The study design required informants/participants with the following who are current 
or former women’s movement(s) activists in Palestine and who lived in a time span that goes 
back to the early 20th century.  In most probability the majority of the women’s activism pioneers 
belonging to this era have either passed away or are very old or are incapacitated and were 
unable to participate in the study. This limitation was overcome by locating alternative 
informants, such as people who worked very closely with these pioneers, successor CEOs, (and 
annual records of the agencies that these pioneers were active in).   
The second limitation relates to geographical location of potential pioneers. Some of the 
targeted pioneers, for some reason, are no longer living in the West Bank, Palestine. I tried to 
track down current contacts to get to these pioneers and to organize telephone interviews, when 
possible. 156 
 The third limitation relates to the political atmosphere in the Middle East region in 
general and the Palestinian Occupied Territories in particular, especially the West Bank, I 
anticipated that I would have limited access to the West Bank where the majority of the women’s 
movements’ organizations headquarters are locate, due to military closures or curfews. To reduce 
the impact of this limitation I tried to schedule the interviews in East Jerusalem for those 
informants who have access into Jerusalem and compensated them for the inconvenience and 
                                                            
156 As mentioned earlier, the researcher had no access to women’s movement(s) organizations located in the Gaza 
strip. Access to the Gaza strip is suspended and denied by Israeli military forces since June 2007.  
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any travel expenses.157 But the majority of the interviews took place in the WB particularly, in 
Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Hebron.  
The third limitation was the fact that I anticipated that I would face some restrictions 
regarding locating some primary and secondary resources such as records, pamphlets, or flyers  
due to the fact that some of these resources have either been destroyed, are out of print, or are no 
longer in existence.  I overcame this limitation by recording word-of-mouth reports of the 
informants, in addition to asking their permission to view any archives that they may have stored 
in their respective organizations or personal archives or computers. 
Finally, another limitation relates to the researcher. Although I am Palestinian, and I have 
lived in Palestine and is closely familiar with the Palestinian culture, one of the challenges would 
be the fact that I am a man trying to explore and analyze women’s movement(s) organizations. 
The literature explains this issue through the concepts of etic and emic perspectives (Grbich, 
2004). In qualitative research the etic perspective entails the researcher’s ability to maintain his 
objectivity as an outsider and still be able to investigate the case or culture s/he is studying, 
taking into account that Palestine is considered a conservative society that in certain aspects still 
endorses a patriarchal mind-set towards women’s rights.  
One question is whether I as a researcher have adopted the beliefs, attitudes and points of 
view shared by the Palestinian women’s movement(s) activists. Have I gone “native” in the 
course of the interviewing process?  Or, was there an insurmountable barrier to my 
understanding of the thoughts, actions and aspirations of PWM’s and their relation to PNM, 
given the fact that I am a male aiming to delve into women’s sphere of struggle? Another 
                                                            
157 West Bank Residents have very limited access to Jerusalem, as the Israeli regime has restricted Palestinian 
mobility and access within the West Bank and particularly East Jerusalem,  
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question is whether or not my being a male interviewer conducting interviews within a relatively 
patriarchal society, impinged on my women informants’ openness and accessibility?  Did I 
impact negatively the degree to which informants were forthcoming about their points of view, 
memories, and reflections?  Was it possible that my female informants either reacted more 
strongly against me being a male, or were they compliant or cautious or withholding because 
they feared that the interviewer would be displeased if they told truths which I was not ready to 
hear? 
Fortunately, I believe I am equipped with the necessary training, expertise and strong 
commitment to women’s equity and equality to create the necessary engagement and empathy 
with informants that are essential in gaining and sustaining the trust of interviewees, regardless 
of my gender and theirs. Being a trained social worker and university educator of social work, 
social science, and research, I have the skills to put my women informants at ease and to hear in 
a full sense their attitudes, hopes, and thoughts, relationships, and activities. My response to this 
limitation was to work hard at all times during each interview to be an excellent listener, and to 
show appreciation and respect for the informant’s contributions and opinions, in addition to 
creating a respectful and empathic atmosphere throughout the interview. 
In a relatively small society, such as the Palestinian society, it is inevitable that the 
researcher’s identity could in fact have some influence on the interviewees. Indeed, I felt that my 
family name “Al Daqqaq,”158 being a well-known, deeply-rooted Jerusalemite family, was 
reassuring to my interviewees being a well-known, deeply-rooted Jerusalemite family I think it 
made them feel safe and comfortable with me.  
                                                            
158 Arabic (الدقاق) 
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My ability to obtain some of the early pilot interviewees was related to the visibility of 
and respect given by my family name.  My method of compensating for this influence was by 
reassuring the informants that the interview proceedings were to be kept confidential and were to 
be used for academic research purposes only.  Moreover, I made certain to keep quiet most of the 
time except when I asked questions, so that my responses were insignificant in comparison with 
the answers and conversations provided by the informants.   
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Appendix (B): Interview questions 
 
I. Relationship with Palestinian nationalist movement: 
1. What do you think are key aspects of the relationship between Palestinian women’s 
movement(s) and Palestinian Nationalist Movements?  
2.  When did this relationship start?  
3. How did this relationship develop? 
4.  What were some major themes that governed this relationship? 
5.  Where does this relationship stand today?  
6. What is the thematic future of this relationship?  
7.  What external factors, if any, influenced the initiation and the development of the 
relationship between the women’s movement(s) and the nationalist movements in 
Palestine? 
8. Are you a current member of the PNMs or the PA? 
9. Were you an ex-member?  
10. How do you think your activism and the philosophy of your organization would have 
been affected if you were a member of the PNMs or the PA? 
 
II. Palestinian women’s movement(s) structure and objectives   
1. In your opinion, can one talk about a unified women’s movement in Palestine, or is it 
better to talk about women’s movements instead?  And if so, what are the underlying 
causes for the lack of, or for having such unity? 
2.  Can one say that there are clear objectives of the women’s movement(s) in Palestine, and 
if so, how can these objectives be summarized?  
3. Presumably, if one can argue that there are different women’s movements in Palestine, do 
you think that they share the same objectives, or do their objectives vary?  
4. Do you think that women’s movement(s)’ objectives have remained static, or did they 
evolve over time?  Why so? 
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5.  What are the major aspirations of Palestinian women to join and get actively involved in 
women’s movement(s) in Palestine?   
6.  Do you think that these aspirations were dynamic? Have women’s movement 
organizations been affected by the political defining moments in the modern Palestinian 
history? 
7.  Do you think that the Palestinian women’s movement(s) were inspired by regional, 
Arab, or western feminist models?  Can you please give examples?  
 
III. Activists in the Palestinian women’s movement(s):  
1. In your opinion, who formed the nucleus of women’s movement(s) in Palestine? 
2.  Who were the supporters of women’s movement(s) in Palestine?  
3. Who were the members of these movement(s)?  
4. Accordingly, do you think that they were dynamic and changed overtime? 
5.  Can one say that women’s movement(s)’s supporters and members were only female?  
6.  Did women’s concerns and aspirations include national independence as the main 
objective or did they relegate it, in contrast to other nationalist groups, to women’s 
independence?   
7. Did women’s movement(s) in Palestine posit a distinction between independence as 
women and independence as Palestinians, or did they see them as coextensive?  
8. Do you think that men—those affiliated with the causes and aspirations of Palestinian 
women’s social movements—would give the same answers as women?  
9. Would those who directly affiliate themselves with the women’s movement’s agenda, 
whether men or women, have the same response to the movement’s acts and causes as 
those who do not directly affiliate themselves with the movement?  
10. How did the Palestinian society perceive women’s movement(s) when they first appeared 
in the early 20th century?   
11. Has this perception changed overtime? How and why?  
12. Do you think that women’s movement(s) in Palestine took an organized form since they 
first appeared in the 20th century?  
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13. In your opinion were there any major changes in organizational structures or organization 
dynamics or organizational cultures within the Palestinian women’s movement(s) ? If so, 
how can one explain these changes, and what would be a good indicator of these 
changes? 
IV. Contemporary women’s movement(s) in Palestine      
1. Based on what we have discussed so far, in your opinion, what are the major themes that 
shape the contemporary women’s movement in Palestine? 
2.  In your opinion, can we say that Arab women movements in general and the Palestinian 
women’s movement(s) in particular, are closer today to women’s movement(s), models 
in the West than when you began your work in the PWMs?   
3. Do you think that the contemporary women movements(s) in Palestine have a well- 
defined feminist agenda similar to the feminist164 movements in the West?   
 
V.  Resource dependencies & resource mobilization 
1. What is the nature of Palestinian women’s movement(s) vis-à-vis Palestinian nationalist 
movements? 
2. What is the nature of Palestinian Women’s movement(s) vis-à-vis Arab women’s 
movements?   
3. What legitimacy and political influence do you have?  
4. With whom do you have contact in PWMs and the PNM?   
5. How are you able to influence the politics and society of Palestine? What is the influence 
of a framing discussion? How tangible are resources, and how do they influence the 
social movements framing in Palestine? How can resources influence the legitimacy, 
ideology, and framing of Palestinian social movements?   
 
VI. Activism and community mobilization 
1. What is/are the motivation(s) for civic engagement?  
                                                            
164  Ferree & Mueller (2004) distinguishes between women’s movements and feminist movements. They define 
women’s movements as: “mobilizations based on appeals to women as a constituency and thus an organizational 




2. What is the nature of women’s civic engagement in Palestine? 
3. How does education and politics affect women’s movement(s) in general and women’s 
civic engagement in particular? What is the role of culture? 
4. As far as the Palestinian women’s movement(s) is/are concerned, do you think that civic 
engagement is considered a tactic or a goal? Can one classify it as a motivation or in your 
professional opinion you think it was a purpose? 
5. Can one say that activism is a culture in Palestine?   
 
VII. Organizational structure  
1. How does the organization structure affect community mobilization?  
2. What is the hierarchy of women’s movement(s) in Palestine? 
3. What are they able to mobilize to the movement? What is the Influence of a framing 
discussion?   
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Appendix (C): Invitation Letter (to be sent via E-mail) 
Dear: ………………………..  
Hope this message finds you well. 
Let me start by introducing myself. My name is Ihab Al Daqqaq, I am a full time faculty 
at Bethlehem University, Bethlehem, West Bank, Palestine, currently on a study leave perusing a 
Ph.D. at Columbia University in New York City, New York, U.S.A.  I am currently conducting 
my field research about “Palestinian Women’s Movements Organizations in Palestine”. I am 
representing the research team which includes Dr. Barbara Simon and myself. I am conducting a 
qualitative study about the history of development of the women’s movements organizations, 
and I am planning to do that through in-depth interviews with former and current activists and 
CEOs or senior officers of these organizations in the West Bank, Palestine.  
The purpose of this research is to investigate the early beginnings of women activism in 
Palestine and to understand the early structure and dynamics of women movement organizations. 
Moreover, the study aims at unearthing major milestones that shaped women’s activism in 
Palestine. Also important is the question of where women’s movement organizations stand 
today. You are being asked to take part in this study because you are a current or former activist 
or CEO of Women's Movement(s) Organizations that are still operating in the West Bank, 
Palestine. We anticipate recruiting between 12 and 15 current or former activists from the 
Palestinian women's movement(s) organizations. As a leader of a prominent organization in this 
field and someone that has been active in issues leading to women’s equality, equity and 
development, you have been selected to take part in this study. I would greatly appreciate it if 
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you would agree to my request to conduct an in-depth interview with you as the director of this 
important organization.   
Following this email, I will be contacting you by phone to follow up and address any 
questions or concerns you may have.  I will explain to you the procedures for taking part in this 
study and the measures and procedures that will be followed to guarantee your privacy and 
confidentiality. Also, I will supply you with the informed consent form, which you are requested 
to sign before taking part in this study.  
If you are unable to carry out this interview, I would appreciate it if you can recommend 
a senior staff person, instead of yourself, that can provide me with necessary information about 
the history and developmental progress of your organization.  
Please be assured that any information obtained through these interviews will be treated 
with the utmost confidentiality, will not include your name or other identity identifiers.  Personal 
information and transcription of the interviews will be uploaded and stored on the researcher’s 
account on Columbia university server, which is a protected server, requiring a password for 
access. Transcriptions and recordings of the interviews will be kept in a locked file cabinet with 
no link to your identity, at Columbia University School of Social Work in New York City, and 
only the researcher will have access to the actual contents and the transcription of the interviews 
that will be conducted with you. 
Realizing the value of your time, please note that I am willing to reimburse you for your 
time and commitment with a monetary compensation of $50.00, to be paid by a money order 
after the completion of the interview. 
Please find attached a letter of support by my academic supervisors asking you kindly to 
facilitate my mission.  
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Lastly, please find below our contact information, if you wish to contact us with any 
further inquiries. 
I will be looking forward to your response and feedback, and I would be honored to have 
the chance to learn more about your organization and the vital contribution that it has made to 
the advancement of women in Palestine. 
Your prompt response is highly appreciated since I have a fixed time frame for conducting 
the field study in Palestine. 
Respectfully yours; 
Ihab Al Daqqaq 
 
Mr. Ihab Al Daqqaq M-Phil /Ph.D Candidate 
Columbia University School of Social Work  
1255 Amsterdam Avenue, New York, NY 10027   
Mobile in Palestine:  0547-333-004  
E-mail: (iyd2101@columbia.edu)   
 
Dr. Barbara Simon 
Columbia University School of Social Work  





Appendix (D): Protocol for the follow-up phone call. 
Greetings: 
My name is Ihab Aldaqqaq, and I am calling to follow up on the email that I have sent to 
your attention asking for your kind cooperation to take part in my study titled “Palestinian 
Women’s Movements Organizations in Palestine”. As I explained in my email, I am representing 
the research team, which includes Dr. Barbara Simon and myself. I am conducting a qualitative 
study about the history of development of the women’s movement’s organizations, and I am 
planning to do that through in-depth interviews with former and current activists and CEOs or 
senior officers of these organizations in the West Bank, Palestine.  The purpose of this research 
is to investigate the early beginnings of women activism in Palestine and to understand the early 
structures and dynamics of women movement organizations. Moreover, the study aims at 
unearthing the major conditions, forces and events that shaped women’s activism in Palestine, 
and where women’s movement organizations stand today. You are being asked to take part in 
this study because you are a current or former activist or CEO of women's movement(s) 
organizations that are still operating in the West Bank, Palestine. As a leader of a prominent 
organization in this field, and one that has been active in issues leading to women’s equality, 
equity and development, you have been selected to take part in this study.  
It is my pleasure to address any questions or concerns you may have and explain to you 
the procedures for taking part in this study. Also, I will happily explain to you the measures and 
procedures that will be followed to guarantee your privacy and confidentiality. I will submit to 
you an informed consent form, which you are requested to consider carefully and sign before 
taking part in this study. I will be bringing a copy of the consent form with me on the day of the 
interview so that we can go over any details or concerns you may still have and to ask you kindly 
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to sign the consent form before we commence the interview. A copy of the consent form will be 
left with you for your records.   
Please be assured that any information obtained through these interviews will be treated 
with the utmost confidentiality and will not include your name nor will any other identity 
identifiers be recorded. Personal information and transcription of the interviews will be uploaded 
and stored on the researcher’s account on the Columbia University server, which is a protected 
server, requiring a password for access. 
I am asking for permission to allow me to audio-tape the interview as part of the research 
study. The recording(s) will be used for study analysis only by the research team. The 
recording(s) will not include your name nor will any other identity identifiers be recorded. Upon 
the completion of the interview, the recording(s) will be uploaded and stored on the researchers 
account on a Columbia University server, which is a protected server, requiring a password for 
access. Transcriptions and recordings of the interviews will be kept in a locked file cabinet with 
no link to any subject's identity, at the Columbia University School of Social Work in New York 
City and will be destroyed five years after the researcher has defended his Ph.D. dissertation 
successfully.  
Realizing the value of your time, please note that I am willing to reimburse you for your 
time and commitment with a monetary compensation of $50.00, to be paid by a money order 
after the completion of the interview. 
It would be of great assistance if we can set a date and time for the interview, to be conducted at 




Appendix (E)  
Academic Support Letter. 
Date:----------- 
Dear Colleague: 
MR. IHAB AL-DAQQAQ is a doctoral student in good standing at the Columbia University 
School of Social Work (CUSSW).  He has completed all required course work and has passed 
his comprehensive written and oral exams.  We (Assistant Professor James Mandiberg, Ph.D., 
and Associate Professor Barbara Simon, Ph.D.) are jointly serving as the co-sponsors of his 
dissertation research and writing. 
He is currently undertaking a study of the Palestinian women’s movement(s).  As a Palestinian, 
social worker, and educator, Mr. Al-Daqqaq has a life-long interest in the variety of liberation 
movements within his homeland.  
In-depth interviews with key founders of and activists within the women’s movements of 
Palestine are one important source of his data.  Know that, were you to agree to serve as one of 
his interviewees, Mr. Al-Daqqaq would treat with the highest respect the information and 
perspectives that you share with him.   You would be helping him to build as accurate and full an 
account and analysis as possible of Palestinian women’s movements. 




Barbara Simon, M.S.S., Ph.D.   bls1@columbia.edu 
Associate Professor 
 




























165 Source Yasser Arafat Foundation (Yaf.ps, 2013). 
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Appendix (G) The Women Manuscript/Doctrine of 1994.166,167 
 
 الفلسطينية  وثيقة حقوق المرأة









 مقدم لـ 
 وزارة شؤون المرأة 
 واالتحاد العام للمرأة الفلسطينية
2006 
                                                            
166 Only a modified version from 2006 is available through the GUPW website. No translation is available in 
English. However, I translated the goals of this document.   
167 Please note the part in Yellow is translated to English  
280 
 
الفلسطينية   وثيقة حقوق المرأة  
 النسخة الرابعة 
2006  
  
  : توطئة
طينيين أينما كانوا. فيھا يطورون ھويتھم الوطنية والثقافية، ويتمتعون "إن دولة فلسطين ھي للفلس
بالمساواة الكاملة في الحقوق، تصان فيھا معتقداتھم الدينية والسياسية وكرامتھم اإلنسانية، في ظل نظام 
ديمقراطي برلماني يقوم على أساس حرية الرأي وحرية تكوين األحزاب ورعاية األغلبية حقوق األقلية 
واحترام األقلية قرارات األغلبية، وعلى العدل االجتماعي والمساواة وعدم التمييز في الحقوق العامة على 
  أساس العرق أو الدين أو اللون أو بين المرأة والرجل.....". 
  
  وثيقة إعالن االستقالل
األسس والمبادئ  1988وضعت وثيقة إعالن االستقالل الصادرة عن منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية في العام 
القانونية لبناء الدولة الفلسطينية، وكان من بين أھم ھذه األسس، اعتمادھا "مبدأ المساواة" كأحد الركائز 
  الرئيسية التي يجب أن تبنى عليھا المنظومة القانونية الفلسطينية. 
، وتسلمھا صالحياتھا ونتيجة لتوقيع اتفاقية أوسلو 1994وبعد نشوء السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية في العام 
التشريعية. عمدت المرأة الفلسطينية، وكانعكاس للدور التاريخي الذي مارسته وتمارسه على كافة األصعدة 
. النوع االجتماعيالنضالي منھا والتنموي، إلى ترسيخ مبدأ المساواة وعدم التمييز في الحقوق على أساس 
لوثائق التي تحمي أو تشير إلى ضرورة حماية حقوق وكان حصيلة ھذا الجھد أن تم إعداد مجموعة من ا
  المرأة وعلى وجه الخصوص في الجانب التشريعي، ومن أھم ھذه الوثائق:
  
في مدينة القدس عن االتحاد العام للمرأة الفلسطينية،  1993وثيقة حقوق المرأة الصادرة في العام  .1
 والتي صادق عليھا الرئيس أبو عمار رحمه هللا. 
ھذه الوثيقة اإلشارة إلى ضرورة إرساء مبدأ المساواة بين المرأة والرجل واتخاذ كافة  وقد تضمنت
  التدابير الضرورية لتحقيق ذلك، وعلى وجه الخصوص إجراء التعديالت التشريعية الالزمة. 
كما استعرضت الوثيقة مجموعة من الحقوق التي شكلت في مجموعھا مطالب المرأة، وعلى وجه 
ال الحقوق السياسية، والمدنية، واالقتصادية واالجتماعية والثقافية، كما ركزت الخصوص في مج
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الوثيقة على مجموعة الحقوق الصحية، واألھلية القانونية للمرأة الفلسطينية، وتطرقت كذلك لمطالب 
  المرأة في مجال قانون األحوال الشخصية.
عام للمرأة الفلسطينية والمجموعة من عن االتحاد ال 2000وثيقة حقوق المرأة الصادرة في العام  .2
. حيث تضمنت 1993المراكز والمؤسسات النسوية، والتي جاءت لتأكد على ما تضمنته وثيقة العام 
 عددا من المبادئ التي تشكل أسسا لترسيخ مبدأ المساواة بين المرأة والرجل. 
لوثائق السابقة، كما جاءت ، والتي شكلت إضافة إلى ا2002وثيقة حقوق المرأة الصادرة في العام  .3
 لتأكد على كافة الحقوق والمبادئ التي تم تضمينھا من خالل ھذه الوثائق. 
 
وقد كانت حصيلة ھذا الجھد المبذول أن تم إرساء العديد من المبادئ القانونية الراعية لحقوق المرأة في العديد 
لتقدم الملحوظ الذي حققته المرأة الفلسطينية من التشريعات الفلسطينية، ولعل أھم وآخر ھذه االنجازات ھو ا
  على صعيد التشريعات الناظمة لالنتخابات، وعلى وجه الخصوص ما تضمنه قانون االنتخابات العامة.
  
  المبــررات واألھــــــداف: 
ساء بعد كل ھذه الجھود المبذولة، وبعد عمل كل الوثائق السابقة، وتحقيق العديد من االنجازات على صعيد إر
المبادئ التي تحمي حقوق المرأة، تأتي ھذه الوثيقة، والسؤال الذي قد يثور ھنا، ما الھدف من إعداد ھذه 
  الوثيقة؟ وما ھي الغاية التي من اجلھا تم العمل على إعداد ھذه الوثيقة؟ 
  168تأتي ھذه الوثيقة في إطار تطوير واغناء الوثائق السابقة، وھي بشكل خاص تھدف إلى: 
  
اظ على الحقوق الوطنية للمرأة الفلسطينية، لتثبيت ما تم انجازه، والخروج بوثيقة حقوقية تلبي الحف .1
  احتياجات المرأة الفلسطينية على كافة األصعدة. 
 اعتبار ھذه الوثيقة كمرجع حكومي ملزم، يتم االلتزام به لدى سن التشريعات الفلسطينية.  .2
 عليه كل المرجعيات والمرتكزات القانونية لھذه الوثيقة. تحقيق مبدأ المساواة في الحقوق كما نصت  .3
                                                            
168  
a. Maintaining the fundamental national rights of the Palestinian women, to sustain what has been 
accomplished, and come out with bill of rights that meets the needs of Palestinian women on all levels. 
b. Consider this bill of rights as a binding reference to governments, and is binding to the   Palestinian 
legislators and when putting legislations. 
c. Achieving of the principle of equal rights as stipulated by both authorities and the legal underpinnings of 
this bill. 
d. Supporting Government's commitment to the application of this bill in collaboration with all partners at all 









  المرتكزات والمرجعيات القانونية: 
  لقانونية، وھي على النحو التالي: في صياغة ھذه الوثيقة تم االعتماد على عدد من المرجعيات والمرتكزات ا
  
  . المواثيق الدولية: 1
على الرغم من الوضع القانوني الحالي لدولة فلسطين، والذي ال يسمح لھا باالنضمام إلى عضوية المنظمات 
الدولية، وبالتالي المصادقة على المواثيق واالتفاقات الدولية. إال أن المشرع الفلسطيني أعلن صراحة ومن 
نصوص القانون األساسي الفلسطيني رغبته في االلتزام بما تضمنته المواثيق واالتفاقات الدولية، وعلى خالل 
وجه الخصوص ما تضمنته من نصوص تدعو إلى رعاية وحماية حقوق اإلنسان بشكل عام وحقوق المرأة 
  بشكل خاص. 
يه المواثيق الدولية، وذلك لذا كان من الضروري أن تتضمن ھذه الوثيقة إشارة واضحة إلى ما نصت عل
  لسببين:
: أن تعمل ھذه الوثيقة على تشجيع صانع القرار الفلسطيني التبني واالنضمام إلى ھذه االتفاقيات الدولية األول
  وفي الفرصة األولى التي تتاح له. 
  الدولية.  : أن يراعي المشرع الفلسطيني عند وضعه للتشريعات المختلفة ما تضمنته ھذه االتفاقياتالثاني
عند صياغة ھذه الوثيقة تم الرجوع إلى أھم المواثيق الدولية التي نجحت في وضع اإلطار العام لحقوق المرأة 
على الصعيد الدولي، والتي نجحت إلى حد كبير في أن تنشئ نھجا قانونيا دوليا تستنير به الدول وتحذو حذوه 
  في تشريعاتھا الوطنية. 
إلى بيان وتفصيل ھذه المواثيق والمعاھدات الدولية في ثالثة منظمات دولية، تشكل فكان من المناسب التطرق 
في مجموعھا إطارا قانونيا ھاما لمشرعنا الفلسطيني ينبغي عليه مراعاته عند سنه لتشريعاتنا الوطنية، ھذه 
  المنظمات تمثلت في: 
  منظمة األمم المتحدة -
 منظمة العمل الدولية -
 منظمة العمل العربية -
  
وبالنظر إلى الحقوق القانونية التي أدرجتھا ھذه المنظمات، سنجد أنھا قد انحصرت في ثالثة تصنيفات 
  موضوعية، ھي:
  الحقوق السياسية  -
 الحقوق االجتماعية واالقتصادية -
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 الحقوق المتعلقة باألھلية المدنية واألحوال الشخصية -
  
  . وثيقة إعالن االستقالل: 2
طينية باتجاھھا العام مھيأة لتضمين قضايا المرأة في إطار من المساواة وعدم التمييز إن البنية التشريعية الفلس
في الحقوق بين المرأة والرجل. فقبل قيام السلطة الفلسطينية شكلت وثيقة إعالن االستقالل التي أصدرھا 
وريا مھما، في في دورته التاسعة عشر في الجزائر، أساسا دست 1988المجلس الوطني الفلسطيني في العام 
  إحقاق حقوق المرأة الفلسطينية. 
وجاء فيھا نصا "إن دولة فلسطين ھي للفلسطينيين أينما كانوا. فيھا يطورون ھويتھم الوطنية والثقافية، 
ويتمتعون بالمساواة الكاملة في الحقوق، تصان فيھا معتقداتھم الدينية والسياسية وكرامتھم اإلنسانية، في ظل 
برلماني يقوم على أساس حرية الرأي وحرية تكوين األحزاب ورعاية األغلبية حقوق األقلية  نظام ديمقراطي
واحترام األقلية قرارات األغلبية، وعلى العدل االجتماعي والمساواة وعدم التمييز في الحقوق العامة على 
لقانون والقضاء أساس العرق أو الدين أو اللون أو بين المرأة والرجل، في ظل دستور يؤمن سيادة ا
  المستقل...".
من خالل ھذا النص، يتضح جليا أن ھذه الوثيقة نصت على ضمان حقوق المرأة على قدم المساواة، في ظل 
نظام ديمقراطي برلماني، تعددي. باإلضافة إلى تأكيدھا على أن الناس سواء أمام القانون، وعليه يمكن القول 
يقوم على أساس إنصاف المرأة انطالقا من شرعية حقوق اإلنسان  أن وثيقة إعالن االستقالل رسمت اتجاھا
  واالتفاقيات الدولية ذات الصلة. 
  
  . اإلطار الدستوري: 3
يشكل اإلطار الدستوري إحدى أھم المرجعيات القانونية الناظمة لحقوق المرأة الفلسطينية، وعند الحديث عن 
يقة فإننا يجب أن نشير إلى أن ھذا اإلطار يشمل ما اإلطار الدستوري لحقوق المرأة ومن خالل ھذه الوث
تضمنه القانون األساسي الفلسطيني الساري المفعول في أراضي السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية، إضافة إلى ما 
  تضمنته المسودة الثالثة لمشروع الدستور الفلسطيني. 
الجنسين بشكل أكثر جدية ممن سبقه من وھنا يمكن القول أن المشرع الفلسطيني قد اخذ بمبدأ المساواة بين 
المشرعين في ظل األنظمة السياسية والقانونية المختلفة التي تعاقبت على حكم فلسطين. فحظر التمييز بين 
) من القانون األساسي الفلسطيني على أنه: 9الرجل والمرأة أمام القانون والقضاء، فتنص المادة (
سواء ال تمييز بينھم بسبب العرق أو الجنس أو اللون أو الدين أو الرأي "الفلسطينيون أمام القانون والقضاء 
  السياسي أو اإلعاقة". 
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كما يجري في فلسطين العمل على إعداد دستور البالد، وفي ھذا اإلطار جاء في مسودة الدستور تحت باب 
ز في الحقوق والحريات كافة، "الحقوق والحريات العامة" إعالنا للمساواة التامة بين الرجل والمرأة دون تميي
) من المسودة الثالثة على أنه: "كل الفلسطينيين سواء أمام القانون، وھم يتمتعون بالحقوق 19إذ تنص المادة (
المدنية والسياسية، ويتحملون الواجبات العامة دون ما فرق أو تمييز في ما بينھم بسبب العرق أو الجنس أو 
اسي أو اإلعاقة، إن مصطلح الفلسطيني أو المواطن حيثما يرد في الدستور يعني اللون أو الدين أو الرأي السي
  الذكر واألنثى".
) من ذات المسودة على أن "حقوق اإلنسان وحرياته األساسية ملزمة وواجبة االحترام، 20وتنص المادة (
ية واالجتماعية والثقافية لكل وتعمل الدولة على كفالة الحقوق والحريات الدينية والمدنية والسياسية واالقتصاد
المواطنين، وتمتعھم بھا على أساس مبدأ المساواة وتكافؤ الفرص. ال يحرم شخص من حقوقه وحرياته 
  األساسية أو أھليته القانونية ألسباب سياسية". 
  
  . القوانين والتشريعات الفلسطينية: 4
م إصدارھا في أراضي السلطة الوطنية في صياغة ھذه الوثيقة تم الرجوع إلى معظم القوانين التي ت
  الفلسطينية، ولغايات مراجعة ھذه القوانين تم تقسيمھا إلى عدد من المحاور، وذلك على النحو التالي:
  القوانين ضمن محور الحقوق االجتماعية والثقافية واالقتصادية. -
 القوانين ضمن محور الحقوق السياسية والمدنية. -
 الجزائية للمرأة.  القوانين ضمن محور الحماية -
 القوانين ضمن محور األحوال الشخصية.   -
  
إن ھذه الوثيقة تتضمن عددا من الحقوق والمبادئ القانونية، تشكل في جزء منھا حقوقا تم انجازھا على 
مر التاريخ النضالي للمرأة الفلسطينية، ولقد جاء النص عليھا في ھذه الوثيقة على اعتبار أنھا تشكل 
  ة للمرأة ال يجوز التراجع عنھا أو إسقاطھا عند إعادة الصياغة ألية وثيقة تشريعية كانت. حقوقا مكتسب
  
أما الجزء اآلخر من ھذه الحقوق المضمنة في ھذه الوثيقة، ال زالت تشكل مطالبا للمرأة الفلسطينية على 
يه إليھا وألخذھا بعين طريق ترسيخ مبدأ المساواة على أساس النوع االجتماعي، وقد ورد ذكرھا ھنا للتنب
االعتبار من قبل المشرع الفلسطيني عند صياغته للتشريعات الفلسطينية الجديدة، وستتظافر الجھود 





  مضمون الوثيقة 
انوني الخاص د ة لم يكن للمرأة الفلسطينية أن تسمو بوضعھا الق ة قانوني ى منظوم ا إل تند في مطالبھ ون أن تس
ائج  ا نت ي مجموعھ ق ف ي تحق ة الت وق القانوني ت والحق ن الثواب ة م ى مجموع ا عل ي مجملھ ز ف ة، ترتك متكامل
ة  راف الدولي ق واألع ه المواثي ا نصت علي ب م ل، حس ين الرج ا وب ة بينھ اواة المطلق ق المس ة، لتحقي ايجابي
  والقانون األساسي الفلسطيني.
ة، و وفقا لما ورد في الدراسات القانونية المسحية المتعلقة بوضع المرأة القانوني في المواثيق واألعراف الدولي
ول  ي حق وق ف ذه الحق رد ھ ن المناسب أن ت ان م ريعات الفلسطينية، ك توري الفلسطيني، والتش يم الدس والتنظ
رأة ة للم وق العام ا مطالب  قانونية منفصلة، تحقق في مجموعھا مرتكزات الحق الفلسطينية، لتشكل في مجملھ
ق األمر بعمل  شرعية ينبغي على المشرع الفلسطيني االھتداء بھا عند ممارسته ألعماله التشريعية، سواء تعل
وض  ي النھ اھم ف ة، تس ة عام وابط قانوني ى ض ة إل ي النھاي ة، لنصل ف لطة التنفيذي ريعية أو الس لطة التش الس
دور  بالمستوى االجتماعي واالقتصادي ين ال انوني ب والثقافي لمجتمعنا الفلسطيني، وتخلق حالة من التوازن الق
ا  ة التي يجب أن تكون عليھ ة القانوني الھام الذي تمارسه المرأة الفلسطينية في مجتمعنا المعاصر، وبين المكان
ا الحقوق المكتسبة فيم ا تحصلت  المرأة الفلسطينية في ھذا المجال، استنادا إلى قاعدة عدم المساس ب ق بم يتعل
  عليه المرأة الفلسطينية من حقوق.
  لكل ما تقدم تطالب المرأة الفلسطينية بالحفاظ وتحقيق الحقوق التالية:
  
  أوال: الحقوق السياسية:
ر  .1 ق األم واء تعل طين، س ي فلس ة ف ات العام ع االنتخاب ي جمي ويت ف طينية التص رأة الفلس ق للم يح
ريعية ية أو التش ات الرئاس د  باالنتخاب أنھا تحدي ن ش ون م ات يك ة انتخاب ة، أو أي ة، أو النقابي أو البلدي
 مالمح التنظيم القانوني في فلسطين.
انوني  .2 ان المنصب الق ا ك ة في فلسطين أي ات العام ع االنتخاب للمرأة الفلسطينية الحق في الترشح لجمي
 يز.الناشئ عنھا، وبشروط قانونية مساوية للشروط السارية على الرجل دونما تمي
ار  .3 ا أن أث ة، طالم ة في الدول تفتاءات العام للمرأة الفلسطينية الحق المطلق في المشاركة في جميع االس
 ھذه االستفتاءات ستمتد للرجل والمرأة على حد سواء. 
ة  .4 ع الصالحيات القانوني ة، وممارسة جمي ة في الدول يحق للمرأة الفلسطينية تقلد جميع المناصب العام
ذه ا  المرتبطة بعمل ھ ز بينھ ا تميي ة دونم ة والمھني ا للحاجات والشروط القانوني ك وفق المناصب، وذل
 وبين الرجل.
ة  .5 ي كاف رحين ف ين المش ن ب اء م ة للنس ا قانوني طين إدراج كوت ي فلس ات ف ريعات االنتخاب تضمن تش
ة ع ى االنتخابات في الدولة، لضمان تمثيلھن بشكل فاعل وأساسي في المؤسسات التشريعية والتنفيذي ل
 حد سواء.
ا  .6 ا أن تأسيسھا جاء موافق ا، طالم للمرأة الفلسطينية الحق في تشكيل األحزاب السياسية واالنضمام إليھ
 لشروط التشكيل المنصوص عليھا قانونا على أساس قاعدة عدم التمييز بين الرجل والمرأة.
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ا يحق للمرأة الفلسطينية المشاركة في جميع األنشطة السياسية على اختالف تو .7 دافھا، طالم ا وأھ جھاتھ
 أنھا ال تتعارض مع مقتضيات المصلحة العامة واألمن الوطني دونما تمييز عن الرجل. 
ي، أو انفصالھا  .8 ا من أجنب دى زواجھ يتھا األصلية ل اظ بجنس تتمتع المرأة الفلسطينية بالحق في االحتف
ز ابه جنسية عنه بانحالل رابطة الزوجية، كما تتمتع بنفس الحق في حال تغيير ال يته أو اكتس وج لجنس
 دولة أخرى.
ية أو  .9 اب الجنس ق باكتس ا يتعل ل فيم ررة للرج روط المق وق والش ة الحق طينية بكاف رأة الفلس ع الم تتمت
يتھا أو بفرض جنسية  ا من أجنبي أي مساس بجنس ى زواجھ تغييرھا أو االحتفاظ بھا، وال يترتب عل
 الزوج األجنبي عليھا دون رضاھا.
اء  .10 ق ألبن روط يح ا لش ك وفق ية األم، وذل ى جنس ي الحصول عل ن أجنب ة م طينية المتزوج رأة الفلس الم
 ومتطلبات التجنس المقررة ألبناء الرجل الفلسطيني في النظام القانوني الفلسطيني.
ان قضائيا أو  .11 نح للزوجة الفلسطينية سواء ك ازا م ى نحو يسحب امتي وق عل ال يجوز تأويل ھذه الحق
دأ عدم تشريعيا، فيما يتع ى أساس مب ي، عل ا األجنب ى جنسية زوجھ ا في طلب الحصول عل ق بحقھ ل
 المساس بالحقوق المكتسبة.
  
  ثانيا: الحقوق االقتصادية واالجتماعية
ز  .1 ا تميي ة دونم للمرأة الفلسطينية الحق في التمتع بشروط عمل عادلة ومرضية بما فيھا المكافآت المالي
 لحق في تساوي أجرھا بالرجل لدى تساوي العمل بينھما.بينھا وبين الرجل، على أن تتمتع با
ا   .2 ة التي ترغب فيھ ار المھن ة اختي ى حري ي يساعدھا عل دريب مھن للمرأة الفلسطينية الحق في تلقي ت
ع  وتناسبھا، على أن تلتزم السلطات ذات العالقة في فلسطين بتوفير أنماط اجتماعية وثقافية تمكن جمي
ل فك ن تقب ع م راد المجتم ا أف تأثر بھ ي اس ن والحرف الت ن المھ رة م واع كثي ي أن رأة ف د الم رة تواج
 الرجال، طالما تتوافر فيھا المقدرة على القيام بھا.
ة  .3 تلتزم السلطة الفلسطينية باتخاذ جميع اإلجراءات التشريعية والتنفيذية، التي تكفل حماية المرأة العامل
 تتعرض لھا في مكان العمل.من كافة أشكال العنف والمضايقات الجنسية التي 
للمرأة الفلسطينية الحق في التمتع بمعاملة مساوية للرجل داخل بيئة العمل، وحقھا في التمتع بإجازات  .4
ة أو المرض أو  ة ضد البطال ة المؤمن ة والضمانات االجتماعي مدفوعة األجر واالستحقاقات التقاعدي
 الشيخوخة، أو غير ذلك من أسباب العجز عن العمل.
ة    .5 ا األسرية والتجاري الي لضمان مباشراتھا لمھامھ للمرأة الفلسطينية الحق في التمتع باالستقالل الم
نح للرجل،  ذي يم أمين ال ة والت ات المالي ة اإلعان ى كاف ا في الحصول عل تقل، وضمان حقھ بشكل مس
 وكذلك المساواة المطلقة بينھا وبين الرجل في كافة المعامالت المصرفية.
ة تلتزم الس  .6 راف بمساھمتھا في رفاھي ة، واالعت رأة الريفي لطة الفلسطينية باالعتراف بأھمية عمل الم
ة  اذ كاف ائي، واتخ يط اإلنم ة التخط داد وتنمي ي إع اركتھا ف وطني، وضمان مش اد ال رتھا واالقتص أس
 التدابير الالزمة لتنمية قدراتھا االجتماعية والثقافية واالقتصادية.
ة أو خاصة، أو في أي من ال يجوز تشغيل النساء   .7 اة صناعية عام في أي سن أثناء الليل في أي منش
زم المشرع  راد األسرة الواحدة، ويلت ر أف ا غي فروعھا، ويستثنى من ذلك المنشآت التي ال يشتغل فيھ
 الفلسطيني بتحديد ساعات العمل الليلي، مراعيا في ذلك المواثيق واألعراف الدولية.
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رده أو يلتزم كل صاحب عمل في   .8 المنشآت التي تعمل فيھا النساء بالعمل على تھيئة دار للحضانة بمف
اء ومواصفات  د شروط إنش زم المشرع الفلسطيني بتحدي ى أن يلت ع منشآت أخرى، عل باالشتراك م
 ونظام دور الحضانة.
دة تحددھا التشري  .9 عات للمرأة العاملة الحق في الحصول على إجازة بأجر كامل قبل الوضع وبعده، لم
ا في  الوطنية الفلسطينية وتراعي فيھا ما نصت عليھا المواثيق واألعراف الدولية، دون المساس بحقھ
ة  ازة مرضية مدفوع نح إج ة أن تم رأة المتزوج ا يحق للم ة، كم الوات الدوري ة والع ة واألقدمي الترقي
د األجر خاصة في حالة المرض الناجم عن الحمل أو الوضع، على أن يتولى المشرع ال فلسطيني تحدي
ا  الحد األقصى لھذه المدة، بحيث تستثنى ھذه اإلجازة من حساب اإلجازات المرضية المنصوص عليھ
 قانونا.
رة  .10 رجيح الوضع خالل فت د ت ة تفي دمت شھادة طبي للمرأة العاملة الحق في االنقطاع عن العمل إذا ق
دة، زمنية يتولى المشرع الفلسطيني تحديدھا، وال يجوز لصاحب العمل  مطالبتھا بالعمل خالل ھذه الم
 أو فصلھا أو توقيع عقوبات مالية عليھا.
دة  .11 ل م ا، ال تق ا خالل ساعات عملھ يحق للمرأة التي ترضع طفلھا الحصول على فترتين للراحة يومي
ذا االنقطاع كساعات  رة ھ كل منھما عن نصف ساعة، لتتمكن من إرضاع طفلھا، على أن تحتسب فت
 .عمل مدفوعة األجر
للمرأة الحق في الحصول على خدمات األمومة والطفولة وتنظيم األسرة، التي تمكنھا من حسن إدارة  .12
 أسرتھا، بما يتفق مع دورھا التربوي في األسرة.
ان عمل   .13 ى مك ه إل ة انتقال ة األخر في حال دون اجر لمرافق يحق لكال الزوجين الحصول على إجازة ب
د أخر غير مكان العمل األصلي، داخل ا ولى المشرع الفلسطيني تحدي ى أن يت ا، عل ة أو خارجھ لدول
 الحد األقصى المصرح به لمدة ھذا النوع من اإلجازات، دونما تمييز بين الرجل والمرأة.
ولى  .14 ا لشروط يت ا وفق ة أطفالھ رغ لتربي دون اجر للتف ى إجازة ب للمرأة العاملة الحق في الحصول عل
 حتفظ المرأة بوظيفتھا خالل ھذه المدة. المشرع الفلسطيني تحديدھا، على أن ت
د  .15 يحق للرجل والمرأة على حد سواء الجمع بين معاشھما الوظيفي وبين معاش زوجه دون انتقاص عن
الوفاة، على أساس انفصال الذمة المالية لكليھما، كما يمتد ھذا الحق ألبناء المرأة العاملة في الحصول 
 واحد عند وفاتھما. على معاشي أبويھما دون انتقاص في وقت
ة  .16 رأة العامل تفيد الم المرأة، وتس أمين الصحي الخاص ب ازات الت لجميع أفراد األسرة االستفادة من امتي
 من المنح المالية العائلية في حال إعالتھا ألوالدھا.
ة  .17 ة والمعاش وأي ة الخدم للمرأة العاملة الحق في الحصول على كامل مستحقاتھا المالية من مكافأة نھاي
 استحقاقات مالية أخرى، دونما تمييز عن الرجل.  
ع   .18 ة بجمي ات التعليمي ة المؤسس اق بكاف ك االلتح مل ذل ه، ويش ع مراحل يم بجمي ي التعل ق ف رأة الح للم
ررة  دريس المق ل الت ي حق ل ف ة للعم ؤھالت المطلوب ية، والم اھج الدراس ي المن اوي ف ا، والتس أنواعھ
ى  للجنسين، والتساوي في فرص الحصول على ة، عل ات الدراسية والمعلومات التربوي المنح واإلعان
 أساس قاعدة تكافؤ الفرص بين الجنسين.
ى الجھل  .19 ة والقضاء عل للمرأة الحق في االلتحاق بكافة البرامج التعليمية والثقافية الخاصة بمحو األمي
 البدنية. في المجتمع، والتساوي مع الرجل في فرص المشاركة في األنشطة الرياضية والتربية
ا،   .20 ا بمفرھ اذ قرارھ ي اتخ اعدھا ف ي تس ة الت ات الطبي ة المعلوم ى كاف ي الحصول عل رأة الحق ف للم
 ومعاملتھا باحترام طوال فترة رعايتھا الصحية، وحقھا في احترام سرية وخصوصية عالجھا. 
ا، وال يجوز استغالل الطفل .21 ى في للمرأة الحق في الحصول على الرعاية الصحية الشاملة مجان ة األنث
 أي عمل يلحق ضررا بسالمتھا أو بصحتھا أو بحقھا في التعليم المجاني.
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ا  .22 ل ذويھ ة القاسية سواء من قب يعمل المشرع الفلسطيني على حماية الطفلة األنثى من اإليذاء والمعامل
ذاء أو الضرب أو  ا باإلي رض لھ ن يتع ل م ى ك ة عل ة القانوني ديد العقوب ا، وتش اء عنھ ن الغرب أو م
 االعتداء على حقوقھا المرتبطة بطبيعتھا وعمرھا. 
  
  ثالثا: الحقوق الجنائية
  للمرأة الفلسطينية الحق في التمتع بحقوق مساوية للرجل في الحياة والحرية والسالمة الشخصية. .1
ز ضد  .2 ى تميي يلتزم المشرع الفلسطيني بالعمل على إلغاء كافة أحكام قوانين العقوبات التي تنطوي عل
، وعلى وجه الخصوص األحكام الخاصة بقضايا الشرف والزنا، على نحو يحقق مساواة المرأة المرأة
 بالرجل في تنظيم ھذه التشريعات. 
اويھما في شروط  .3 ار تس يؤخذ بشھادة المرأة في جرائم الزنا على نحو مساو لشھادة الرجل، على اعتب
 األھلية القانونية.
رأة يعمل المشرع الفلسطيني على تشديد الع .4 ة إجھاض الم ى ارتكاب جريم دم عل قوبة على كل من يق
رأة  دفع الم ق باألسباب التي ت ا يتعل ة فيم ة القانوني را من المرون درا كبي الحامل رغما عنھا، وتوفير ق
 الحامل إلى إجھاض جنينھا برغبتھا، باعتبارھا أكثر الحريصين على سالمته وحياته.
ى  .5 ردع تشدد العقوبات الجزائية المفروضة عل ى نحو يحقق ال جرائم االغتصاب وھتك العرض، عل
ا  ا عنھ ه رغم زوج لزوجت ة ال ى تجريم مواقع العام لكل من يقدم عليھا، ويعمل المشرع الفلسطيني عل
 باعتباره شكالً من أشكال العنف األسري الواقع عليھا.
دني والجنسي والنفسي .6 ة أشكال العنف الب ى تجريم كاف د يصيب  يعمل المشرع الفلسطيني عل ذي ق ال
ف  اث، والعن رة اإلن ال األس ى أطف دي الجنسي عل ك الضرب والتع ي ذل ا ف رة، بم رأة داخل األس الم
رأة داخل  د تصيب الم ي ق ة الت ا من الممارسات التقليدي ه، وغيرھ زوج لزوجت المتصل باغتصاب ال
 األسرة.
ة   .7 ة أو العقوب ذيب أو المعامل ن التع أمن م ي م ون ف ي أن تك ق ف رأة الح انية أو للم ية أو الالإنس القاس
 المھينة في المجتمع.
يح العنف ضد  .8 ي تب ة الت دات الديني د والمعتق ة األعراف والتقالي ة كاف زم السلطة الفلسطينية بمقاوم تلت
ا  ع تعويضھا عم ال، م ذه األفع ل ھ ارس مث ن يم ل م ة لك ة رادع زاءات قانوني درج ج رأة، وأن ت الم
ا ة تأھيلھ ة  أصابھا من ضرر وأذى، وكفال ذا العنف المادي ار ھ ة آث تخلص من كاف ى ال ومساعدتھا عل
ى ظاھرة العنف  ة للقضاء عل دني العامل والنفسية، وتقديم العون والتسھيالت لمؤسسات المجتمع الم
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د بسبب العرق أو الجنسية أو  للمرأة متى أدركت سن .1 زوج وتأسيس أسرة دون أي قي البلوغ، حق الت
 الدين، وھي متساوية مع الرجل في كافة الحقوق عند الزواج وخالل قيامه ولدى انحالله.
ه شخصيا دون  .2 ا عن ه، وبإعرابھم ال ينعقد الزواج صحيحا إال برضاء طرفيه رضاء كامال ال إكراه في
 إكراه المرأة عليه.
ا مع يل .3 ذا السن متوافق تزم المشرع الفلسطيني بتعيين الحد األدنى لسن زواج الفتيات، على أن يكون ھ
 ما أخذت به أحكام القانون المدني من سن األھلية القانونية الالزم لمباشرة التصرفات القانونية.
د انحالل رابطة ال .4 رأة بع وق الم ى حق ا عل زواج حفاظ د ال ق عق ا تشترط الرسمية في توثي ة، كم زوجي
يشترط إجراء الفحص الطبي لكال الزوجين قبل الزواج بفترة وجيزة، واعتبار ھذا الفحص شرطا من 
 شروط صحة عقد الزواج.
األصل في عقد الزواج الوحدانية والديمومة، ويجوز للقاضي استثناء السماح للرجل بالزواج من ثانية  .5
ت ا ى أن يثب ة، عل باب ضرورية وملح داء أس ريطة إب ى ش دل، باإلضافة إل اق والع ى اإلنف درة عل لق
 اشتراط علم الزوجة األولى بھذا الحق، وعلم الزوجة الثانية بوجود زوجة سابقة.
ق  .6 ب التفري ي طل ق ف ا الح في، ومنحھ الق التعس ن الط ويض ع ى تع ي الحصول عل ق ف رأة الح للم
زمن العقم أو بمرض م ل إصابة الرجل ب ذلك، مث رر ل د وجود المب ى  القضائي عن ه عل دم قدرت أو ع
رر عدم جدوى استمرار  ه، أو أي أسباب تب ه أو ھجره لزوجت مباشرة حياته الزوجية أو تعدد زوجات
 رابطة الزوجية.
تھن  .7 ى نفق يعمل المشرع الفلسطيني على تفعيل دور صندوق النفقة إلعالة النساء الالتي لم يحصلن عل
 ه المادية على دفع مبلغ ھذه النفقة.نتيجة تغيب الزوج المحكوم عليه بھا، أو لعدم قدرت
ى  .8 يعمل المشرع الفلسطيني على عدم إقرار ضم األنثى بما ال يرتب حرمانھا من نفقتھا، كما يعمل عل
 تقرير حق األم في الحضانة. 
ة  .9 اواة في حق الملكي دني، كالمس انون الم للمرأة حق المساواة المطلق مع الرجل في جميع مجاالت الق
 ا في إبرام عقود خاصة لحقھا الشخصي.والتوريث، وحقھ
ة الرجل   .10 ى رغب اء عل يحق للمرأة اختيار محل إقامتھا ومسكنھا الدائم، وال يجوز تحديد ھذا المحل بن
 لوحده دون االعتداد بواقع المرأة ورغبتھا.
ا يحق لھ  .11 يير البيت األسري، كم اء وتس ة باألبن وق المتعلق ة الحق رأة مع الرجل في كاف ا تتساوى الم
 الوالية والوصاية على األبناء لما ھو مقرر لمصلحتھم، وليس العتبار نوع الجنس.
 للمرأة الحق في ملكية وحيازة ممتلكات األسرة والتصرف فيھا على قدر المساواة مع الرجل.  .12
 للمرأة األھلية الكاملة في مزاولة األعمال التجارية باسمھا ولصالحھا.  .13
 ولقبھا واسم عائلتھا بعد الزواج. يحق للمرأة االحتفاظ باسمھا  .14
ى إذن   .15 ى الحصول عل للمرأة مطلق الحق في استصدار كافة الوثائق الثبوتية والرسمية دون الحاجة إل
 من أحد.
ة   .16 ى بلغت األھلي د، مت ن أح ى إذن م تراط الحصول عل ل دون اش فر والعم ل والس ة التنق رأة حري للم
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  الملحق األول:
  حقوق المرأة في ظل المعاھدات والمواثيق الدولية
ة  ا في ثالث ا أن نجملھ ة، يمكنن ق الدولي ا للمعاھدات والمواثي رأة وفق وق التي أقرت للم بالنظر إلى مجمل الحق
  أدرجت في مضمونھا مختلف ھذه الحقوق. تمثلت ھذه القطاعات فيما يلي:قطاعات رئيسية، 
  الحقوق السياسية -أ
ولي  ة، والحق في ت ات في الدول ة االنتخاب ات لكاف تمثلت ھذه الحقوق بشكل أساسي في حق الترشح واالنتخاب
ة ة بالجنسية الوطني وق المتعلق وق، والحق ابھا  الوظائف العامة والخاصة وما يتصل بھا من حق من حيث اكتس
  وتغييرھا واآلثار المترتبة عليھا. 
  االتفاقية الخاصة بالحقوق السياسية للمرأة
 .الحق في التصويت في جميع االنتخابات  
 .الحق في أن ينتخبن لجميع الھيئات المنتخبة باالقتراع العام في الدولة 
  169الدولة.الحق في تقلد المناصب العامة، وممارسة جميع المناصب العامة في 
 
  االتفاقية المتعلقة بشأن جنسية المرأة المتزوجة
  انحالل رابطة ه ب ي، أو انفصالھا عن ا من أجنب دى زواجھ أثر جنسية الزوجة األصلية ل عدم جواز ت
  الزواج.
 .عدم جواز تأثر جنسية الزواج بتغيير الزوج لجنسيته، أو اكتسابه لجنسية دولة أخرى  
  د ن اح ة م ة األجنبي ع يجوز للزوج ا م ية زوجھ ى جنس ب الحصول عل دول األعضاء طل واطني ال م
ومي  احتفاظھا بجنسيتھا األصلية، وتخضع في ذلك لشروط التجنس التي قد تفرضھا مصلحة األمن الق
ة  ذه االتفاقي ل ھ رأة، وال يجوز تأوي ين الرجل والم أو النظام العام في دولة جنسية الزوج دون تمييز ب
ا الحصول  على نحو يسحب امتيازا منح ق بحق طلبھ ا يتعل للزوجة سواء كان تشريعيا أو قضائيا فيم
 على جنسية زوجھا.
  
  إعالن القضاء على التمييز ضد المرأة
  
                                                            
169 مواد) لتضع  8جاءت الحقوق السياسية المقررة للمرأة في هذه االتفاقية في نصوص المواد الثالثة األولى منها، بينما خصصت باقي النصوص ( 
 قواعد إجرائية خاصة بتنفيذ أحكام هذه االتفاقية وانضمام الدول إليها وانسحابها منها.
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  ات ع الھيئ ھا لجمي يح نفس ي ترش ا ف ات، وضمان حقھ ع االنتخاب ي جمي ي التصويت ف ا ف ضمان حقھ
  المنبثقة عن االنتخابات العامة.
 ع االستفتاءات العامة.ضمان حقھا في التصويت في جمي 
 .ضمان حقھا في تقلد المناصب العامة، ومباشرة جميع الوظائف العامة في الدولة 
  ا أو ية أو تغييرھ اب الجنس ق باكتس ا يتعل ل فيم ررة للرج وق المق ة الحق رأة بكاف ع الم وجوب أن تتمت
ا جنسية االحتفاظ بھا، وال يترتب على الزواج من أجنبي أي مساس بجنسية الزوجة، أو يف رض عليھ
  170زوجھا.
  
  اتفاقية القضاء على أشكال التمييز ضد المرأة
  .ضمان تحقيق المساواة في الحقوق السياسية بين الرجل والمرأة 
 .وان تضمن للمرأة حق التصويت في جميع االنتخابات واالستفتاءات العامة 
 ة وشغل وظائف حي ي الدول ة ف ة الوظائف العام ي كاف ي ترشحھا ف ة مؤسسات والحق ف ي كاف ة ف وي
ين  ة للنساء من ب الدولة العامة، سواء على الصعيد الداخلي أو الخارجي، من خالل إدراج كوته قانوني
   171المرشحين في كافة االنتخابات في الدولة، لضمان تمثيلھن بشكل فاعل وأساسي.
 را  أن تضمن للمرأة حقوقا مساوية للرجل فيما يتعلق باكتساب الجنسية وتغييرھا أو ا، فكثي االحتفاظ بھ
ة  د الجنسية الوطني من الدول تمارس تمييزا ضد رعاياھا من النساء آالتي يتزوجن بأجانب، حيث تمت
ة،  ي من زوجة وطني زوج األجنب ى ال إلى الزوجة األجنبية من زوج وطني، بينما ال يمتد ھذا الحق إل
اء كما ال تتعامل الكثير من الدول بمبدأ المساواة فيما يتعلق  بأبناء الوطنية المتزوجة من أجنبي مع أبن
 األجنبية المتزوجة من وطني.
  
  الحقوق االقتصادية واالجتماعية -ب
تعتبر ھذه الحقوق أكثر الحقوق التي وجدت اھتماما دوليا فيما يتعلق بتحقيق مبدأ المساواة بين الرجل والمرأة، 
ذه إدراكا من المجموعة الدولية بمدى التأثير الذي يحدث ه الوضع االقتصادي واالجتماعي على مجمل تحقيق ھ
ادة  ا في زي ا ومحوري رأة تلعب دورا ھام المساواة، خاصة فيما يتعلق بالجانب االقتصادي، حيث أصبحت الم
  الدخل األسري والقومي، على نحو شاركت فيه الرجل بدرجة كبيرة في ھذا المجال.
  
  إعالن القضاء على التمييز ضد المرأة
  
                                                            
170 اء على التمييز ضد المرأة.من إعالن القض 5م   
171 من اتفاقية القضاء على أشكال التمييز ضد المرأة. 7م    
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 172حة جميع أنواع االتجار بالمرأة واستغاللھا جنسيا.مكاف  
  ع ة بجمي ة المؤسسات التعليمي حماية حق المرأة في التعليم على كافة درجاته، من حيث االلتحاق بكاف
ررة  دريس المق ل الت ي حق ل ف ة للعم ؤھالت المطلوب ية والم اھج الدراس ي المن اوي ف ا، والتس أنواعھ
 ل على المنح واإلعانات الدراسية، للجنسين، والتساوي في فرص الحصو
  رة حة األس ة ص ى كفال اعد عل ي تس ة الت ات التربوي ى المعلوم ول عل ة الحص ي إمكاني اوي ف التس
  173ورفاھيتھا.
  .حقھا في العمل وتلقي التدريب المھني وحرية اختيار مھنتھا 
 خل بيئة العمل. حقھا في تقاضي مكافأة مساوية لمكافأة الرجل والتمتع بمعاملة مساوية للرجل دا 
  ة ضد حقھا في التمتع بإجازات مدفوعة األجر واالستحقاقات التقاعدية والضمانات االجتماعية المؤمن
 البطالة أو المرض أو الشيخوخة أو غير ذلك من أسباب العجز عن العمل. 
  ع فصلھا من العمل في ة حقھا في تقاضي التعويضات العائلية على قدم المساواة مع الرجل، ومن حال
 زواجھا أو حملھا، ومنحھا كافة االمتيازات التي تتناسب مع طبيعتھا من إجازة أمومة مدفوعة األجر. 
  .174تمنح المرأة امتيازات إضافية عن الرجل فيما يتعلق بطبيعة عملھا تناسب صميم تكوينھا الجسدي   
  
  اتفاقية القضاء على أشكال التمييز ضد المرأة
  
 ا أن تراعي المنظومة التع ليمية في الدولة تفھما صحيحا ومتحضرا لدور المرأة الھام في األسرة باعتبارھ
 نواة المجتمع. 
  ،رأة ين الرجل والم اء في األسرة مسؤولية مشتركة ب أن تلتزم الدول بان تعترف أن مسؤولية تربية األبن
رار نظم إج ل إق ة (مث ة ھياكل أساسية اجتماعي تتبعه ضرورة إقام د يس ذي ق اء األمر ال ازات خاصة لآلب
  175تمكنھم من المشاركة االيجابية والفعالة في ھذه التربية).
 .اتخاذ كافة التدابير التشريعية والعملية الخاصة بالقضاء على كافة أسباب االتجار الجنسي بالمرأة 
 رأة ة الم ة صارمة لكل من ينتھك حرم دابير عقابي اذ ت ع، واتخ  توفير فرص عمل كافية للنساء في المجتم
  الجسدية والنفسية. 
  ايير ا للمع ك وفق ة، وذل ال التربي ي مج اوية للرجل ف ا مس رأة حقوق نح الم دابير الخاصة بم ة الت اذ كاف اتخ
  176التالية:
                                                            
172 من إعالن القضاء على التمييز ضد المرأة. 8، و7انظر نصوص المواد    
173 من إعالن القضاء على التمييز ضد المرأة. 9م    
174 من إعالن القضاء على التمييز ضد المرأة. 10م   
175 ء على أشكال التمييز ضد المرأة.من اتفاقية القضا 5م     
176 من اتفاقية القضاء على أشكال التمييز ضد المرأة. 10لمزيد من التفاصيل انظر نص المادة     
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ا  .1 منح شروط متساوية في التوجيه الوظيفي والمھني، وعدم التمييز في الفرص الممنوحة للجنسين فيم
  يتعلق بتكافؤ فرص التعليم العالي.
 المناھج الدراسية واالمتحانات ومستويات مؤھالت المدرسين. التساوي في .2
 التساوي في فرص الحصول على المنح الدراسية واإلعانات المالية األخرى. .3
 التساوي في فرص االلتحاق ببرامج محو األمية والقضاء على الجھل في المجتمع. .4
 التساوي في فرص المشاركة في األنشطة الرياضية والتربية البدنية. .5
  ذي يجب أن دابير ال ى عدد من الت تمتع النساء بالحق المطلق في العمل، من خالل النص الصريح عل
 تتخذھا الدول األطراف في ھذا المجال على النحو التالي:
يم  .1 ي والتعل دريب المھن وفير فرص الت ا، وت وفرة لكليھم ل المت ي فرص العم رأة بالرجل ف اواة الم مس
  كافؤ.للمرأة الكفيل بتحقيق ھذا الت
ة تمكن  .2 ة وثقافي اط اجتماعي وفير أنم دول بت ام ال بھا، وقي ة التي تناس اء المھن كفالة حرية المرأة في انتق
ا  تأثر بھ جميع أفراد المجتمع من تقبل فكرة تواجد المرأة في أنواع كثيرة من المھن والحرف التي اس
 الرجال.
ا با .3 ل، وكفالتھ ة مساواة المرأة للرجل في األجر في نفس العم ا، وكفال اعي المناسب لھ لضمان االجتم
 ظروف العمل ومتطلباته.
 حماية المرأة في مكان العمل من كافة أشكال التمييز القائم على الحالة االجتماعية أو األمومة. .4
ايقات  .5 ل، وخاصة المض ان العم ي مك ا ف رض لھ د تتع ي ق ف الت كال العن ة أش ن كاف رأة م ة الم حماي
 177الجنسية التي يتعرضن لھا.
    .اتخاذ كافة اإلجراءات القانونية الالزمة لضمان الرعاية الصحية للمرأة  
  ؤثر ة ت ة أو اجتماعي ات قانوني ة عقب ة أي ا، وإزال املة لھ ة الصحية الش ى الرعاي الحق في الحصول عل
 على ھذا الحق. 
 ة ة كاف حية وإزال ة الص دمات الرعاي ع خ ى جمي اء عل ول النس ة بحص دابير الخاص ع الت اذ جمي  اتخ
  األسباب التي تحول دون ذلك، من فقر أو أمية أو العزل البدني الذي تتعرض له النساء الريفيات.
  .ضمان االستقالل المالي للمرأة، لضمان مباشراتھا لمھامھا األسرية والتجارية بشكل مستقل 
  ة نح النساء كاف رأة، وم ة إزالة كافة أشكال التمييز في المعاملة المالية بين الرجل والم ات المالي اإلعان
ة  اواة المطلق ذلك المس ات، وك ذه اإلعان اواة في شروط ھ والتأمين الذي قد يمنح للرجل، وتحقيق المس
  178في المعامالت المصرفية من خالل الحظر على التمييز بين الرجل والمرأة في ھذا المجال.
 دا نھن، وضمان مشاركة االعتراف بأھمية عمل الريفيات ومساھمتھن في رفاھية أسرھن واقتصاد بل
دراتھا  ة ق المرأة الريفية في إعداد وتنمية التخطيط اإلنمائي لكي تتمكن المرأة من إيجاد بيئة جيدة لتنمي
  االجتماعية واالقتصادية.
  
                                                            
177 ، أن تدرج في 1992في هذا الشأن طالبت االتفاقية جميع الدول األطراف في التوصية الثانية عشرة المعتمدة في الدورة الثامنة للجنة في العام   
 رها إلى اللجنة (لجنة القضاء على التمييز ضد المرأة) معلومات عن التشريعات الصادرة ضد المضايقات الجنسية في مكان العمل، وفي العامتقاري
أوصت اللجنة بان تعتمد الدول األطراف تدابير قانونية فعالة لحماية المرأة من كافة أشكال العنف التي قد تتعرض لها في مكان العمل.  1992  
178 من اتفاقية القضاء على أشكال التمييز ضد المرأة. 13م    
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  االتفاقية المتعلقة بشأن تشغيل النساء أثناء الليل وتعديالتھا
ة أو خاصةالحق في عدم جواز تشغيل النساء في أي سن أثناء الليل في  ، أو في أي 179أي منشأة صناعية عام
  . 180من فروعھا، ويستثنى من ذلك المنشآت التي ال يشتغل فيھا غير أفراد األسرة الواحدة
  بشأن تساوي أجور العمال والعامالت عند تساوي العمل 100االتفاقية رقم 
 امھم بعمل م د قي امالت عن ال والع ين العم افئ، ويمكن أن يطبق وكفالة تطبيق مبدأ تساوي األجر ب تك
ق:  ن طري دأ ع ذا المب ة.  -1ھ وائح القومي وانين أو الل ا  -2الق ه قانون رف ب انوني، أو معت از ق أي جھ
ور.  د األج ال.  -3لتحدي ل والعم ين أصحاب العم ة ب ات الجماعي اليب  -4االتفاق ذه األس ين ھ ع ب الجم
    181المختلفة.
  ضع وبعدهاالتفاقية الخاصة بشأن استخدام النساء قبل الو
 182ال يجوز السماح بتشغيل المرأة خالل األسابيع الستة التالية للوضع . 
  تة الل س ع خ ول الوض رجيح حص د ت ة تفي ھادة طبي دمت ش ل إذا ق ن العم اع ع رأة االنقط ق للم يح
  183أسابيع.
  ا من المعيشة ا ھي وطفلھ ة تمكنھ تمكين المرأة خالل ھذا الظرف من الحصول على مزايا مالية كافي
 حوال صحية طيبة. في أ
  .كما يحق للمرأة الحصول على رعاية طبية مجانية من طبيب أو قابلة مؤھلة 
  دة ل م ا، ال تق يحق للمرأة التي ترضع طفلھا الحصول على فترتين للراحة اليومية خالل ساعات عملھ
 كل منھما عن نصف ساعة لتتمكن من إرضاع طفلھا. 
  ا نتيجة إذا ما تغيبت المرأة عن عملھا للظروف ر من المسموح بھ المشار إليھا أعاله لفترة زمنية أكث
ى تحمل  ادرة عل ر ق مرض بشھادة طبية، تفيد أن ھذا التغيب ناتج عن الحمل أو الوضع، قد جعلھا غي
ا  ا، وال أن يرسل إليھ ذرھا بالفصل من عملھ ا لصاحب العمل أن ين أعباء العمل، فانه ال يجوز قانون
ي م ذارا بالفصل تنتھ دة إن ا الم رة غيابھ ا فت دى فيھ ي تتع ة الت تثناء الحال اب، باس ذا الغي الل ھ ه خ دت
 184المنصوص عليھا قانونا في التشريعات الداخلية لدولتھا.
                                                            
179 الصناعات التي تتناول تصنيع  -2المناجم والمحاجر واألعمال األخرى المتصلة باستخراج مواد من باطن األرض.  -1يقصد بالمنشأة الصناعية:  
صالح الخاصة باألبنية والطرق والمشاءات. األعمال المتصلة بأعمال الترميم واإل -3األدوات وتحويلها وتنظيفها وٕاصالحها.   
180 ق العمل بمواد ورد استثناء على هذا المبدأ يتعلق بحالة القوة القاهرة التي تؤدي إلى توقف العمل في المنشاة ألسباب قاهرة غير متوقعة، وعندما يتعل 
بشأن تشغيل النساء أثناء الليل. 4رقم من االتفاقية  4أولية قابلة للتلف السريع. لمزيد من التفاصيل انظر نص المادة   
181 من اتفاقية تساوي أجور العمال والعامالت عند تساوي العمل. 2م   
182 /أ3م     
183 /ب3م    
184 الخاصة باستخدام النساء قبل الوضع وبعده. 3من االتفاقية رقم  4م   
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  ن ل ع رة ال تق ة لفت ازة لألموم رة إج ى فت رأة الحصول عل ق للم ازة  12يح رة إج مل فت بوعا تش أس
 المحتمل للوضع.  إجبارية بعد الوضع، متى قدمت شھادة طبية تحدد اليوم
ق  ى أن ترف ل الوضع، عل ازة إضافية قب ى إج ا الحصول عل ل، فيحق لھ ة الحم رأة نتيج ة مرض الم ي حال ف
  أسباب طلبھا ھذا بشھادة طبية معتمدة. 
  1976االتفاقية العربية بشأن المرأة العاملة لعام 
 ى العمل على مساواة المرأة بالرجل في كافة تشريعات العمل، ووجوب أن تشت ذه التشريعات عل مل ھ
  185أحكام خاصة منظمة لعمل المرأة في كافة القطاعات االقتصادية، وعلى األخص قطاع الزراعة.
  ،ل ة شروط وظروف العم العمل على ضمان تكافؤ الفرص في االستخدام بين المرأة والرجل في كاف
  186وضمان منح المرأة العاملة األجر المماثل للرجل في نفس العمل.
 يم، العمل ع ة مراحل التعل لى ضمان إتاحة الفرص للمرأة العاملة على قدم المساواة مع الرجل في كاف
  187وكذلك في التوجيه والتدريب المھني قبل وبعد االلتحاق بالعمل.
  ه ا المسموح ب رات انقطاعھ د فت ة بع رأة العامل دريب الم ادة ت وفير تسھيالت إع ى ضمان ت العمل عل
اقة أو الضارة بالصحة قانونا عن مجال العمل، كما  ال الخطرة أو الش يحظر تشغيل النساء في األعم
ولى الجھات  ى أن تت يال عل ة، وال يجوز تشغيل النساء ل واألخالق التي يحددھا المشرع في كل دول
   188المختصة في كل دولة تحديد فترات الليل طبقا لما يتماشى مع مناخ وتقاليد كل دولة.
 رده أو يلتزم كل صاحب عمل في المنش ة دار للحضانة بمف ى تھيئ آت التي تعمل فيھا النساء بالعمل عل
باالشتراك مع منشآت أخرى، بحيث تحدد التشريعات الداخلية للدول شروط إنشاء ومواصفات ونظام 
  189دور الحضانة.
  ل، وفي رة للحم رة األخي اء الفت ة أثن رأة العامل ا الم ال التي تكلف بھ وجوب العمل على تخفيف األعم
  190فترة األولى عقب الوالدة، ويحظر تشغيلھا ساعات إضافية في ھذه الفترات.ال
  ،ابيع ل عن عشرة أس يحق للمرأة العاملة الحصول على إجازة بأجر كامل قبل وبعد الوضع لمدة ال تق
دة  ل انقضاء الم غيلھا قب ابيع، ويحظر تش تة أس د الوضع عن س ازة بع ذه اإلج دة ھ ل م ى أن ال تق عل
اجم عن المذكورة، كم ة المرض الن نح إجازة مرضية خاصة في حال رأة المتزوجة أن تم ا يحق للم
                                                            
185 1976االتفاقية العربية بشأن المرأة العاملة لعام من  2م   
186 1976ربية بشأن المرأة العاملة لعام االتفاقية العمن  3م   
187 1976االتفاقية العربية بشأن المرأة العاملة لعام من  4م   
188 1976االتفاقية العربية بشأن المرأة العاملة لعام من  7، و6، و5انظر نصوص المواد    
189 1976االتفاقية العربية بشأن المرأة العاملة لعام من  8م   




ازات ضمن  ذه اإلج ى أن ال تحتسب ھ ة، عل ل دول ي ك دده المشرع ف ا يح ا لم ل أو الوضع طبق الحم
ة  رأة العامل ع الحاالت يحظر فصل الم انون. وفي جمي ا في الق اإلجازات المرضية المنصوص عليھ
  ھا بإجازة الوضع، أو أثناء أجازتھا المرضية بسبب الحمل أو الوضع.أثناء حملھا أو قيام
  ة ة األخر في حال كما أجازت االتفاقية لكال الزوجين الحق في الحصول على إجازة بدون اجر لمرافق
ولى التشريعات  ى أن تت ا، عل ة أو خارجھ انتقاله إلى مكان أخر غير مكان العمل األصلي، داخل الدول
رأة  الداخلية للدول ة للم تحديد الحد األقصى المصرح به لھذا النوع من اإلجازات. كما أجازت االتفاقي
دد  ا للشروط والم ك وفق ا وذل ة أطفالھ رغ لتربي دون اجر للتف ى إجازة ب العاملة الحق في الحصول عل
ا يج ب أن التي تحددھا التشريعات الوطنية للدول، على أن تحتفظ المرأة بوظيفتھا خالل ھذه المدة. كم
 تشتمل تشريعات التأمينات االجتماعية الخاصة بكل دولة تأمينا خاصا باألمومة.
   وظيفي ين معاشھما ال ى حد سواء الحق في الجمع ب كما أجازت االتفاقية لكل من الرجل والمرأة عل
رأة في  ة للرجل عن الم ة المالي وبين معاش زوجه دون انتقاص عند الوفاة، على أساس انفصال الذم
ى معاشي الت ي الحصول عل ة ف رأة العامل اء الم ذا الحق ألبن د ھ ا يمت ة. كم ة العربي ريعات القانوني ش
 أبويھما دون انتقاص في وقت واحد عند وفاتھما.
  أمين الصحي ازات الت تفادة من امتي راد األسرة الحق في االس ع أف ى أن لجمي ة عل كما نصت االتفاقي
ريعات الخاصة ولى التش المرأة، وتت ا يحق  الخاص ب رة، كم ة المقصود باألس د ماھي ة تحدي ل دول بك
ة  رأة العامل ا يحق للم ا، كم ا ألوالدھ للمرأة العاملة الحصول على المنح العائلية المالية في حالة إعالتھ
ة  ة استحقاقات مالي ة أو المعاش أو أي ة الخدم أة نھاي ة من مكاف تحقاتھا المالي ى كامل مس الحصول عل
 تمييز عن الرجل.أخرى دونما أدنى درجة 
  الحقوق المتعلقة باألھلية المدنية واألحوال الشخصية -ج
دولي، نظرا التصالھا بشكل مباشر  ى الصعيد ال على الرغم من صعوبة تناول مثل ھذا النوع من الحقوق عل
ى الصعيد ال دولي، بثوابت دينية وعقائدية في المجتمعات المختلفة، وتناولھا أمورا قانونية يصعب توحيدھا عل
ة  ق والمعاھدات الدولي نظرا لخصوصية كل مجتمع وكل تنظيم قانوني وطني على ھذا الصعيد، إال أن المواثي
اواة  ا من المس ى تحقيق نوع ا بصعوبة الوصول إل لم تكن لتغفل تنظيم مثل ھذا النوع من الحقوق، إدراكا منھ
  بين الرجل والمرأة دون التطرق لھا.
ة للمجتمعات ورغبة من المجتمع الدولي  دات الديني وق دون المساس بالمعتق من تنظيم مثل ھذا النوع من الحق
وق دون أن تخوض  ذه الحق وثوابتھا الوطنية على الصعيد األسري، جاءت ھذه المواثيق لتضع حدودا عامة لھ
  في تفاصيلھا رغبة منھا في عدم التعرض لخصوصية المجتمعات المحلية.
  
  لحد األدنى لسن الزواج، وتسجيل عقود الزواجاتفاقية الرضا بالزواج، وا
  د ه بشخصيھما بع ال ينعقد الزواج قانونا إالّ برضا الطرفين رضاء كامال ال إكراه فيه، وبإعرابھما عن
ام  ا ألحك ھود وفق زواج، وبحضور ش د ال ة بعق لطة المختص ة، وبحضور الس ة الالزم أمين العالني ت
ن  تثنى م ة، ويس ي الدول تص ف انون المخ تثنائية الق ة باس لطة المختص ت الس ا إذا اقتنع ة م ك حال ذل
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ھا  ي يعرض يغة الت لطة مختصة وبالص ام س اه أم ن رض رب ع د أع ذا الطرف ق أن ھ روف، وب الظ
 القانون، ولم يسحب ذلك الرضا. 
  ذا م دون ھ اتخاذ التدابير التشريعية الالزمة لتعيين حد أدنى لسن الزواج، وال ينعقد قانونا زواج من ھ
ة، لمصلحة الطرفين المزمع  السن، ما لم تقرر السلطة المختصة اإلعفاء من شرط السن ألسباب جدي
 زواجھما. وتلتزم السلطة المختصة بتسجيل جميع عقود الزواج في سجل رسمي مناسب. 
  
  إعالن القضاء على التمييز ضد المرأة
 اوية للر ة مس وق مدني رأة بحق ع الم ة بتمت دابير الكفيل ة الت اذ كاف دة اتخ دأ وح الل بمب ل، دون اإلخ ج
  191وانسجام األسرة، وال سيما في الحقوق التالية:
 .حق التملك وإدارة الممتلكات الخاصة والتصرف بھا ووراثتھا  
 .حق التمتع باألھلية القانونية الكاملة 
 .كافة الحقوق التي يتمتع بھا الرجل فيما يتعلق بالتشريعات الخاصة بحق التنقل والسفر 
 د  حق المرأة وق الناشئة عن عق ة الحق في اختيار زوجھا بمحض إرادتھا، وتساويھا مع الرجل في كاف
ذه  ر ھ ي لتقري ار أول اء كمعي ار مصلحة األبن ين االعتب ه، واألخذ بع الزواج، والحقوق الناشئة عن حل





  كال التمييز ضد المرأةاتفاقية القضاء على أش
  
  .وجوب مساواة المرأة بالرجل أمام القانون 
  ة ق الملكي ي ح اواة ف ل المس دني (مث انون الم االت الق ي مج ين ف ين الجنس اواة ب ق المس ة تحقي كفال
 والتوريث وحق المرأة في إدراج عقود خاصة لصالحھا). 
  .حق المرأة في اختيار محل إقامتھا ومسكنھا الدائم  
 ار حظر كاف ي اختي ا ف ن حقھ رأة م رم الم ا تح را م رة، فكثي انون األس ق بق ا يتعل ز فيم كال التميي ة أش
ا في  زوجھا، وكثيرا ما تحرم من اختيار أسلوب التربية الذي ترتئيه ألوالدھا، وكثيرا ما يصادر حقھ
 إنھاء عالقتھا الزوجية إن ھي رأت بعدم جدوى استمرارھا أو تضررھا من استمرارھا. 
                                                            
191 من إعالن القضاء على التمييز ضد المرأة. 6م  
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  ة تتخذ الدول األطراف جميع التدابير المناسبة للقضاء على التمييز ضد المرأة في كافة األمور المتعلق
  بالزواج والعالقات العائلية". وفي ھذا الشأن جاءت االتفاقية لتفصل ھذه الحقوق على النحو التالي:
 .الحق في الرضا على عقد الزواج  
 .الحق في اختيار الزوج 
 قاد عقد الزواج أثناء الحياة الزوجية.الحقوق الناشئة عن انع 
 .الحقوق المتعلقة باألبناء وتسيير البيت األسري 
 .الحق في الوالية والوصاية على األبناء لما ھو مقرر لمصلحة األبناء وليس العتبار نوع الجنس 
 .الحق في العمل واختيار طبيعته 



















  اإلطار الدستوري لحقوق المرأة الفلسطينية
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  الملحق الثاني:
  اإلطار الدستوري لحقوق المرأة الفلسطينية
باستعراض نصوص القانون األساسي والمسودة الثالثة لمشروع الدستور الفلسطيني، نجدھا تقرر مبدأ 
اسية واالقتصادية واالجتماعية والمدنية والثقافية، وذلك على المساواة بين الرجل والمرأة في كافة الحقوق السي
  النحو التالي: 
  الحقوق السياسية: - أ
  .حق مشاركة المرأة في الحياة السياسية العامة جنبا إلى جنب مع الرجل 
  .حق تشكيل األحزاب السياسية والمشاركة فيھا على أي وجه 
 ؤسسات الشعبية. حق تكوين النقابات واالتحادات واألندية والم 
  .حق التصويت والترشح في االنتخابات 
  .الحق في عقد االجتماعات العامة والخاصة 
  .الحق في تولي الوظائف العامة 
  .الحق في التعبير عن الرأي، وتأسيس الصحف وسائر وسائل اإلعالم 
 .حق المرأة الفلسطينية في إعطاء الجنسية إلى أبنائھا 
  
  الحقوق االقتصادية: - ب
 .للمرأة شخصيتھا القانونية المستقلة، وذمتھا المالية المستقلة عن الرجل 
  .تقرير حرية المرأة في إبرام العقود والتصرفات القانونية أيا كانت، والحفاظ على ملكيتھا الخاصة 
  .الحق االقتصادي على أساس مبدأ تكافؤ الفرص 
 .حق المرأة في المساھمة الفاعلة في الحياة االقتصادية 
  
  الحقوق االجتماعية واالقتصادية: - ج
 .حق المرأة في العمل والرعاية الصحية واالجتماعية 
  .حقھا في التنظيم النقابي 
 .الحق في التعليم وحرية البحث العلمي واإلبداع األدبي والثقافي والفني 
  .اعتبار رعاية األمومة والطفولة واجب وطني 




  الحقوق المدنية والشخصية: -د
  .الحق في السكن المالئم للحفاظ على الحياة األسرية الخاصة 
  .الحق في الحياة وسالمة الجسد 
  .حماية حرمة الحياة الخاصة للمرأة 
  .حقھا في اإلقامة والتنقل 
  .الحق في التقاضي 
قرر مبدأ المساواة بين الكافة دون تمييز ألي سبب كان، وبالذات على إن االتجاه الدستوري في فلسطين ي
أساس الجنس، بالتالي فانه ال يجوز ألي تشريع كان قانون أو نظام أن يشير إلى حرمان المرأة ألي من 


















Appendix (H)  
The Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine November 15th 1988 (Arabic 
Version) 
The Palestinian Declaration of Independence192, also known as the Palestinian proclamation of 
independence, is a doctrine written by the late Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish and 
proclaimed by late PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat before the PNC on 15 November 1988 in 
Algiers, the Algerian capital. The declaration stressed the rights of the Palestinian nation to 
establish their nation state in the geographic area known as historic Palestine, as determined by 
the British Mandate. 
 
 وثيقة إعالن االستقالل
 
على أرض الرساالت السماوية إلى البشر، على أرض فلسطين ولد الشعب العربي الفلسطيني، نما وتطور 
ريخوأبدع وجوده اإلنساني عبر عالقة عضوية، ال انفصام فيه وال انقطاع، بين الشعب واألرض والتا . 
بالثبات الملحمي في المكان والزمان، صاغ شعب فلسطين ھويته الوطنية، وارتقى بصموده في الدفاع عنھا 
إلى مستوى المعجزة، فعلى الرغم مما أثاره سحر ھذه األرض القديمة وموقعھا الحيوي على حدود التشابك 
ن شعبھا من إمكانية تحقيق من مطامح ومطامع وغزوات كانت ستؤدي إلى حرما… بين القوى والحضارات
استقالله السياسي، إال أن ديمومة التصاق الشعب باألرض ھي التي منحت األرض ھويتھا، ونفخت في 
الشعب روح الوطن، مطعما بسالالت الحضارة، وتعدد الثقافات، مستلھما نصوص تراثه الروحي والزمني، 
في التواجد الكلي بين األرض واإلنسان على  واصل الشعب العربي الفلسطيني، عبر التاريخ، تطوير ذاته
خطى األنبياء المتواصلة على ھذه األرض المباركة، على كل مئذنة صالة الحمد للخالق ودق مع جرس كل 
 .كنيسة ومعبد ترنيمه الرحمة والسالم
ت شعبنا ومن جيل إلى جيل، لم يتوقف الشعب العربي الفلسطيني عن الدفاع الباسل عن وطنه ولقد كانت ثورا
  .المتالحقة تجسيداً بطوليا إلرادة االستقالل الوطني
الجديدة كانت موازين القوى المحلية والعالمية  هففي الوقت الذي كان فيه العالم المعاصر يصوغ نظام قيم
 .تستثني الفلسطيني من المصير العام، فاتضح مرة أخرى أن العدل وحدة ال يسير عجالت التاريخ
جرح الفلسطيني الكبير على مفارقة جارحة: فالشعب الذي حرم من االستقالل وتعرض وطنه وھكذا انفتح ال
الحتالل من نوع جديد، قد تعرض لمحاولة تعميم األكذوبة القائلة "إن فلسطين ھي أرض بال شعب" وعلى 
، وفي 1919ام من ميثاق عصبة األمم لع 22الرغم من ھذا التزييف التاريخي، فإن المجتمع الدولي في المادة 
                                                            
192 Section highlighted in yellow is translated into English. It is the section in the Declaration of Independence which 
emphasizes the equal rights of Palestinian regardless of their race, religion, or gender. Please refer to Appendix (M) 
for  the English version  
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قد اعترف بأن الشعب العربي الفلسطيني شأنه شأن الشعوب العربية األخرى، التي  1923معاھدة لوزان لعام 
 .انسلخت عن الدولة العثمانية ھو شعب حر مستقل
ومع الظلم التاريخي الذي لحق بالشعب العربي الفلسطيني بتشريده وبحرمانه من حق تقرير المصير، أثر 
م، الذي قسم فلسطين إلى دولتين عربية ويھودية،فإن ھذا القرار 1947عام  181ية العامة رقم قرار الجمع
 .مازال يوفر شروطاً للشرعية الدولية تضمن حق الشعب العربي الفلسطيني في السيادة واالستقالل الوطني
ع غالبية الفلسطينيين إن احتالل القوات اإلسرائيلية األرض الفلسطينية وأجزاء من األرض العربية واقتال
وتشريدھم عن ديارھم، بقوة اإلرھاب المنظم، واخضاع الباقين منھم لالحتالل واإلضطھاد ولعمليات تدمير 
معالم حياتھم الوطنية، ھو انتھاك صارخ لمبادئ الشرعية ولميثاق األمم المتحدة ولقراراتھا التي تعترف 
لعودة، وحق تقرير المصير واالستقالل والسيادة على أرضه بحقوق الشعب الفلسطيني الوطنية، بما فيھا حق ا
  .ووطنه
وفي قلب الوطن وعلى سياجه، في المنافي القريبة والبعيدة، لم يفقد الشعب العربي الفلسطيني إيمانه الراسخ 
 بحقه في العودة، وال إيمانه الصلب بحقه في االستقالل، ولم يتمكن االحتالل والمجازر والتشريد من طرد
ولقد واصل نضاله الملحمي، وتابع بلورة شخصيته الوطنية من خالل التراكم  -الفلسطيني من وعيه وذاته
النضالي المتنامي. وصاغت اإلرادة الوطنية إطارھا السياسي، منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية، ممثالً شرعياً 
مم المتحدة ومؤسساتھا والمنظمات ووحيداً للشعب الفلسطيني، باعتراف المجتمع الدولي، متمثالً بھيئة األ
اإلقليمية والدولية األخرى، وعلى قاعدة اإليمان بالحقوق الثابتة، وعلى قاعدة اإلجماع القومي العربي، وعلى 
قاعدة الشرعية الدولية قادت منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية معارك شعبھا العظيم، المنصھر في وحدته الوطنية 
ام المجازر والحصار في الوطن وخارج الوطن. وتجلت ملحمة المقاومة المثلي، وصموده األسطوري أم
الفلسطينية في الوعي العربي وفي الوعي العالمي، بصفتھا واحدة من أبرز حركات التحرر الوطني في ھذا 
 .العصر
إن االنتفاضة الشعبية الكبرى، المتصاعدة في األرض المحتلة مع الصمود األسطوري في المخيمات داخل 
خارج الوطن، قد رفعا األدراك اإلنساني بالحقيقة الفلسطينية وبالحقوق الوطنية الفلسطينية إلى مستوى أعلى و
من اإلستيعاب والنضج، وأسدلت ستار الختام على مرحلة كاملة من التزييف ومن خمول الضمير وحاصرت 
اب في نفيھا الوجود الفلسطينيالعقلية اإلسرائيلية الرسمية التي أدمنت اإلحتكام إلى الخرافة واإلرھ . 
مع االنتفاضة، وبالتراكم الثوري النضالي لكل مواقع الثورة يبلغ الزمن الفلسطيني أحدى لحظات اإلنعطاف 
التاريخي الحادة وليؤكد الشعب العربي الفلسطيني، مرة أخرى حقوقه الثابتة وممارستھا فوق أرضه 
 .الفلسطينية
التاريخي والقانوني للشعب العربي الفلسطيني في وطنه فلسطين وتضحيات واستناداً إلى الحق الطبيعي و
أجياله المتعاقبة دفاعا عن حرية وطنھم واستقالله وانطالقا من قرارات القمم العربية، ومن قوة الشرعية 
ي ، ممارسة من الشعب العربي الفلسطيني لحقه ف1947الدولية التي تجسدھا قرارات األمم المتحدة منذ عام 
 .تقرير المصير واالستقالل السياسي والسيادة فوق أرضه
إن دولة فلسطين ھي للفلسطينيين أينما كانوا، فيھا يطورون ھويتھم الوطنية والثقافية، ويتمتعون بالمساواة 
الكاملة في الحقوق، تصان فيھا معتقداتھم الدينية والسياسية وكرامتھم اإلنسانية، في ظل نظام ديمقراطي 
برلماني يقوم على أساس حرية الرأي وحرية تكوين األحزاب ورعاية األغلبية حقوق األقلية واحترام األقلية 
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قرارات األغلبية، وعلى العدل االجتماعي والمساواة وعدم التمييز في الحقوق العامة على أساس العرق أو 
الدين أو اللون193 أو بين المرأة والرجل، في ظل دستور يؤمن سيادة القانون والقضاء المستقل وعلى أساس 
 .الوفاء الكامل لتراث فلسطين الروحي والحضاري في التسامح والتعايش السمح بين األديان عبر القرون
إن دولة فلسطين دولة عربية ھي جزء ال يتجزأ من األمة العربية، من تراثھا وحضارتھا، ومن طموحھا 
لديمقراطية والوحدة. وھي إذ تؤكد التزامھا بميثاق جامعة الحاضر إلى تحقيق أھدافھا في التحرر والتطور وا
الدول العربية، واصرارھا على تعزيز العمل العربي المشترك، تناشد أبناء أمتھا مساعدتھا على إكتمال 
 .والدتھا العملية، بحشد الطاقات وتكثيف الجھود إلنھاء االحتالل اإلسرائيلي
مم المتحدة وأھدافھا وباإلعالن العالمي لحقوق اإلنسان، والتزامھا وتعلن دولة فلسطين التزامھا بمبادئ األ
 .كذلك بمبادئ عدم اإلنحياز وسياسته
وإذ تعلن دولة فلسطين أنھا دولة محبة للسالم ملتزمة بمبادئ التعايش السلمي، فإنھا ستعمل مع جميع الدول 
ق، تتفتح في ظله طاقات البشر على البناء، والشعوب من أجل تحقيق سالم دائم قائم على العدل واحترام الحقو
ويجري فيه التنافس على إبداع الحياة وعدم الخوف من الغد، فالغد ال يحمل غير األمان لمن عدلوا أو ثابوا 
 .إلى العدل
وفي سياق نضالھا من أجل إحالل السالم على أرض المحبة والسالم، تھيب دولة فلسطين باألمم المتحدة التي 
ولية خاصة تجاه الشعب العربي الفلسطيني ووطنه، وتھيب بشعوب العالم ودولة المحبة للسالم تتحمل مسؤ
والحرية أن تعينھا على تحقيق أھدافھا، ووضع حد لمأساة شعبھا، بتوفير األمن له، وبالعمل على إنھاء 
 .االحتالل اإلسرائيلي لألراضي الفلسطينية
ية المشاكل الدولية واإلقليمية بالطرق السلمية وفقاً لميثاق األمم كما تعلم في ھذا المجال، أنھا تؤمن بتسو
المتحدة وقراراتھا وأنھا ترفض التھديد بالقوة أو العنف أو اإلرھاب، أو بإستعمالھا ضد سالمة أراضيھا 
واستقاللھا السياسي، أو سالمة أراضي أي دولة أخرى، وذلك دون المساس بحقھا الطبيعي في الدفاع عن 
يھا واستقاللھاأراض . 
ونحن نقف على عتبة عھد جديد، ننحني  1988وفي ھذا اليوم الخالد، في الخامس عشر من تشرن الثاني 
إجالال وخشوعاً أمام أرواح شھدائنا وشھداء األمة العربية الذين أضاءوا بدمائھم الطاھرة شعلة ھذا الفجر 
ا على أيدينا لنمألھا بالنور القادم من وھج االنتفاضة العتيد، واستشھدوا من أجل أن يحيا الوطن. ونرفع قلوبن
المباركة، ومن ملحمة الصامدين في المخيمات وفي الشتات وفي المھاجر، ومن حملة لواء الحرية: أطفالنا 
وشيوخنا وشبابنا، أسرنا ومعتقلينا وجرحانا المرابطين على التراب المقدس وفي كل مخيم وفي كل قرية 
                                                            
193 “The State of Palestine is for all the Palestinians wherever they are. It is the state within which all Palestinians 
shall develop their national and cultural identity. They shall enjoy full equality in rights. Their religious and political 
beliefs and their human dignity shall be protected by a parliamentary democratic system based on freedom of 
opinion and freedom to form parties. It is a state within which the rights of minorities are protected and the respect 
of minorities to the decisions of the majority is mutual. It is a state that promotes social justice, equality and non-
discrimination in public rights on the basis of: race, religion, color, or between women193 and men, under a 
constitution which ensures the rule of law and an independent judiciary. It is a state that stands on the basis of 
preserving the full legacy of Palestine spiritual and civilizational heritage of tolerance and coexistence between 




الفلسطينية الشجاعة، حارسة بقائنا وحياتنا، وحارسة نارنا الدائمة. ونعاھد أرواح شھدائنا ومدينة، والمرأة 
األبرار، وجماھير شعبنا العربي الفلسطيني وأمتنا العربية وكل األحرار والشرفاء في العالم على مواصلة 
عظيم إلى االلتفاف حول علمه النضال من أجل جالء االحتالل، وترسيخ السيادة واالستقالل إننا، ندعو شعبنا ال
الفلسطيني واإلعتزاز به والدفاع عنه ليظل أبدا رمزاً لحريتنا وكرامتنا في وطن سيبقي دائما وطننا حراً 






















The Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine (English) 
 
Palestine, the land of the three monotheistic faiths, is where the Palestinian Arab people was 
born, on which it grew, developed and excelled. The Palestinian people was never separated 
from or diminished in its integral bonds with Palestine. Thus the Palestinian Arab people ensured 
for itself an everlasting union between itself, its land and its history. 
Resolute throughout that history, the Palestinian Arab people forged its national identity, rising 
even to imagined levels in its defense, as invasion, the design of others, and the appeal special to 
Palestine’s ancient and luminous place on that eminence where powers and civilizations are 
joined ... All this intervened thereby to deprive the people of its political independence. Yet the 
undying connection between Palestine and its people secured for the land its character, and for 
the people its national genius. 
Nourished by an unfolding series of civilizations and cultures, inspired by a heritage rich in 
variety and kind, the Palestinian Arab people added to its stature by consolidating a union 
between itself and its patrimonial Land. The call went out from Temple, Church and Mosque that 
to praise the Creator, to celebrate compassion and peace was indeed the message of Palestine. 
And in generation after generation, the Palestinian Arab people gave of itself unsparingly in the 
valiant battle for liberation and homeland. For what has been the unbroken chain of our people’s 
rebellions but the heroic embodiment of our will for national independence? And so the people 
was sustained in the struggle to stay and lo prevail. 
When in the course of modern times a new order of values was declared with norms and values 
fair for all, it was the Palestinian Arab people that had been excluded from the destiny of all 
other peoples by a hostile array of local and foreign powers. Yet again had unaided justice been 
revealed as insufficient to drive the world’s history along its preferred course? 
And it was the Palestinian people, already wounded in its body, that was submitted to yet another 
type of occupation over which floated the falsehood that "Palestine was a land without people.’’ 
This notion was foisted upon some in the world, whereas in Article 22 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations (1919) and in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the community of nations had 
recognized that all the Arab territories, including Palestine, of the formerly Ottoman provinces, 
were to have granted to them their freedom as provisionally independent nations. 
Despite the historical injustice inflicted on the Palestinian Arab people resulting in their 
dispersion and depriving them of their right to self-determination, following upon UN General 
Assembly Resolution 181 (1947), which partitioned Palestine into two states, one Arab, one 
                                                            
194 Source: Lukacs, Y. (1992). The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict – a documentary record 1967-1990. Cambridge: 




Jewish, yet it is this Resolution that still provides those conditions of international legitimacy 
that ensure the right of the Palestinian Arab people to sovereignty. 
By stages, the occupation of Palestine and parts of other Arab territories by Israeli forces, the 
willed dispossession and expulsion from their ancestral homes of the majority of Palestine’s 
civilian inhabitants, was achieved by organized terror; those Palestinians who remained, as a 
vestige subjugated in its homeland, were persecuted and forced to endure the destruction of their 
national life. 
Thus were principles of international legitimacy violated. Thus were the Charter of the United 
Nations and its Resolutions disfigured, for they had recognized the Palestinian Arab people’s 
national rights, including the right of return, the right to independence, the right to sovereignty 
over territory and homeland. 
In Palestine and on its perimeters, in exile distant and near, the Palestinian Arab people never 
faltered and never abandoned its conviction in its rights of Return and independence. 
Occupation, massacres and dispersion achieved no gain in the unabated Palestinian 
consciousness of self and political identity, as Palestinians went forward with their destiny, 
undeterred and unbowed. And from out of the long years of trial in ever mounting struggle, the 
Palestinian political identity emerged further consolidated and confirmed. And the collective 
Palestinian national will forged for itself a political embodiment, the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, its sole, legitimate representative recognized by the world community as a whole, 
as well as by related regional and international institutions. Standing on the very rock of 
conviction in the Palestinian people’s inalienable rights, and on the ground of Arab national 
consensus and of international legitimacy, the PLO led the campaigns of its great people, molded 
into unity and powerful resolve, one and indivisible in its triumphs, even as it suffered massacres 
and confinement within and without its home. And so Palestinian resistance was clarified and 
raised into the forefront of Arab and world awareness, as the struggle of the Palestinian Arab 
people achieved unique prominence among the world’s liberation movements in the modern era. 
The massive national uprising, the intifada, now intensifying in cumulative scope and power on 
occupied Palestinian territories, as well as the unflinching resistance of the refugee camps 
outside the homeland, have elevated awareness of the Palestinian truth and right into still higher 
realms of comprehension and actuality. Now at least the curtain has been dropped around a 
whole epoch of prevarication and negation. The intifada has set siege to the mind of official 
Israel, which has for too long relied exclusively upon myth and terror to deny Palestinian 
existence altogether. Because of the intifada and its revolutionary irreversible impulse, the 
history of Palestine has therefore arrived at a decisive juncture. 
Whereas the Palestinian people reaffirms most definitively its inalienable rights in the land of its 
patrimony: Now by virtue of natural, historical and legal rights, and the sacrifices of successive 
generations who gave of themselves in defense of the freedom and independence of their 
homeland; In pursuance of Resolutions adopted by Arab Summit Conferences and relying on the 
authority bestowed by international legitimacy as embodied in the Resolutions of the United 
Nations Organization since 1947; And in exercise by the Palestinian Arab people of its rights to 
self-determination, political independence and sovereignty over its territory, The Palestine 
National Council, in the name of God, and in the name of the Palestinian Arab people, hereby 
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proclaims the establishment of the State of Palestine on our Palestinian territory with its capital 
Jerusalem (Al-Quds Ash-Sharif). 
The State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be. The state is for them to 
enjoy in it their collective national and cultural identity, theirs to pursue in it a complete equality 
of rights. In it will be safeguarded their political and religious convictions and their human 
dignity by means of a parliamentary democratic system of governance, itself based on freedom 
of expression and the freedom to form parties. The rights of minorities will duly be respected by 
the majority, as minorities must abide by decisions of the majority. Governance will be based on 
principles of social justice, equality and non-discrimination in public rights of men or women, on 
grounds of race, religion, color or sex, under the aegis of a constitution which ensures the rule of 
law and an independent judiciary. Thus shall these principles allow no departure from Palestine’s 
age-old spiritual and civilizational heritage of tolerance and religious coexistence? 
The State of Palestine is an Arab state, an integral and indivisible part of the Arab nation, at one 
with that nation in heritage and civilization, with it also in its aspiration for liberation, progress, 
democracy and unity. The State of Palestine affirms its obligation to abide by the Charter of the 
League of Arab States, whereby the coordination of the Arab states with each other shall be 
strengthened. It calls upon Arab compatriots to consolidate and enhance the emergence in reality 
of our state, to mobilize potential, and to intensify efforts whose goal is to and Israeli occupation. 
The State of Palestine proclaims its commitment to the principles and purposes the United 
Nations, and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It proclaims its commitment as well 
to the principles and policies of the Non-Aligned Movement. 
It further announces itself to be a peace-loving state, in adherence to the principles of peaceful 
coexistence. It will join with all states and peoples in order assure a permanent peace based upon 
justice and the respect of rights so that humanity’s potential for well-being may be assured, an 
earnest competition for excellence may be maintained, and in which confidence in the future will 
eliminate fear for those who are just and for whom justice is the only recourse. 
In the context of its struggle for peace in the land of Love and Peace, the State of Palestine calls 
upon the United Nations to bear special responsibility for the Palestinian Arab people and its 
homeland. It calls upon all peace-and freedom-loving peoples and states to assist it in the 
attainment of its objectives, to provide it with security, to alleviate the tragedy of its people, and 
to help it terminate Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories. 
The State of Palestine herewith declares that it believes in the settlement of regional and 
international disputes by peaceful means, in accordance with the UN Charter and resolutions. 
Without prejudice to its natural right to defend its territorial integrity and independence, it 
therefore rejects the threat or use of force, violence and terrorism against its territorial integrity 
or political independence, as it also rejects their use against the territorial integrity of other states. 
Therefore, on this day unlike all others, November 15, 1988, as we stand at the threshold of a 
new dawn, in all honor and modesty we humbly bow to the sacred spirits of our fallen ones, 
Palestinian and Arab, by the purity of whose sacrifice for the homeland our sky has been 
illuminated and our Land given life. Our hearts are lifted up and irradiated by the light emanating 
from the much blessed intifada, from those who have endured and have fought the fight of the 
camps, of dispersion, of exile, from those who have borne the standard for freedom, our, 
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children, our aged, our youth, our prisoners, detainees and wounded, all those whose ties to our 
sacred soil are confirmed in camp, village and town. We render special tribute to that brave 
Palestinian Woman, guardian of sustenance and Life, keeper of our people’s perennial flame. To 
the souls of our sainted martyrs, to the whole of our Palestinian Arab people, to all free and 
honorable peoples everywhere, we pledge that our struggle shall be continued until the 
occupation ends, and the foundation of our sovereignty and independence shall be fortified 
accordingly. 
Therefore, we call upon our great people to rally to the banner of Palestine, to cherish and defend 
it, so that it may forever be the symbol of our freedom and dignity in that homeland, which is a 
homeland for the free, now and always. 
In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful: "Say: O God, Master of the Kingdom, 
Thou givest the Kingdom to whom Thou wilt, and seizest the Kingdom from whom Thou wilt, 
Thou exaltest whom Thou wilt, and Thou abasest whom Thou wilt; in Thy hand is the good; 
Thou art powerful over everything." Sadaqa Allahu al-Azim.  
 
Say, "O God, Owner of Sovereignty. You grant sovereignty to whom You will, and You strip sovereignty from whom you will. 
You honor whom you will, and You humiliate whom you will. In Your hand is all goodness. You are Capable of all things." 
Surah 3, Al- ‘Imran, verse 26 
Say: "O Allah! Lord of Power (And Rule), Thou givest power to whom Thou pleasest, and Thou strippest off power from whom Thou pleasest: Thou enduest with 
honour whom Thou pleasest, and Thou bringest low whom Thou pleasest: In Thy hand is all good. Verily, over all things Thou hast power.   
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